

NATO ROAD TO SERBIA: WHY 1999?

Slobodan JANKOVIĆ, Ph.D.¹

Abstract: How NATO found its new *raison d'être* after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in the Yugoslav crisis? Why Serbia and the Serbs were designated as bad guys? How the initial NATO and USA policy determined the sides in the war, and how it affected the U.S. policy in Europe are the questions raised and answered in this article. The author starts with the historical introduction of the Yugoslav crisis and wars in the territory of the dissolved nation. He presents the main differing views on these processes among scholars and explains how their attachment to governmental policies affects their portrayal of events. Afterward, the author examines the European and global context in which the crisis and the subsequent aggression of the NATO Alliance on a small Balkan state occurred. Different interests in Berlin, Washington, London and the Vatican led to common action against a pariah state of the 1990s. What prevailed is the Anglo Saxon influence in the Balkans and in the EU.

Key words: Serbia, NATO, Europe, U.S., Kosovo.

INTRODUCTION

How the biggest military alliance wrestling with the USSR and its Warsaw Pact ended up attacking a European country isolated for years and with a tiny population of 10 million with the harshest sanctions? Was it forced to fight against a threat posed by a small Yugoslav army, when it did not intervene previously in several wars in Africa, like in the prolonged Congo wars (First from 1996 to 1997 and the Second Congo War 1998-2003)

¹ Research Fellow, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, Serbia, e-mail: slobodan@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs

This paper was created within the project "Serbia in contemporary international relations: Strategic directions of development and firming the position of Serbia in international integrative processes - foreign affairs, international economic, legal and security aspects", Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Serbia, number 179029, for the period 2011-2019.

by far more bloody than all Balkan wars in the 1990s combined?² Why did it not engage in the Sierra Leone wars, or in the Afghanistan war in the 1990s, or in Somalia..?

Of course, the list of publications on some aspects of the NATO aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (or as some say intervention or bombing) is probably too extensive to be mentioned. However, those dealing with causes are by far less numerous. Aside from many Serbian authors, prominent academicians wrote on the subject. Elena Guskova in Russia published the most significant books on the subject (*History of Yugoslav Crisis and NATO against Yugoslavia in 1999 and the process of the peace settlement*) (Guskova, 2000, 2013). In addition, Elena Ponomarova, Aleksandr Dugin and most deeply Natalia Narochitskaya delved into the causes and consequences of the NATO aggression in Russia. In the West, Susan Woodward, Raju Thomas, Diana Johnston, Michael Parenti, Noam Chomsky and Andrew Bacevich, are among many authors that researched this subject. Still, this approach requires additional examination, taking into account several other contemporary crises that will help to understand why NATO or the US have chosen to attack or intervene against Yugoslavia and not in some other contemporary crisis. A number of Russian authors and many others like Italian Giacomo Gabellini or Turkish Ahmed Davutoglu claim *realpolitik* behind the NATO decision (Davutoglu, 2014; Gabellini, 2012).

In fact, NATO and USA interest in Yugoslavia was long present and clear since the inception of the crisis in the (second) Socialist Yugoslavia. Changing the world order – the fallout of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and in the USSR and the rise of the United States and NATO to the position of leadership – influenced the difference in behaviour of Washington. Once a partner of Belgrade, the USA did not need Yugoslavia anymore at the southeast flank of European defence and as a challenging model for socialist countries loyal to the Soviets during the Cold War. At the same time, internal changes in Yugoslavia contributed to the methods applied by Washington and NATO.

²The Congo wars or the Great African war were fought from 1996 until 2002 and involved many African countries and paramilitary organizations. A comprehensive and detailed description and analysis of the wars in the Congo can be found in Thomas Turner's book (see: Turner, 2007). However, in Congo Kinshasa, there are still military conflicts, particularly in 2018.

How this evolved into direct hostility by NATO and its first military action (against the Serbs)? What was the path towards the 1999 aggression on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and subsequent occupation of Kosovo and Metohija?

In order to answer these questions, the author will employ the historical method to present the evolution of relations and explain the causes by relying both on systemic and local motives for the behaviour of NATO. In this regard, modification of the Lake concept of international hierarchies is useful. It is so if combined with the liberal interventionism based on a marriage of neo-conservatives and liberals arguing for the promotion of 'democratic peace' and 'democratic intervention', which Parmar calls an ideology of global intervention (Parmar, 2009). We could assume that the new leadership of the United States (the USA or the US) was not only determined to create the dominant position towards the growing number of states but it also wanted to control internal processes in its subjects or in those countries it wanted to put into a subordinate position (Lake, 2009). As Beate Jahn (Jahn, 2018), Parmar (Parmar, 2009) or Tony Smith argued, a democratic promotion was underpinned with military interventions, humanitarian or R2P. After the full public collapse of the moral underpinning of the so-called humanitarian interventions, liberal authors still tried to preserve some shred of justification, '(o)ne cannot ignore the beneficial humanitarian outcomes that can result from intervention, meaning absolute nonintervention may be even more morally intolerable than the crusading force of liberal imperialism' (Davidson, 2012, p. 128). Democratic globalization was a fine word for internalization of the rule of the USA and other western elites. Still, destruction and dismemberment of Yugoslavia were one of the founding acts of the Anglo-Saxon led world order.

When did the special relationship between Belgrade and the Serbs with NATO start?

FROM LOVE TO HATE

Honeymoon

In September 1949, a bunch of statesmen gathered in Washington to discuss the nascent North Atlantic Treaty Organization at its first meeting. Since the establishment of the contemporary strongest military and political alliance, Balkan politics was prominent in the global rift with Moscow. Thus,

among different discussions, Ernest Bevin, British foreign minister, discussed also the position and policy of Yugoslavia. At the meeting in Washington (September, 14th 1949), while analyzing with American colleagues the policy and perspectives of Yugoslavia as a breakaway from Cominform (from Moscow), Bevin argued that he wanted to save its communist leader. He said about Tito 'although he was a scoundrel, he was our scoundrel' (U.S. Department of State, 1949b, p. 956).

