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COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY INTEGRATION PROCESS THROUGH THE LENS OF SERBIA AND TURKEY NEGOTIATION

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Abstract: The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union (EU CSDP) integration is the unique type of defence integration at the supranational level. As a major part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (EU CFSP), the range of the EU CSDP is not strictly limited to its member states, but is open to the candidate countries as well. This paper aims to inspect to what extent the general integration process with the European Union correlates with the CFSP/CSDP one. The integration process will be inspected through two main variables: alignment record with the EU's CFSP/CSDP decisions and the participation in the EU CSDP missions and operations, as the most notable and visible element of the CSDP. For the study cases, Turkey and Serbia as candidate countries have been chosen. Authors have used the European Commission's annual Progress Reports for the two countries for the last 10 years (2016 inclusive), in order to determine the quality and level of integration in the EU CFSP/CSDP field. The results indicate that even though Serbia has gone further in the general EU accession process and *acquis communautaire* harmonization, Turkey is more integrated into the EU CSDP elements.

Key words: EU, CFSP, CSDP, defence, integration, Turkey, Serbia, Progress Report.

INTRODUCTION

Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union, has provided an important place in the EU integration process.³ The CFSP has been

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³ By Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), in this paper it will be also assessed the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as a major part of the previously mentioned policy.

developed to establish common principles and guidelines for foreign policy and security issues, to develop common diplomatic approaches, and to co-operate with common actions (Jopp, 1996, p. 153). Because of their commitment to the national interests of the member states, the CFSP, which is a difficult process, has become a policy desired by all. Having needed an effective, reliable and strong CFSP in order to be a global force, the EU accelerated its efforts to establish the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)⁴ which constitutes a significant part of the CFSP. The CFSP was established with Part V of the Maastricht Treaty, which was signed on 7 February 1992. With the decision of the Council of Europe's policy was taken an important step in the political union (Missiroli, 2000, p. 1-47). The European Union has established the task of the High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in November 1999 as an indication of the importance of the CFSP. The Nice Treaty in 2001 has increased the powers of the Political and Security Committee in crisis management to make the process of the Common Foreign and Security Policy even easier.

Furthermore, it has been decided that the majority of the decisions, which are taken by vote, will be taken by qualified majority. Thus, the scope of decisions to be made by qualified voting multiples has been expanded (Peterson, 1998, p. 3-18). The CFSP has become part of the EU's external action with the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force in December 2009. Within the Lisbon Treaty, in order to increase the effectiveness of the CFSP and to ensure that the EU acts as a more coherent actor in the foreign policy area, the European High Commissioner, as well as the European diplomatic service Europe External Relations Service were established.

At the same time, the High Representative and Vice-President of the European Commission heads the EU Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), which brings together the foreign ministers of the EU member states every month and informs the Council on foreign affairs (European Union External Action, 2016). The main roles of the EU's external and security policy are peacekeeping, strengthening international security and the promotion of international cooperation. In a wider sense, there is democracy promotion, among which the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, as the most important. The EU plays a key role in the international arena, ranging from global warming to the Middle East peace process. The CFSP, which advances on the basis of diplomacy, is supported by a number of instruments in the fields of trade, aid, security and defence, if necessary for the development of a solution and a common understanding of armed conflicts. At the same time, the EU is the world's leading donor of international development assistance (Mix, 2013, p. 1-29). The EU is one of the major powers of the world

⁴ The ESDP has been renamed into the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), after the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009. The "CSDP" abbreviation will be used for all the occurrences described after 2009.

without a pretence of being able to grasp the entire landscape of the policy (Kurowska et al., its size coming from economical, financial and commercial aspects. The weight of the EU, which plays an important role in global relations, is increasing as the EU member states act jointly in the field of common foreign policy.

Even though the EU does not have an army, under the CSDP, *ad hoc* forces are being created by EU member states for common disarmament operations, rescue operations, military consultation and assistance, conflict prevention and peacekeeping, crisis intervention, peace building and post-conflict stability. The EU has launched 23 civilian missions and military operations over three continents during the last decade.⁵ As of January 2007, the EU has the capacity to deploy emergency response operations. The decision to dispatch troops or initiate an operation is taken by the relevant ministers of the EU member states at the European Council (European Union, 2016). Various research on the nature and defence integration process have been done. On the theoretical level, there are many different views on how to do CFSP integration research (Kurowska et al., 2012).

