

EU AND NATO: WHOSE IS THE VICTORY OVER MANAGING CRISES?

Claudia Fahron-Hussey, *Military Crisis Management Operations by NATO and the EU: The Decision-Making Process*, Springer VS, 2019, pp. 337.

In her pioneering monograph, Claudia Fahron-Hussey provides a conceptual framework with predictive value for scholars and policy-makers interested in the military responses of NATO and the EU. In the affluence of existing literature, we can reveal the “body of knowledge” largely founded on the insights referred to the EU-NATO relationship and their military operations separately (Biermann and Koops 2017; Smith and Gebhard 2017). Emphasising criteria for their effectiveness, theoretical and empirical foundation of knowledge tends to neglect the importance of the decision-making process in these two organisations (Rodt 2011; Rodt 2014). Consequently, many scholars and students get the impression of a blurred image about the division of labour between the EU and NATO. Since the security realm is an open question, Fahron-Hussey with her book fills the research gap about the very important empirical phenomenon. Accordingly, she raises two main points in her introductory observations. First, the EU and NATO represent two international organisations, which are struggling for the new strategic positioning after the end of the Cold War. Second, there is a significant operational overlap between these two organisations in the field of military crisis management. Bearing in mind these two constellations, the author poses a research puzzle asking a key question: why is an authorisation given to either NATO, the EU, or both NATO and the EU to intervene militarily in a conflict?

It is worth mentioning that the book represents an updated version of Claudia Fahron-Hussey’s dissertation, so it can serve as an exemplary guide for PhD students who are in the process of writing their doctoral thesis. The structure of the book follows a logical sequence of research divarication, contained in seven chapters: 1) the first one that follows research design (research question, political and academic relevance, state of research, methods); 2) the second chapter reflects the empirical puzzle of the book, through which are selected pivotal players of the EU and NATO; 3) the third chapter depicts the theoretical framework with a refinement of the principal-agent approach; 4) the fourth part of the book is dedicated to the first case study, the NATO operation in Libya in early 2011; 5) the fifth chapter explains the decision for EU operation

Chad/CAR in 2007; 6) the sixth chapter and the last case study analyse the decision for NATO operations and an EU operation in the Horn of Africa in late 2008; 7) and lastly, the seventh chapter is based on the achievements and limitations of the research.

The theoretical framework of the research goes beyond mainstream theories of international relations, often used to explain the deployment of military operations. Primarily aimed to resolve the empirical riddle, this study also emphasises the theoretical aim embodied in the refinement of the principal-agent approach. Originated from political economy, the principal-agent theory was limited to narrow institutional and economic clarifications, without further examination of delegation in security affairs. Revealing the possibility of multiple agents in the principal-agent hierarchy, Fahron-Hussey notices that organisations can be divided into two roles. The first role of agents belongs to NATO or the EU, as collectivities, and the second role of principals is attributed to their Member States. Through the decision-making process in the EU and NATO, Claudia Fahron-Hussey explores the conditions under which they receive authorisation to launch a military crisis management operation. A succinctly posed research problem has been elaborated by focusing on pivotal states: the United States, Great Britain, France and Germany. Further operationalisation develops two distinct indicators for the concept of agent characteristics. The first indicator is the “capabilities” or characteristics of international organisations, based on insights combined from the principal-agent approach and organisational sociology. Hence, the positivist interpretation of military apparatus has been overcome by the other, soft side of the coin, composed of non-material features. An indispensable part of further examination is the experiences and preferences used as the second indicator of agency characteristics.

Claudia Fahron-Hussey tests principal-agent explication in three detailed case studies by applying the method of process tracing. Since the tracing process is based on the establishment of a dependent and independent variable, she had to suggest certain correlations in each case study and offer alternative explanations of the state-centric institutional perspective and neorealist explanation. The first case study is the NATO operation in Lybia in 2011. By analysing official speeches, interviews, press conferences and messages of representatives, Fahron-Hussey tries to determine the attitude of a particular country towards a particular crisis, which thus guides the entire crisis management of an organisation. Almost every pivotal player voted for military engagement except Germany, which was against it. Diffusion in the process making was prevailed by UK preferences and bureaucratic actors within both NATO and the EU. Their lobbying efforts included agent characteristics of their organisation when they pointed out NATO’s structures, assets, and experience as well as its preferences, which were in line with the preferences of the pivotal players within the principal. In contrast,