"Hidden from the public sphere was the collaboration with the West since 1948 (when Belgrade defected from Stalin) and in years 1954-1957, Yugoslavia was partly allied with NATO" (Janković, 2017a, p. 50; Mates, 1970). British endorsement of 'our scoundrel' was followed with more generous USA help. The USA became a decade-long supporter of Tito's Yugoslavia since the 1950s, when Yugoslavia broke out with the USSR. The United Kingdom and the USA promoted trade agreements that would assist Yugoslav communists in their secession from the Soviets. The first such agreement was stipulated in March 1949 between their occupied zones in Germany called Bizonia or Bizone and Yugoslavia. The US Secretary of State announced this in a cable sent to ambassador Cannon on February 25. This was to be followed with trade agreements with Austria, Italy and the Free zone of Trieste. (U.S. Department of State, 1949a). After trade agreements, British 'extended an eight million pounds sterling' loan to Yugoslavia in order to assure further borrowing from Export-Import Bank. (U.S. Department of State, 1949b). After financial assistance, it was also the time for agreements in the security sphere. The first document that would regulate military and defence assistance of NATO countries, despite US reservations, was a *Military Assistance Agreement between the United States and Yugoslavia*, agreed on November 14, 1951.³ (Yale, 1951).

Soon after, Greece and Turkey together with communist leaders of Yugoslavia, parallel to their accession to NATO and in accordance with the strategic plans of NATO leadership, signed the Friendship Treaty in February 1953 and formed the Balkan Pact in the following year. On page 3 of the declassified TOP SECRET document of NATO on the Balkan Pact, one can find that "By concluding the Pact in question, Turkey and Greece will, so to say, have achieved a task implicitly laid on them by the NATO Council". The text of the Balkan Alliance was based in large measure on the

³ For American reservations consult a document that might indicate British push to change the policy later in the same year: (U.S. Department of State, 1951, 1677).

North Atlantic Treaty (NATO, 1954). Turkish delegation informed the Alliance also of the title of the treaty *Pact of Alliance, Political Co-operation and Mutual Assistance* that finally included the names of the signatories (Yale, 1954). These policies contributed to the London Agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia for the division of the Free Zone of Trieste in 1954.

Embracing the policy of non-alignment and its later formalization meant that the Balkan Pact was effectively finished already in the mid-1950s, but this did not end the economic backing of principal NATO countries for Yugoslavia. Its policy in the next period was (at least apparently) balancing among major blocks since, after Stalin's death, Tito and his entourage secured better ties with the USSR. "During the Cold War, Socialist Yugoslavia had an important role as the buffer state in South East Europe" (Janković, 2017a, p. 50).

From 1950 to mid-1954, the USA alone and also Great Britain and France (until the Algerian war), "invested approximately one billion dollars in military and economic aid..." with the aim of "full integration of the Yugoslav forces into an effective system of collective security in the Mediterranean-Southern European-Middle Eastern front, fully consistent with NATO objectives".⁴ More billions were invested, loaned or donated until the 1980s (Janković, 2017a, p. 51; U.S. Department of State, 1954, p. 1393).

Road to Breakup

"Its key geopolitical position as a socialist state not toeing the Soviet line, politically and physically located between the two blocs, marked it out for special treatment. This treatment would last into the 1980s, although seriously undermined in 1980 by the death of Josip Broz Tito, the architect and uncontested leader of the post-war Yugoslavia" (House of Lords, 16 April 2002).

Already in 1983, the CIA and the wider intelligence community in the USA were worried over a prospect of Yugoslavia to keep "cohesiveness of the state as a whole". In the same document analysts warned of the dangers

⁴ More information on the cooperation of Tito's socialist Yugoslavia with NATO during the 1950s, in the context of relations between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey, was given in a detailed and argumentative article based on British archival sources written by Peter Vukman (see: Vukman, 2013, pp. 25-36).

posed by the Albanian minority in Kosovo and by the 'Serb-Croat rivalry' (CIA, 1983, p. 6; p. 18).

Easy borrowing followed with GDP and consumption growth after a hike of interest rates in foreign markets generated a debt crisis during the last years of Tito's rule, similar to Latin American and other developing countries. From 1975 to 1980, foreign debt rose from 6.6 billion USD to almost 19 billion in 1980 (Babić, 1989, pp. 219-20). Several reforms were actuated. In the 1980s, the SFRY was using its position between the East and the West by securing trade agreements with both sides. For seven consecutive years, from 1986 to 1992, Socialist Yugoslavia had a positive trade balance with the USA (United States Census Bureau). Support was particularly affirmed after the understanding of the depth of the economic crisis, for example, in the confidential report of the CIA - *Yugoslavia: Key Questions and Answers on the Debt Crisis* (CIA, 1984). In 1984, the USA still had the interest to keep Yugoslavia stable because of the USSR (The White House, Washington, 1984). This changed dramatically in only seven years.

In 1990, communist regimes collapsed in European Soviet allies, and Russian influence was decreasing in the Balkans. Many academics could say as Ikenberry, "(a)fter the end of the Cold War, this (liberal, S.J.) order spread outwards. Countries in East Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America made democratic transitions and became integrated into the world economy. As the postwar order expanded, so did its international governance institutions. NATO expanded, the WTO was launched and the G20 took centre stage" (Ikenberry, 2018, p. 7). In addition, official Moscow supported all NATO initiatives. The previous role of Yugoslavia as a buffer state expired.

Internal relations were altered when Serbia after many decades of suppression restored formally the same position as other republics in the Yugoslav federation. Effectively, with the votes of changed Montenegrin leadership and the control over two autonomous provinces since 1988 and 1989, Serbia became truly not only the biggest but also the strongest federal unit. However, this happened in the time of big changes and in the advanced state of secession plans by Croatian and Slovenian communist elites.