Applying the multi theoretical approach within the EU CSDP integration is possible only in case of establishing the different discourse of opinions within the academic community. Some authors, however, have used several approaches in research on several different CSDP elements. This implies that they have attempted an explanation of some aspect of CSDP (Kurowska et al., 2012). This study will compare Serbia and Turkey, the candidate countries for the EU membership, in the context of their pre-accession integration in the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The study will seek to answer the question of which country is more compatible and more active in the EU's CFSP. The two countries represent the illustrative samples for an adequate assessment of whether the EU CFSP/CSDP integration correlates with the general political integration within the full membership of the EU. The authors will try to imply the aspects and characteristics of the CFSP/CSDP for both countries. Our work compares the Progress Reports of the two countries for the last ten years (2016 inclusive) and the Enlargement Strategy documents. In this context, we will work with an explanatory and non-interpretative approach. This article is structured as follows. First, we implied the key facts and highlight events from Turkish and Serbian general (and CFSP/CSDP) accession paths.

Afterwards, we examined the CFSP/CSDP integration level through the countries' participation in the CSDP missions and operations, and the alignment with the European Council's CFSP/CSDP decisions, as well. Based on the main findings, we assessed whether the security and defence integration correlates with

⁵ The full and updated information on conducted missions and operations could be seen at the following link: https://ec.europa.eu/topics/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en (Accessed on December 25, 2016)

the general accession to the EU membership, and which country is more integrated into the CFSP/CSDP.

TURKEY IN THE CFSP PROCESS: A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Turkey showed a pro-Western stance in order to ensure its security against the USSR threat, which it faced after the Second World War. The USA tried to provide Turkey's security against the USSR within the Truman Doctrine in 1947. However, Turkey has also been included in the Marshall Plan, which is foreseen for reconstruction and revitalization of European states that have been damaged by war (Hale, 2002, p. 110). In addition, Turkey became a member of NATO in 1952, guaranteeing its national security and beginning to play a deterrent role against the USSR in the southeast wing of NATO. In other words, Turkey has made important contributions to Western and European security as a NATO member, since by that time, the common enemy, the USSR, brought them together (Udum, 2002, p. 72-73). However, this process has begun to create problems for Turkey with ESDP. At the Nice Summit in December 2000, Turkey has not been accepted to take part in ESDP's decision-making mechanism and the status of the advisory task in the Emergency Response Force, which has been granted to NATO member states, which are not EU members, but directly involved in the activities under the ESDP (Official Journal of European Communities, 2001, p. 1-87). During the process, in the Washington Summit, which took place in April 1999, it was decided that NATO members who were members of the WEU, would be able to participate in equal rights with the use of NATO facilities.

According to the decisions taken in NATO, it has also been said that these members have the right to vote when the EU approves the use of NATO opportunities (NATO, 2016). Turkey has not been able to stay away from the developments in NATO's European foot, while NATO wanted to be the most effective institution in European security. Seen by the USA, Turkey's presence in European security is very important. Umbach argues that this is a consequence of the US interest which claims that Turkey should follow and implement a more effective policy in Eurasia by taking the support of Europe (Umbach, 2016). With the formation of the ESDP and the termination of the WEU, Turkey was excluded from the ESDP's decision-making mechanism (European Parliament, 2016).

In this sense, Turkey, which actively participates in the exchange of views with non-EU and non-EU NATO members in the context of the development of CSDP, postulated some regulations of the status of the ESDP for its own national interests to accede to the use of NATO facilities and capabilities in EU operations and to implement the EU's Petersberg Tasks (Western European Union, 2016). This has shaken US plans and has become a problem for EU-NATO relations.

Turkey also claimed that it would use the veto concession stemming from NATO membership, based on the decisions taken at the Washington Summit in April 1999. On top of that, Turkey has vetoed its one-year agreement on the safe access of NATO to its capabilities and capabilities (Tocci and Houben, 2001, p.6). In this context, negotiations were held between the United States, Britain and Turkey before the Laeken Summit in December 2001. Consequently, the Ankara Memorandum was signed to ensure reconciliation.