the EU's representatives made it clear that their organisation should not carry out the military intervention in Libya (p. 151). None of the alternative explanations of the NATO operation in Libya has explained this case. First of all, the state-centric institutional hypothesis was not relevant since the Europeans were not dependent on US military support and the US was interested in the military operation, which would lead to both NATO and EU operations (p. 151). The neorealist hypothesis did not have any explanatory power in the Libya case either, since the US had, compared with France, a lower interest in the crisis region, which would lead to an EU operation (p. 151). Although the neorealist perspective was not obvious by the lack of consensus among the pivotal players, the fact that only NATO conducted the military intervention in Libya means that we should look for a third alternative explanation. In fact, this case demonstrates that the role of bureaucratic actors has become more and more significant.

The second case study was Operation EUFOR Chad/RCA. Even though it was a direct result of the European Union's response to the Darfur crisis, the area of military engagement was in Chad and the Central African Republic, instead of in Sudan. The principal-agent relationship showed that the agency characteristics of the European Union were more suitable than NATO's with regard to a military reaction to the humanitarian disaster in Chad and the CAR. This was confirmed by more suitable material and non-material capabilities of the EU, namely important military resources and significant experience of carrying out military operations in Africa and cooperating with the UN. Strong evidence existed for all parts of the causal mechanism of the principal-agent hypothesis (p. 193). The US saw the EU as the right agent for conducting a military operation in Chad/CAR. The UK and Germany were sceptical about intervening in the two countries, but France argued strongly for an EU operation in Chad/CAR. While NATO's representatives did not lobby for a military operation in Chad and the CAR by their organisation, the EU's representatives like Bernard Kuschner were engaged in intensive lobbying efforts and obtained the consent of other countries to respond to the regional crisis with an EU military operation. Relevant material and immaterial predispositions of the organisation protecting Sudanese refugees in eastern Chad and the northeastern CAR coincided with the preferences of the pivotal player - France in the role of the principal. In this case study, both alternative explanations proved to be affirmative. The state-centric institutional hypothesis was also confirmed because the Europeans did not need US military support for the operation, and the US was not interested in the military operation. The neorealist hypothesis also had explanatory power in the Chad/CAR case, since France compared with the US, had a higher interest in the crisis region.

The third case study was represented through the Operation Allied Provider, the Operation Allied Protector, the Operation Ocean Shield, and the

EUNAVFOR Atalanta off the Horn of Africa. NATO's agent characteristics and the EU's agent characteristics were equally suitable with regard to a military reaction to piracy off the Horn of Africa, in 2008. Both NATO and the EU had highly suitable material and non-material capabilities. Also, they had highly suitable preferences, since both organisations wanted to join the fight against piracy off the coast of Somalia. Preferences of the pivotal players, such as the US, the UK, Germany, and France were compatible, with Germany being the only one that did not have a problem with NATO having a share in the fight against piracy. Unlike the previous mission, the lobbying efforts came more from NATO's representatives. The state-centric institutional hypothesis had explanatory power in the case of the Horn of Africa because the Europeans did not need US military support and the US was interested enough in the military operation (p. 238). On the other side, the neorealist hypothesis has not been confirmed, since the US compared with France, had a lower interest in the Horn of Africa. On the contrary, their highly ambitious interests would lead to an EU operation only (p. 238).

Claudia Fahrion-Hussey's monograph provides a systematic analysis of the decision-making process in NATO and the EU, in order to explain different military outcomes. Speaking the language of academic prudence, the author succeeds to resolve the empirical riddle and make a twofold contribution embodied in theoretical knowledge and policy recommendations. Completing the rationalist approach with constructivist elements from a sociological perspective, the book represents innovative utilisation of the principal-agent conception in terms of international relations and international security. When it comes to the political relevance of research, revelation lies in an empirical pattern with a predictive value for policy-makers. Composing a mosaic of different preferences among pivotal players in NATO and the EU, Fahrion-Hussey identifies strategies to gain organisational support in a military response to the crisis. Uncovering the race to take authority over military crisis management operations, this remarkable study sheds more light on the challenging nature of EU-NATO relations.

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Jovanka KUVKALOVIĆ-STAMATOVIĆ