"Franjo Tudjman went to Germany in 1988 to negotiate support for the secession with Chancellor Kohl and other senior figures in the German Government. Tudjman was a regular guest in Germany, where he officially spoke with senior figures, but not with the Ministers and the Chancellor" (Jankovic, 2017a, p. 56; p. 57). Also, some politicians from Slovenia were

connected with Germany and Austria in their secessionist policies (Jankovic, 2017a). Besides these two countries, the Vatican was a long supporter of Croatian and Slovenian secession, both from first Yugoslavia ruled by Serbian Christian orthodox dynasty and from the second communist federation (Vuković, S, 2004).⁵

Slovenia was not only geographically, but also culturally and politically most inclined towards the West. It registered the first new party in 1988 (Slovenian Peasant Union). In the second Western-oriented republic, Croatia, the right-wing political party Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica – HDZ) was officially established on 17 June 1989 by a former Communist General Franjo Tuđman with substantial support from the German intelligence and Croatian fascist and ultra-nationalist diaspora (mostly coming from Ustascia movement). A year later, in 1990, a former Islamist dissident and once a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, Alija Izetbegović was freed after spending only six out of fourteen years of the prison term and founded a Muslim religious and nationalistic SDA (*Stranka demokratske akcije* – The Party of Democratic Action) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia ceased to function after the Slovenian delegation left the 14th Congress in February 1990. Thus, one of two federal pillars (Army being the second) crumbled.

Most scholars and reports from public institutions in foreign countries describe the *Serbian nationalism* or its *hegemonic intentions* as the main instigators of the conflicts (Anderson, 1995, ii, iii).⁶ However, the assertions of Serbian hegemony neglect the situation prior to 1989 and Serbia's uneven position in the confederated federation. Oversimplified or entirely wrong descriptions of the events and processes usually focus on two political leaders: Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tuđman, the Serbian and the Croatian leaders (the Serbian leader was advocating for a functioning federation and the viability of Yugoslavia, while the Croatian leader, Tuđman, was advocating for secession) (Radeljic, 2010, p. 116). Contrary to previous media reports on the danger posed by the Kosovo Albanians

⁵ First was the Kingdom of Yugoslavia until 1941, then the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1946 until April 1992 and third – the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was formed on April 27, 1992.

⁶ For example, a report for the Australian parliament on the dissolution of Yugoslavia: Anderson, 1995, pp. ii, iii. On the carefully crafted image of the Balkan wars in western media and academia see in: Janković, 2017, pp. 41-50.

(Binder, 1987), western press, starting with Germany and Austria changed tunes after 1990 (Vuković, S. 2001).

At the dawn of the adoption of the new NATO strategy, the USA legislative body voted and adopted the 1991 Foreign Operations Appropriations Law 101-513 on November 5, 1990. This law predicted to end all financial aid and loans from the USA to Yugoslavia. This approach was similar towards other countries and could be explained by the upper hand and better position of the USA as a rising hegemon in Europe, which wanted to reform the economies and institutions of new democracies according to the interest of the Western elites. However, something peculiar happened with Yugoslavia. The USA envisaged elections in each of the six republics that constituted Yugoslavia, ahead of any financial support. Furthermore, it requested from U.S. personnel in all international financial organizations to apply this policy for all credits and loans (made by organizations in which they were employees).

“Only forces that the US defined as ‘*democratic forces*’ would receive funding. This meant an influx of funds to small right-wing nationalist parties in a financially strangled region, which was suddenly thrown into a crisis by the overall funding cut” (Janković, 2019, p. 114).

Almost exactly a year later, NATO held the Summit from 1 to 8 November and proclaimed the New Strategy. Together with this crucial document that was needed to justify the role of NATO in the world without the Warsaw pact, the Transatlantic Alliance issued the document named *Situation in Yugoslavia*. Only a year after the USA had demanded democratic elections in federal units (and not at the federal level in Yugoslavia,) now Washington and its allies wanted to guarantee the internal borders as a basis for the external borders of eventual new states (NATO, 1991). Same was promoted by the Badinter Arbitration Commission (“Badinter Commission”).

In search of a new enemy, the Serbs were designated as bad boys. The USA and its NATO and other western allies chose to impose total sanctions on third Yugoslavia. It was a logical consequence of the new world order with a new role for the Balkans. This meant the activation of some old plans. The only group that opposed the destruction of Yugoslavia was one that had established it, the Serbs. They lived scattered in several federal units and had every interest to keep the country together (Ponomarova, 2017, pp. 59-60). Their position in Yugoslavia became their fate.

French General Pierre Marie Gallois, testified in front of a camera in 2009 of the secret plans of Franz Josef Strauss, then leader of the Bavarian CSU

party and former Minister of Defense and Finance of West Germany, who together with diplomats from the United Kingdom, Spain and Gallois met in 1976 and in 1977. Already then, Strauss said that Germany was planning to achieve the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the integration of at least Slovenia and Croatia into its own sphere of influence. In the course of the meetings, the German politician was asking the support from other Western partners for such a plan (Youtube, 2017).

Hungary, Germany and Austria were assisting Croatian nationalists by selling arms and providing them with diplomatic support (CIA, 1991; Bosnian Institute, 2005). Other sources also confirmed this. Diana Johnston also pointed at German sources regarding a political circle organized by a German Secret Service resident in the SFRY, Klaus Dorner, which supported the emergence of Franjo Tudjman (Johnston, 2002, pp. 186-7). On the other hand, the Vatican, an old opponent of Yugoslavia, was a US ally against communism, and when the time has arrived, it supported the establishment of two new countries with a Catholic majority, Slovenia and Croatia (Igrutinović, 2013; Radić, 2014).