In this Memorandum, ESDP was considered operational and a content satisfying Turkey was created. Turkey has said that NATO's decision-making authority is transferred to the EU if NATO capabilities and capabilities are used by the EU, and NATO states should take part in EU decision-making as representatives of such an authority. Moreover, despite the use of NATO capabilities and capabilities, Turkey said that it was contrary to the decisions taken at the Washington Summit that such a competence was not granted to Turkey in spite of the fact that there were states such as Austria and Finland, who were not NATO members (Morgan, 2004, p. 391). However, Turkey was worried that the EU might use it in the Aegean and Cyprus in an EU operation. It was guaranteed to Turkey that its problems with Greece will be excluded from the role of the European Army if the European Army has ever been planned to be established (Schwok and Maspoli, 2003, p. 147). On the other hand, Turkey stated that it was sufficient for the decision-making mechanism for overcoming bottleneck not to be in the whole process, but only to have a say in the planning and implementation dimension of the action. It was also agreed that if an EU operation was carried out close to the geographical area of a NATO ally, and that the national security interests were affected, the opinion of this country for the operation will be taken, but the final word would have been given by the EU bodies (Peters, 2004, p. 4).

At the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002, when these resolutions were approved, Greece was also pleased, claiming that the ESDP would, in no case, be used against a NATO ally and that NATO would, under no circumstances, oppose the EU and its members (WEU Secretariat General, 2016). On the other hand, Turkey has been very interested in ESDP since its "inauguration" in the field in 2003 and the conclusion of Berlin Plus regulations. In this sense, Turkey has sent forces to EU police missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and FYROM and has the potential to participate in international peace studies (European Commission, 2008). Turkey, on the other hand, was hindering Cyprus by participating in operations to be conducted through NATO facilities and denying access to NATO's confidential documents on the grounds that Cyprus has not signed the Partnership for Peace with NATO (European Commission, 2016).

In addition, Turkey vetoed the participation of Cyprus in the Wassenaar Convention on Export Control of Conventional Weapons, Dual Use Materials and Technologies, as it is excluded from CSDP (European Commission, 2016, p. 93).

This process continues today without any improvement. The EU expects Turkey to take a step in this direction (European Commission, 2015). Turkey's geo-strategic position gives the country a vital role in the EU's energy security, particularly diversification of energy sources. Closer energy cooperation between the EU and Turkey is essential. Turkey will play an important role in the security of energy supply. Existing and future pipeline projects are resources for all countries through which territory they pass, especially for Turkey. According to EU Enlargement Strategy Document 2008, the Southern Gas Corridor and the Nabucco gas pipeline, was among the EU's highest energy security priorities (European Commission, 2008, p. 5).

ADAPTATION OF TURKEY ON CSDP AS A PART OF PROGRESS REPORTS AND ENLARGEMENT STRATEGY DOCUMENTS

According to the 2007 Progress Report, the administrative capacity of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in line with the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (European Commission, 2007). It further strengthened the institutional structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this context, there is a Political Director and officials who are in contact with the EU. In the field of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Turkey is party to all international contracts. In December 2006, the Assembly adopted the law on the implementation of the UN Chemical Weapons Convention. Turkey was involved in the EU Council's Joint Action on Small and Light Weapons and was working to fully align the arms export system with the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (EU Commission, 2007, p. 13). According to EU Enlargement Strategy 2009, Turkey has further strengthened its contribution to the stabilisation of regions such as the South Caucasus and the Middle East. Regarding relations with the South Caucasus, Turkey has close relations with Azerbaijan and Georgia. Turkey has an active and constructive role in the Middle East.

In harmony with the EU position, it has continued to support the Middle East Peace Process, including the Annapolis process (European Commission, 2008, p. 44). Turkey explained the unity of Palestine, its support for reconciliation and has continued to contribute to the establishment of stability in Lebanon through diplomatic activities and participation in UNIFIL (European Commission, 2008, p. 37). It has also strengthened its diplomatic relations with Iraq Kurdish government in Iraq and Armenia (European Commission, 2009, p. 74).