Thus, it is not true, as Susan Woodward and many others claim, that the West and particularly the USA was not implicated since the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis (Woodward, 1995, p. 2). The NATO bombing of the Serbian positions was in continuity with the previous stance against the Serbian interests. But soon after peace was reached in Bosnia in November 1995, the situation in Kosovo and Metohija started to deteriorate.

WAR IN EUROPE: RATIONALE FOR INTERVENTION

The first NATO combat mission (air warfare on that occasion) in its history happened against the Serbs in Bosnia in 1994 and 1995 (Atlantic Council, 2012; Haulman, 2009). The British Special forces (SAS) conducted ground activities against the Serbian forces, sometimes in coordination with NATO air attacks (Elite UK Forces). It supposedly acted against Serbian attacks on the Muslim forces. According to personal testimonies of Serbian officers and soldiers, British and U.S. soldiers engaged in ground operations also during 1999 when the bulk of the units attacking positions of the Yugoslav Army came from the so-called UCK-KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army).

The aggression started on 24 March 1999 and lasted for 78 days until 9 June the same year. Mostly the aerial campaign with ground operations, conducted officially by the Kosovo Albanian KLA from Albania against

Kosovo, destroyed or heavily damaged numerous civilian and military infrastructure, bridges, factories, distribution centres, hospitals, military bases, government buildings, utility systems, even hospitals, schools and bus stations. Yet, until isolated Slobodan Milošević and his entourage did not decide to give in to NATO demands, the Yugoslav Army remained almost intact. The aggression of the largest military alliance at that moment in the history, consisting of 19 developed countries headed by the USA, attacked a small European country with the assistance of almost all of its neighbours (excluding the Serbs in Bosnia). Irrespective of military aspect, the crucial research question remains, why the small Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY, Serbia and Montenegro) or why the Serbs were bombed? Edward Herman, following in the footsteps of Michael Mandelbaum and Diana Johnston argues: "The focus on 'justice' as opposed to peace, and the demonizing of the Serbs and making them the unique group needing punishment, was the vehicle used by Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic and his close associates, and Clinton/Albright and Kohl-Genscher and their associates, to prevent a peaceful settlement – most importantly in backing out of the 1992 Lisbon Agreement – and to work incessantly to get NATO to intervene militarily [...]" (Herman, 2006, p. 4).

Parenti, Johnston and Chomsky argue it is mostly due to economic reasons and because of the globalisation of the economy led by transnational corporations (TNC), fighting to restore capitalism (Parenti, 2002, p. 4; p. 199) in Eastern Europe, employing humanitarian interventions. "With the Soviet deterrent in decline, the Cold War victors are more free to exercise their will under the cloak of good intentions but in pursuit of interests that have a very familiar ring outside the realm of enlightenment. The self-described bearers of enlightenment happen to be the rich and powerful, the inheritors of the colonial and neocolonial systems of global dominion" (Chomsky, 1999, pp. 11-12).

Parenti and others noted how the United States and NATO acted 'against the Serbs' and always presented another side as a victim. He claimed that Yugoslavia was a victim as a socialist country unwilling to follow the dictate of the corporate liberal-capitalist world: "(t)he Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) remained the only nation in that region that would not voluntarily discard what remained of its socialism and install an unalloyed free-market system. It also proudly had no interest in joining NATO" (Parenti, 2002, p. 18).

The West wanted to privatize the riches of Kosovo since only Trepča mines (in the province) were at least 5 billion dollars valuable (Parenti, 2002,

p. 110). Raju Thomas edited a volume on dismantling of Yugoslavia with plenty of argumentation on the role of the external factors in fomenting and maintaining the war. He has also, as Parenti or Johnston, pointed to the role of media in making what is today called the fake news (Raju, 2003, p. xiii, Parenti, pp. 146-148).

There is a chorus of authors supporting the mainstream story launched by NATO and western governments. Still, none of them questions the dominant narrative of the humanitarian reasons for which NATO decided to intervene even though it was contrary to international law in 1999.

Since 1999, the USA has intervened or conducted wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. It backed the proxy wars in Yemen and Syria. The mainstream authors, those representing the absolute majority in Western academia claimed similar as Greenwood that NATO reacted out of humanitarian reasons (Greenwood, 2002). In line with the official propaganda is the most cited Adam Roberts's tale: "(t)he NATO states were united by a sense of shame that, in the first four years of atrocious wars in the former Yugoslavia (1991-95), they had failed, individually and collectively, to devise coherent policies and to engage in decisive actions". In order to lift the shame, NATO, famous as an international league of moral and well-behaving non-aggressive countries, was appalled by the prospect to be even more ashamed as there was evidence of a "risk of developing into wholesale 'ethnic cleansing' of the Kosovar Albanians" (Roberts, 1999, p. 104).

Susan Woodward believed that the USA only later decided to intervene in Yugoslavia in general. Yet, she has understood that the Balkan conflict was inseparable from the international context, but assumed that for the USA in 1994 it was of 'little significance' and only after it "emerged as the most challenging threat to existing norms and institutions that Western leaders faced" (Woodward, 1995, p. 2). In that view, the NATO intervention in 1999 is merely an institutional response to a 'challenging threat'.

Nevertheless, at the same year, the Indonesian para-military units were conducting by far more bloody atrocities than those claimed by the West in Kosovo, calculated at about 10,000 Albanians, mostly killed in the clashes during the NATO aggression (Parenti, 2002, p. 145).

If the FRY represented the threat, what were then East Timor with around 200,000 dead, or the Sierra Leone war (1991-2002) with a peak in 1997-8 and "(i)ndiscriminate amputations, abductions of women and children, recruitment of children as combatants, rape, sexual slavery,

cannibalism, gratuitous killings and wanton destruction of villages and towns” (Sierra Leone, 2015)?

What about the Great African war in Congo involving several African countries and wars in dissolved Somalia, which the USA left after a small number of dead soldiers? How come the wars or crisis in Yugoslavia represented such a threat and all other mentioned wars did not?

Đorđević and Vuković argue that physical and human geography factors are strong arguments for military planning, and of consequence for political planning. They claim that the wars they analysed have in common encircled or semi-encircled starting point of military operations, i.e. that targets were fully or partially isolated and easily accessed (Đorđević & Vuković, 2018). However, they did not research Sierra Leone or better Liberia as a country that led aggression on its neighbour because it was easily accessed. For the same purpose, it is legitimate to point that Somalia was also easily accessed. Australian threat backed by the UK and the USA was obviously enough for Indonesia to accept the military mission led by Sidney and withdraw after 24 years from what is now Timor-Leste.

Besides that, the US decision not to intervene in Georgia or not to attack Iran is not only or not even mostly determined by the mere physical geographic elements, but by the size of a potential enemy and its military characteristics as well. Still, there is no doubt that geography plays some of the crucial roles since other horrible wars have happened far away from Europe, or far away from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). On the other hand, one must admit that France and the UK intervened in Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and Central Africa. Why is then the Balkans and MENA region so important?

“The 1990s saw numerous regional conflicts—Haiti, Colombia, Tajikistan, the Caucasus, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, the Middle East, Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Congo — that were comparable to or, in some cases, more destructive than the Balkan war. Few of these contests have received anything like the intense scrutiny devoted to the Balkans, for reasons good and bad. The Balkans is a part of Europe, and therefore more accessible to scrutiny by the international media and *engagement by external powers* (italic by S. J.) than conflicts waged in less developed and approachable regions [...] The Balkans has been an object of international political competition for centuries, and many of the great European and Eurasian powers have long-standing interests in the region [...] It has, likewise and correctly, been perceived as a kind of testing ground

for international conflict management efforts in the post-cold war era“ (Nation, 2003, p. vii; p. ix).

A reason more is given by the main Turkish foreign policy strategist in the period 2002-2016, Ahmed Davutoglu. He claims that the NATO aggression on the FRY is a result of the decision to take control over a space from Poland to the Adriatic Sea. “This operation should downsize the level of the military power of Serbia, the strongest along the line (from the Baltic to Adriatic sea, S.J.)[...] This is the main rationale behind the operation, and in particular of her conduct against the anti-aircraft systems [...] which could present a threat to the growing influence of NATO power” (Davutoglu, 2014, p. 223).

Clearly, the mechanism of forced collapse of the state was tested in the Balkans. NATO discovered its new rationale in the Balkans with ‘humanitarian interventions’ lately rebranded as R2R. “Germany, for the first time after WWII, takes role as a foreign military power in the Balkans, in the Serbian province (of Kosovo)” (Janković, 2015, p. 56), following its wish to expand its influence in areas of historical partnership (Slovenia and Croatia were once part of the Austrian Empire and Croatia was among the few loyal puppet states until the end of WWII).

As Kljakić notes, the war in the former Yugoslavia was planned and externally stimulated world war against Yugoslavia (as it included countries from two continents and other non-state entities – Al Qaeda). It was waged on the ‘main world stage’ for the promotion of the global corporate order in strategic places (geopolitical) at the crossings of Europe, Asia and Africa (the Balkans) (Kljakić, 2012, p. 103; p. 105; p. 115).

This theatrical tragedy ends with the main actor entering the stage at the beginning, and in the end with the occupation of Kosovo and Metohija. In the end, what was once Yugoslavia became the fragmented space of semi-protectorates with direct or indirect control of the Anglo-Saxon structures (Janković, 2015, pp. 59-61).

Gabellini supposes additional reason, claiming that the aim behind the fragmentation of third Yugoslavia was to impede Serbian access to the sea since Serbia is connected with Russia through the “orthodox diagonal” and represents a potential harbour for the Russian military navy (Gabellini, 2012, p. 56). Along this line are the reasoning of classical geopoliticians, like Stepić, Knežević, Dugin, but also Narochmitskaya. Stepić claims that control over Kosovo and Metohija was needed as a central part of the arch between the Adriatic and the Aegean Sea, seated along the line between two larger

spaces (Western and Southern) (Stepić, 2006b, p. 259; Narochnitskaya, 2008, p. 518) and because the Serbs are perceived as the 'Balkan Russians' (Stepić, 2006a, p. 486).

Ponomarova like Parenti, Johnston and others, cites the economic reasons but couples them with geopolitical reasoning of the establishment of a full NATO protectorate in southeast Europe (Ponomarova, 2014, pp. 88-89). Finally, Narochnitskaya similar like Dugin (but with different conclusions) understands the world as a theatre of a spiritual battle between good and evil with its material ramifications. Regarding the Balkans and Serbia, she also has in mind Christian orthodox and historical bases of Russian and Serbian relations. She points that Eastern, formerly socialist European countries between the Baltic Sea and the Mediterranean, had to be transformed in irrelevant and not independent countries. Germany had the interest to transform it into new *Mitteleuropa*, but the USA elites managed to induce these countries to join the EU only after integration to NATO. Such order of events tied the process of the EU integration to Atlantic structures (Narochnitskaya, 2008, pp. 474-5; p. 485). Narochnitskaya points out that the general NATO policy against Yugoslavia was aimed to control the strategic passage on the road between the Adriatic and the Aegean Sea, a remnant anti-Atlantic island in the 1990s. The European Left headed publicly by Oscar Lafonten Massimo D'Alema and Javier Solana were advocates of NATO enlargement at the moment when it was a question of life or death for the western military alliance (Ivi, 2008, pp. 476-492). Indeed, leftist and liberal European politicians accepted the *de facto* capitulation of independent EU policy, since the US together with faithful London, with the war in 1999, also obstructed St. Malo initiatives. At the time when the EU planned to form rapid deployment forces (1999), NATO intervened massively on European soil and prevented the initiative of distinct European defence policy.

In that *milieu*, Yugoslavia served as an example for the new reason of NATO and at the same time as an example of how those opposing the global processes would end. Locally, the result was the fragmentation of the space inhabited with the population with multiple links to Russia and not oriented towards NATO.