Turkey has increased its positive role in the development of regional stability, particularly in the Caucasus and the Middle East. According to 2008 Progress Report, Turkey gave efforts to stabilize the Iraq and maintain close diplomatic relations, including contacts with the regional Kurdish government (European Commission, 2008, p. 39-40). On the other hand, according to the same report

Turkey remained an important actor in the crisis in Syria, continuing its support to the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces. It contributed to lay the groundwork for the International Syria Support Group (ISSG) and supported the run-up to the UN-sponsored talks in Geneva. Turkey stepped up its involvement in the coalition against Da'esh, continued air strikes against Da'esh positions, joined the coalition's airstrikes and measures to prevent cross-border activities by Da'esh fighters (European Commission, 2016, p. 93). Within the framework of the zero problems with neighbourhood policy, efforts have been made to normalize relations with neighbouring countries, including Turkey, Greece and Armenia, and the Kurdish Regional Government.

But Turkey breaks relations with Israel significantly due to blue Marmara (European Commission, 2010, pp. 56). After Blue Marmara, relations with Israel have further deteriorated since the Gaza Flotilla incident occurred in 2010 (European Commission, 2011, p. 80). According to 2016 Progress Report, Turkey's relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government remained stable. But Turkey continued to conduct air strikes against PKK camps in Iraqi Kurdistan. Regarding the relations with the United States, Turkey allowed the US access to the Incirlik airbase used by the coalition forces, which remained crucial. The US support to Democratic Unity Party/Public Protection Associations within the framework of the fight against Da'esh remained controversial in Turkey (European Commission, 2016, p. 92). Nevertheless, Turkey did not recognize the Crimean operation by Russia and proposed to contribute to the EUAM in Ukraine. But Turkey has not participated in the EU's decisions and restrictive measures in this regard.

It is thought that Turkey will be at risk against Russia, which wants to increase its activity in the Black Sea by annexing the Crimea. Turkey, which did not want relations with Russia to be injured, was diplomatically condemned to the annexation of the Crimea and supports the EU's development of Ukrainian relations with its inability to participate in the decisions and measures of the EU. However, from time to time Turkey has not participated in some elements of the EU's CFSP. According to EU Enlargement Strategy 2011, Turkey did not align with EU restrictive measures on Iran, Libya or Syria. No progress was made in the normalisation of ties with Armenia due to the problems experienced in the Armenian opening in 2009. After the protocols signed between Turkey and Armenia on 10 October 2009, relations have begun to normalize. But in January 2010, the decision of the Armenian Constitutional Court negatively affected relations. According to this ruling, the Constitutional Court found the signing of the protocols positive for Turkey's recognition of the events of 1915 as genocide. Turkey has found this situation unacceptable and relations have been deteriorated again (Foreign Policy Institute, 1989, p. 36).

SERBIA IN THE CFSP PROCESS: A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

As from the Turkish perspective, Serbia does not have such a rich experience in the EU accession process. The first moves towards the full membership of all the Western Balkans countries have been made at the EU-Western Balkans countries Summit in 2003, which succeeded the Zagreb Summit, held in 2000. The Declaration adopted in Thessaloniki stipulated the respect of international law, inviolability of international borders, peaceful resolution of conflicts and regional co-operation among the Western Balkans countries (European Commission, 2003).

What further impeded the Serbian (and Montenegrin) EU Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) negotiations was the referendum in Montenegro (2006), which created two independent accession negotiation processes.

Since the SAA negotiations had already been started in 2005, Serbia became the *volens-nolens* successor in the negotiation process. The negotiations have been called off since Serbia did not fulfil its commitments towards the International Court Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In 2012, the European Commission granted Serbia a member candidate status. The EU SAA concluded with Serbia entered into force in 2013.

Serbia was faced with the unilaterally self-declared independence of its southern province Kosovo in 2008. This has distanced out Serbia from the EU CSFP in particular. At first, leading EU member states recognized its independence and afterwards, most of them did so. By the end of 2016, there were five EU member states that did not recognize Kosovo's independence (Slovakia, Spain, Cyprus, Romania and Greece). Slovenia was the presiding member state at the time of Kosovan independence declaration in 2008. Unlike Turkish actions within the Cypriot presidency (2012) when Turkey did not comply with most of CFSP/CSDP decisions, Serbia did not make any significant negative movements towards the CFSP/CSDP.

In 2010, a year after the EU decided to maintain its visa-free regime with Serbia, in the Report it was stated that Serbia was 'moderately advanced' in visa and border management (European Commission, 2010). In 2012, Serbia ratified an agreement which represented a framework for its military forces to participate in the EU CSDP military operations. After being granted a candidate status, Serbia started to participate in the meetings with the EU Military Committee in 2012 (European Commission, 2012). Serbian Parliament adopted a law on an annual plan for use of the Serbian Army and other defence forces within the multinational operations (Narodna Skupština, 2013). It is worthy to mention that for the last 5 years, when it comes to conflict prevention, no particular development could be reported in any report from 2012.

There is one main problem which could potentially impede Serbian integration within the CFSP/CSDP. At the beginning of 2016, Serbian Parliament adopted the Law on international restrictive measures, according to which, "Serbia will implement

or revoke restrictive measures in line with the decisions adopted by the UN, the OSCE and other international organizations in which Serbia participates actively, and the other decisions, when they are in line with the Serbian foreign policy goals” (Narodna skupština, 2016: art. 1). Among the restrictive measures, the Law incriminates “partial or complete interruption of economic and financial relations” (Narodna skupština, 2016: art. 4). The EU imposed economic sanctions on Russia following its actions in Ukraine. This issue has led to the biggest discrepancy in foreign policy views of Serbia and the EU. The Commission has several times strongly criticized Serbia concerning the rules on imposing the sanctions towards the third party.

The sanctions are being prolonged ordinarily in every six months. On July 1st, the Council decided to prolong the economic sanctions targeting specific sectors of the Russian economy until 31 January 2017. The Republic of Serbia has been “accused” for not following the EU’s official CFSP decisions, concerning the sanctions towards Russia. Its government states that this law does not involve decisions of the international organizations in which Serbia is not a full member. In those cases, Serbia can act in line with its “foreign policy goals” (Narodna skupština, 2016: art. 4). For the purpose of more comprehensive understanding of the CFSP/CSDP integration, several additional factors should be taken into consideration. Besides the restrictive measures, as a part of CFSP/CSDP integration process, participation within the CSDP missions and operations should be also involved.

Serbian Army actively participates within the CSDP military operations EU NAVFOR *Atalanta* in Somalia, as well as EU Training Mission in Somalia, EU Training Mission in Mali and in EUFOR RCA in the Central African Republic (European Commission, 2016). Within the mentioned crisis management operations, Serbia’s participation is unpretentious. In all EU missions and operations, Serbia participates with only 12 personnel, of which 6 in the EUTM Somalia, 3 in EU NAVFOR *Atalanta* and 3 in EUTM Mali (Serbian Army, 2016). As far as the official negotiation process is concerned, at the beginning of 2017, Serbia has not yet opened Chapter 31 (on the EU CSFP/CSDP).


TURKEY’S AND SERBIA’S ALIGNMENT WITH THE EU CFSP/CSDP

As stated earlier, this article aims at comparing the Turkish and Serbian CFSP/CSDP participation, in light of their general accession paths to the EU.⁶ In this part, we will examine the interrelation between Turkish and Serbian alignments

⁶ All negotiations led concerning 35 Chapters in the accession process are considered as the “general accession path” to the European Union in sense of this article. As defined by the European Commission, general negotiation talks are in an “ongoing phase” by the moment of ratification the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), signed with the negotiation parties.

towards the European Council's decisions and resolutions made within the year. The data analyzed below are taken from the annual Progress reports issued by the European Commission for two countries, respectively. From 2012, the Progress reports got improved with significant statistical information. The latter reports provide a total number of Council's decisions within the CFSP/CSDP area, and the record of alignment for every single country expressed in percentage and by share of the countries' decision on the national level that followed Council ones.

Table 1: Alignment records of Serbia and Turkey towards the European Council's decisions 2012-2016



Source: European Commission Progress Reports (2012–2016 period).