The spiritual dimension of the battle is that of the fallen West wanting to install global rule and the oppressed Orthodox Christianity as a crucial enemy of worldly evil, which is the main thesis of Narotchnitskaya. Geography obviously matters also for Narotchnitskaya, but as a place at the strategic route. Along that route in Europe, Washington and London

continue to stockpile ammunition and troops. "NATO has constantly been expanding since 1990 in numbers of member states but also in numbers of military bases, offensive weaponry, in stocking armaments and organizing numerous military exercises and it is assuming an openly confrontational stance towards Russia and China" (Janković, 2017b, p. 42). Unlike countries in which controlled wars with numerous atrocities have been committed, but which did not challenge the global corporate order, Yugoslavia under Milošević did so. Serbian leader of the 1990s opposed general policies of the Western elites much like Saddam Hussein (Iraq), Ghedaffi (Libya) and Bashar el Assad (Syria).

CONCLUSION

Destruction and fragmentation of Yugoslavia that culminated with the NATO aggression on third Yugoslavia in 1999 and ended with the *de facto* occupation of the Serbian southern province of Kosovo and Metohija, is part of a larger political and ideological reformulation of the world after the end of the Cold War.

It resulted in small controlled protectorates and semi-independent countries. Globally, it was a stage in the promotion of the new world global corporate order after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Sovereign states became the main enemies of this rising force.

"Until the 1990s, dominant ideological strife between communism and capitalism vanished. But the new one was rising. It is a confrontation between globalism and modern society (political nationalism, classical democracy as the rule of the majority and the rule of law, the importance of religious traditions as markers of society). One of the manifestations of this struggle was and is a *new spiral of violence* against sovereignty and modern world order (achievements confirmed after the Second World War), which started with the wars against Iraq, the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the NATO bombing in 1995), against Yugoslavia in 1999, Iraq again in 2003..." (Janković, 2013, p. 80).

The economic reason for the capitalist conquest is truly global. It is the same process occurring worldwide and irrespective of geography. Strong national countries willing to protect national economies are by definition enemies of transnational corporate governance. However, that applies to both Bolivia, Argentina, the FRY, African or Asian countries.

Congo, Sierra Leone or East Timor are not situated along the strategic trajectories of control of oil and gas production (MENA region) or on the route of collision of the West and Russia/Christian orthodoxy. Furthermore, the process of NATOisation of EU integrations was utterly strengthened with NATO interventions in Europe.

“Importance of the Balkan wars is particularly essential in inventing the new role for NATO as a tool of imperial policies of the USA and global elites controlling the politics of Western countries and for the promotion of the humanitarian interventions (backed by highly publicized moral underpinning – humanitarianism)” (Janković, 2017a, p. 61). The symbolism of the date is also important as NATO celebrated its 50th anniversary during the war with the bombing of the Serbian state TV broadcaster RTS. Hence, a half-century of the Alliance was celebrated with bombs and blood.

NATO changed the strategic concept twice in the 1990s, and both times it affirmed its new role as a force that exports stability via military interventions. Submission of disobedient countries not included in hierarchical order (Lake, 2009) headed by Transatlantic elites, coupled with the geographic factor along the ‘orthodox diagonal’ between Balkan and Muscovite Russians, additionally explains ‘why the Serbs’ were targeted. Democratic interventions are used as a tool of both the Anglo-Saxon domination in Europe and as exemplary punishment for those opposing the planned reconstruction of Eastern Europe and the world in general. As the Serbs created Yugoslavia, they wanted to keep it. This and their historical and religious ties to Russia made them a crucial and demonstrative target of NATO.

The NATO aggression on Yugoslavia thus strengthened the leadership of US elites in the EU, in particular of the greater area that will soon after 1999 become a New Europe. This new Europe, a Trimarium between the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean is a modification of old British, and since WWII, American projects of creating a buffer zone between Russia and continental Europe. Construction of this buffer zone after 1999 was consolidated and imposed by Washington, and London led hierarchical international order.

REFERENCES

Anderson, D. (1995, November 22). Collapse of Yugoslavia: Background and Summary. Research Paper No. 14 1995-96, Department of the

- Parliamentary library. SNIE 15-83, Approved for Release: 2008/08/26 CIA-RDP86T00302R000801270010-6.
- Atlantic Council. (February 28, 2012). NATO's first combat action occurred 18 years ago today over Bosnia. retrieved from <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/natos-first-combat-action-occurred-18-years-ago-today-over-bosnia> Accessed: 28 November 2018.
- Babić, M. (1989). Yugoslav External Debt: a Constraint for Macroeconomic Policy. In: Singer H.W., Sharma S. (eds) *Economic Development and World Debt*, London, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Binder, D. (1987 November 01). In Yugoslavia, Rising Ethnic Strife Brings Fears of Worse Civil Conflict. *The New York Times*, retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/1987/11/01/world/in-yugoslavia-rising-ethnic-strife-brings-fears-of-worse-civil-conflict.html?pagewanted=all> Accessed: 19 March 2016.
- Bosnian Institute. (2005, January-April). Debate on the wars in Croatia and Bosnia - Part I, by Dušan Bilandžić, Mile Bjelajac, Ivo Komšić, Denis Kuljiš, Martin Špegelj. Bosnian Report New series, No: 43-44, retrieved from http://www.bosnia.org.uk/bosrep/report_format.cfm?Articleid=2965&reportid=167 Accessed: 02 July 2016.
- Chomsky, N. (1999). *The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo*. London, Pluto Press.
- CIA. (1991, March). Yugoslavia military dynamics of a Potential Civil War. C00372340, Retrieved from <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1991-03-01.pdf> Accessed on: 7 June 2016.
- CIA. (1984). Yugoslavia: Key Questions and Answers on the Debt Crisis. Directorate of Intelligence, Eur 84 - 11, Approved for Release: 12-May-2011.
- CIA. (1983, January 31). Yugoslavia: An Approaching Crisis? Directorate of Intelligence, Secret SNIE 15-83, Approved for Release: 2008/08/26 CIA-RDP86T00302R000801270010-6.
- Davidson, J. (2012). Humanitarian Intervention as Liberal Imperialism: A Force for Good?, *POLIS Journal*, 7 Summer, pp. 128-164, Retrieved from <http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/students/student-journal/ug-summer-12/joanna-davidson.pdf> Accessed: 20 November 2018.
- Davutoglu, Ahmed. (2014). (Serbian edition of *Strategic Depth*) *Стратегијска дубина*, Београд, Службени гласник.