In 2012, Serbia aligned its foreign policy 99% with the EU Council's CFSP/CSDP decisions (European Commission, 2012). It has been the highest alignment rate ever since this country negotiated for the EU membership.

Since 2013, Serbian alignment records have been continuously going down. Among the potential causes for this, there could be the lack of consensus over what should be the main Serbia's foreign policy goal. Not only Serbian key political actors, but the even wider public is divided over should Serbia become the EU member state. As mentioned before, it did not join EU's sanctions towards Russian Federation. Besides, there is also a necessity to determine the nature of the adopted Council's decisions. Wong (2015) argues that before 2013 most of the decisions were focused on the "internal" dimension of the EU CFSP/CSDP.

The most important of them were strictly dedicated to CSFP/CSDP development and its further integration. As a candidate member, Serbia was obliged to harmonize its legislative with the *acquis communautaire* in this area, so that could be a possible reason for following most of the decisions in the years before 2013. From 2013 on, the nature of CFSP/CSDP decisions was turned towards "external" dimension of those policies, predominantly towards the African continent, in which the EU have imposed many sanctions in line with its sanctions policy.

Wong argues that from 2013, the nature of EU CFSP decisions has primarily been moved to the “external dimension” (Wong, 2015). On the other side, Turkish record of alignment varies over the time. For instance, the biggest deviation within the measured period was in 2014, then Turkey failed to follow almost all Council’s decisions. In his latest book, Adrian Daniel Stan argues that this could possibly be the consequence of the migrant crisis which culminated in 2015, and the 3 billion EUR ‘heavy agreement between the EU and Turkey’ (Stan, 2015). Nevertheless, it is for sure that those two candidate countries do not fully follow the CFSP decisions, which would not be the case of any other EU member state, which are obliged to do so.

Turkey participated in 45 of the 46 CFSP decisions in 2007. According to the 2008 Progress Report, it participated in 109 of the 124 declarations (European Commission, 2008). This rate went lower in 2011, with 32 out of 67 CFSP decisions alignment (European Commission, 2011, p. 40). But this trend was changed in the second half of 2012 during the Cypriot presidency over the EU. Turkey-EU relations have come to a freezing point due to the fact that Cyprus became a member of the EU in 2004 and the crisis that occurred between Turkey and the EU in 2006 due to Cyprus. According to 2007 EU enlargement Strategy document Turkey is expected to ensure full, non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement and to make progress towards normalisation of bilateral relations with the Republic of Cyprus (European Commission, 2007, pp. 9-12). Thereby Turkey has not participated in any declaration of the EU within the framework of international organizations in this period. However, Turkey has participated in the invitation of 45 EU Declarations and 13 Council Decisions (European Commission, 2013). This rate has increased again in the following years.

According to the 2015 Progress Report, Turkey participated in 16 of the 40 EU declarations to which it was invited (European Commission, 2015). Turkey, however, is actively involved in many operations under the CSDP. For example, the NATO Peacekeeping Force (SFOR) in Bosnia was transferred to the EU Task Force (EUFOR) at the NATO Summit held in Istanbul on 28-29 June 2004. Turkey has accepted this situation and has participated to this force that includes 370 troops out of 7000 in total (European Commission, 2012). Meanwhile, Turkey has also supported the integrated police unit established in the EU with 23 gendarmes. Likewise, it supports EUPOL-KINHASSA power in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the framework of the ESDP. Moreover, Turkey ratified the agreement in April 2007 on participation in EU crisis management operations (European Commission, 2007). However, Turkey also wishes to increase cooperation and active participation in the ESDP decision-making process (European Commission, 2016, p. 92).

Turkey supports the EUPM II Police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and EUPOL KINSHASA in the Republic of Congo.

In addition, Turkey supports NATO's Darfur Peacekeeping mission (European Commission, 2007). However, Turkey is also supporting the EU's rule of superiority mission in Kosovo (EULEX) (European Commission, 2016, p. 93).

CONCLUSION

This article analyzed the two different accession paths to the European Union. The evaluation was carried out in the context of the CFSP/CSDP integration. In this context, the authors tried to evaluate the EU negotiation processes of the two countries. From 31 July 1959 until today, Turkey-EU relations have been experiencing turbulent times as well as the beautiful periods. After the problems arising from Cyprus in 2006, Turkey-EU relations have come to the freezing point. The Positive Agenda was launched in 2012 to revitalize relations and continue negotiations. In December 2013, Readmission Agreement and a Roadmap for the Visa liberalization was signed on the Positive Agenda, which revived the relationship between the two sides. Negotiations within the scope of the Roadmap for Visa Liberation are still in progress. Turkey has gone a long way in this process. While the process was proceeding in such a positive manner, on 15 July 2016, there was a coup attempt in Turkey.

After the coup attempt, the government declared a three-state emergency and extended it for another three months. Measures taken by the government during this period, as well as numerous arrests, detention and dismissal decisions, were found disproportionate by the EU. For this reason, the EU invited Turkey to the Constitutional Assembly as soon as possible. However, as the process continued in the same way, the European Parliament adopted a recommendation to stop membership negotiations with Turkey on 24 November 2016. This decision hurt Turkey-EU relations. Despite this, negotiations on the visa liberalization between the two sides are ongoing and Turkey is doing everything in its power. Despite all, Turkey is actively participating and supporting the Common Foreign and Security Policy. On the other hand, Serbia is foreseen to become a next EU member state (Smeets, 2015). By the end of 2016, Serbia opened six negotiations Chapters.

The dynamics of the negotiation path depends on the willingness of both sides. So far, Serbian integration (both general and defence one), is developing according to the expectations of both sides. Many potential obstacles are possible. For instance, Serbian public is divided over the Serbian EU membership. The CFSP/CSDP integration has been assessed through two important aspects of integration: alignment with the CFSP/CSDP decisions and participation within the CSDP missions and operations. When it comes to the first aspect (alignment with *acquis communautaire*), Serbia is far integrated into the CFSP/CSDP than Turkey. Harmonization of legislation goes faster in the Serbian case than in Turkish one.

On the other side, the findings show that Turkey has a more proactive role within the EU CSFP/CSDP missions and especially military operations. Even though European Parliament has voted for the suspension of membership talks with Turkey at the end of 2016 (European Parliament, 2017), Turkey is more integrated into the Common Foreign and Security Policy than Serbia, which is in general political dialogue closer to the full membership in the EU.

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PROCES INTEGRACIJE U ZAJEDNIČKU SPOLJNU I BEZBEDNOSNU POLITIKU EVROPSKE UNIJE KROZ PRIZMU PREGOVORA SRBIJE I TURSKE

Apstrakt: Zajednička bezbednosna i odbrambena politika Evropske unije (EU ZBOP), predstavlja jedinstven tip odbrambenih integracija na supranacionalnom nivou. Kao najznačajniji deo Zajedničke spoljne i bezbednosne politike (EU ZBOP), dometi EU ZBOP-a, nisu striktno limitirani na države članice Evropske unije, već dosežu i obuhvataju i politike država kandidata za članstvo. Cilj ovog članka je da istraži do koje mere proces opšte političke integracije u punopravno članstvo Evropske unije, korelira sa odbrambenom komponentom ove integracije. Stepen integracionog procesa biće ispitan kroz dve promenljive: procenat usaglašenosti država kandidata za članstvo sa odlukama Evropske unije u oblasti ZBOPa/ZSBP-a, i participacije u operacijama upravljanja krizama ZBOP-a, kao najvidljivijeg elementa ove politike. Za studije slučaja odabrane su Srbija i Turska, kao dve države sa statusom kandidata za članstvo u Evropskoj uniji. Autori su koristili godišnje Izveštaje o napretku, objavljene od strane Evropske komisije, za period od deset godina (uključujući 2016. godinu), kako bi odredili kvalitet i nivo integrisanosti u oblasti ZBOP/ZSBP. Rezultati ukazuju da iako je Srbija dalje odmakla u opštem procesu pregovora o pristupanju i harmonizaciji sa *acquis communautaire*, Turska je integrisanija u realizaciji elemenata ZBOP-a.

Ključne reči: EU, ZBOP, ZSBP, odbrana, integracija, Turska, Srbija, Izveštaj o napretku.

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