- Đorđević, B. & Vuković, N. (2018). Географија и употреба силе: геополитичка анализа војног ангажовања Сједињених Држава на крају 20. и почетком 21. [Geography and the Use of Force: A Geopolitical Analysis of The Military Engagement of The United States in the Late 20th and the Early 21st Century], in: Novičić, Ž. (ed.), *Употреба силе у међународним односима*, [The use of Force in International Relations], (pp. 11-33). Београд, Институт за међународну политику и привреду.
- Elite UK Forces. Special Air Service (SAS) – Bosnia Operations, retrieved from <http://www.eliteukforces.info/special-air-service/history/bosnia/> Accessed: 08 October 2018.
- Gabellini, G. (2012). *La parabola – geopolitica dell'unipolarismo Statunitense*. [The parable – Geopolitics of U.S. unipolarity]. Anteo edizioni, Grignano.
- Greenwood, C. (2002). Humanitarian Intervention: The case of Kosovo, in *Finnish yearbook of international law*. (pp. 141-175). Helsinki, Kluwer Law.
- Гуськова, Е. [Guskova, J.] (2013). *Агресија НАТО против Југославије у 1999. години и процес мирног урегуловања*. [NATO Aggression against Yugoslavia in 1999 and peace settlement process]. Москва, «Индрик».
- Guskova, J. (2003). *Istorija jugoslovenske krize (1990-2000) I i II* [History of Yugoslav Crisis]. Beograd, Igam.
- Haulman, D. (5 October 2009, edits by FLM 22 October 2015). Manned Aircraft Losses Over the Former Yugoslavia, 1994-1999. *Air Force Historical research Agency*, pp. 14, retrieved from <https://www.afhra.af.mil/Portals/16/documents/Airmen-at-War/Haulman-MannedAircraftLossesYugoslavia1994-1999.pdf?ver=2016-08-22-131404-383> Accessed: 28 December 2018.
- Herman, S. E. (2006). Good Versus Evil: How the Media got it wrong in Yugoslavia. Review of Peter Broc. *Journalism and Tragedy in Yugoslavia*. ColdType.
- House of Lords. (16 April 2002). European Union - Twentieth Report: Part 3: The historical background. *UK Parliament, Session 2001-02, European Union Committee Publications*, Retrieved from <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200102/ldselect/ldeucom/107/10701.htm> Accessed: 29 December 2018.

- Igrutinović, M. (2013). Zapadna Evropa i raspad Jugoslavije [Western Europe and collapse of Yugoslavia], *Građanski rat u Hrvatskoj*, Br. 9, Udruženje Srba u Hrvatskoj, Beograd, pp. 78-92.
- Ikenberry, G. J. (2018). The End of Liberal International Order? *International Affairs*, 94(1), pp. 7-23.
- Jahn, B. (2018). Liberal internationalism: historical trajectory and current prospects. *International Affairs*, 94(1), pp. 43–61. doi: 10.1093/ia/iix231
- Janković, S. (2019). Relations between the United States and Serbia: Asymmetric confrontation and relation, in: Péczeli, A. (ed.), *Central European Countries' Relations with the United States* (pp. 112-130). Budapest. Incoming.
- Janković, S. (2017a). Involvement of Foreign Factor in Balkans War and Peace. *Национални интерес*, 28(1), pp. 39-68.
- Janković, S. (2017b). World War Three? in: Đorđević B. Tsukimura, T. & Lađevac, I. (eds.), *Social and economic problems and challenges in the contemporary world* (pp. 41-57). Global Resource Management Program, Doshisha University, Japan, Institute of International Politics And Economics, Belgrade.
- Janković, S. (2015). Izazovi ili pretnje na Zapadnom Balkanu [Challenges or Threats in the Western Balkans]. *Međunarodna politika*, N. 1158–1159, Beograd, pp. 52-67.
- Janković, S. (2013). Collective Identity and Loyalty to National States in the Balkans, in: Dimitrijević Duško and Lađevac Ivona (eds.). *Challenges of the 21st Century and the Region* (pp. 79-95). Proceedings of the Round table Conference, Institute of International Politics And Economics, Belgrade.
- Johnston, D. (2002). *Fools' Crusade: Yugoslavia, Nato, and Western Delusions*. NYU Pluto Press.
- Kljakić, Lj. (2012). Razbijanje Jugoslavije i svetski korporativni poredak [Destruction of Yugoslavia and the World Corporative Order], in: Đurić, Ž. Jovanović, M. & Knežević, M. (Eds.), *Destruction of Yugoslavia* (pp.103-124). Institute for Political Studies, Belgrade.
- Knežić, B. & Ćirić, J. (eds.). (2011). *20 years since the Breaking - Up of the SFRY*, Institute of comparative law, Belgrade.
- Lake, A. D. (2009). *Hierarchy in International Relations*, Ithaca – New York, Cornell University Press.

- Mates, Leo. (1970). *Nesvrstanost: Teorija i savremena praksa (English version: Nonalignment: Theory and Current Policy, 1972)*, Institute of International Politics and Economics; Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., Oceana Publications.
- Narotchnitskaya, N. (2008). *Русија и Руси у светској историји* [Russia and Russians in World history], Београд, СКЗ
- Nation, R. C. (2003). *War in the Balkans, 1991-2002*. Carlisle, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI).
- NATO. (1954). Balkan Pact. RDC(54)396, 1954-07-27, (13 pages), Executive Secretariat (1952 - 1970), NATO Archives Online. U.S. Department of State. (1949). Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State. CFM Files, Lot M-88, Box 144, Memos Conv Formins and Sec Sep 1940, William Z. Slany, Rogers P. Churchill (eds.), in *Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1949. Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union*, Volume V, [Washington,] September 14, 1949, United States Government Printing Office, Washington 1975.
- NATO. (1991, November 8). The Situation in Yugoslavia, Press Release S-1(98) 88. retrieved from https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23849.htm?mode=pressrelease Accessed: 02 April 2018.
- Parenti, M. (2002). *To Kill a Nation: The Attack on Yugoslavia*. London, New York, Verso.
- Parmar, I. (2009). Foreign policy fusion: Liberal interventionists, conservative nationalists and neoconservatives - The new alliance dominating the US foreign policy establishment. *International Politics*, 46(2-3), pp. 177-209. doi: 10.1057/ip.2008.47
- Ponomarova, E. (2014). That shall not be forgotten! NATO aggression against Yugoslavia: causes and effects. *Observer, научно-аналитический журнал, ИЮНЬ*, No 6 (293), pp. 83-100.
- Radeljic, B. (2010). Europe 1989-2009: Rethinking the Break-up of Yugoslavia. *European Studies*, 9 (1). pp. 115-127.
- Radić, R. (2014). Jugoslavija i Vatikan 1918-1992. godine / Iugoslavia e Vaticano 1918-1992", *Annales, ser. Hist. Sociol. (Annales Journal, the Annals for Istrian and Mediterranean Studies)*, Koper, 24 (4), pp. 691-703.
- Raju G. C. T. (ed.). (2003). *Yugoslavia Unraveled: Sovereignty, Self-Determination, Intervention*, Lexington Books.
- Roberts, A. (1999). NATO's 'Humanitarian War' over Kosovo. *Survival*, 41(3), pp. 102-123, DOI: 10.1080/00396339912331342943

- Sierra Leone. (2015 August 7). Retrieved from https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/sierra-leone/#_edn5 Accessed: 24 December 2018.
- Stepić M. (2006a). The territorial division of Kosovo and Metohija: The question of geopolitical merit, in: Erić, Slobodan (Ed.), *Arguments in Favour of its Future within Serbia*. (485-508). Udruzenje gradana Cer. Beograd.
- Stepić, M. (2006b). Перспективе Косова и Метохије у контексту глобалних геополитичких концепција, Срби на Косову и Метохији, [Perspectives of Kosovo and Metohija in the context of Global Geopolitical Concepts], у: Карамата, С. & Оцић, Ч. (ур.). *Зборник радова с научног скупа одржаног у Косовској Митровици* (259-281). САНУ и Универзитет у Приштини с привременим седиштем у Косовској Митровици, Београд.
- The White House Washington (March 19, 1984) *United States Policy Toward Yugoslavia* (1984): National Archives Catalog, NSDD 133 United States Policy towards Yugoslavia, Retrieved on <https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6879731>, Accessed 26.03.2018.
- Turner, T. (2007). *The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth, and Reality*. New York, Zed Books.
- United States Census Bureau. Trade in Goods with Yugoslavia (former). Retrieved from <https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c4790.html#questions> Accessed: 27 March 2018.
- U.S. Department of State. (1954, July 01). The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Riddleberger) to the Department of State. No. 695 00/7-154: Despatch, Belgrade, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954. Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean*: Volume VIII, p. 1393, retrieved from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v08/d695> Accessed: 06 July 2016.
- U.S. Department of State. (1951). Yugoslavia, Interest of the United States in supporting the independence of Yugoslavia through military and economic assistance programs and through the encouragement of expanded political relations with the West. No. 825, 768.56/1-551: Telegram, in: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments*, Volume IV, Part 2.
- U.S. Department of State. (1949a, February 25). The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia. In: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949*,

- Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union*, Volume V, Document 532. 840.50 Recovery/2-2549: Telegram, Washington, USA.
- U.S. Department of State. (1949b, September 14). Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State. CFM Files, Lot M-88, Box 144, Memos Conv Formins and Sec Sep 1940, William Z. Slany, Rogers P. Churchill (eds.), In: *Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1949. Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union*, Volume V, [Washington,] United States Government Printing Office, Washington 1975.
- Vukman, P. (2013). The Balkan Pact, 1953-58: An analysis of Yugoslav-Greek – Turkish Relations based on British Archival Sources. *Mediterrán Tanulmányok (Études sur la région méditerranéenne*, Szeged) 22, pp. 25-36.
- Vuković, S. (2001). Немачка, Аустрија и разбијање Југославије [Germany, Austria and Breakdown of Yugoslavia]. *Социолошки преглед*, 35(3-4), pp. 213-234.
- Vuković, S. (2004). Улога Ватикана у разбијању Југославије [The Role of Vatican in Disintegrating of Yugoslavia]. *Социолошки преглед*, 38(3), pp. 423-443.
- Woodward, S. (1995). *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War*, Washington DC., Brookings.
- Yale (1954). Treaty of Alliance, Political Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance Between the Turkish Republic, the Kingdom of Greece, and the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (Balkan Pact), The Avalon Project, Yale Law School, Retrieved from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/eu002.asp#1 Accessed: 10 December 2018.
- Yale (1951, November 14). Military Assistance Agreement Between the United States and Yugoslavia. The Avalon Project, Yale Law School, retrieved from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/yugo001.asp 28/11/2018. Accessed: 10 December 2018.
- Youtube. (2017). French General's Testimony About NATO Bombing of Yugoslavia 1999., retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p6-f7SqOY18>, Accessed: 26 June 2017