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RELATION BETWEEN THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND SECURITY COUNCIL AS AN ASPECT OF UN REFORM

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Abstract: Seventy years after the establishment, organization of the United Nations is in serious crisis. Numbers of reform demands have increased. The UN Charter has an important deficiency- veto power of Security Council permanent members violates the principle of sovereign equality of states. Having in mind authorizations of the Security Council, its reform is one of the first associations when thinking on the reform of the United Nations. The links and common functions of the General Assembly and the Security Council could be one of the directions of the United Nations reform. It is necessary to establish balance within the powers of these two bodies, and give essentially significant and concrete powers to the General Assembly.

Key words: United Nations, reform, Security Council, General Assembly, veto power, the UN Charter.

INTRODUCTION

The establishment of the United Nations in 1945, after the World War II, was one of the most important historical moments in progressive development of humanity. Its establishment was not only an expression of “pacifist ideas and illusions

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created in the overall relief when a war was over (...) but rather an expression of the strong and objective social needs, which has its source deep in the socio-economic processes of the modern world” (Kardelj, 1955, p. 3). The Charter of the United Nations prohibits war; proclaims the maintenance of international peace and security, development of friendly relations among nations, respect for the principles of equality and self-determination of peoples, international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, cultural, or humanitarian character and promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, regardless of race, sex, language or religion. All these principles have established United Nations as a “new form of the international community” (Andrassy, 1955, p. 46).

Nowadays, 70 years after UN’s establishment, it “may sound paradoxical a widespread sense of deep decline in its reputation and continual decline in efficiency of its actions” (Šahović, 2005, p. 24). Some scholars consider UN as an “ineffectual talk shop” with no concrete results (Peterson, 2005, p. 125) or an organization which interferes too much in domestic jurisdiction of member states. According to some opinions, it is necessary to strengthen the role of the UN in terms of international peace and security, while others emphasize areas of social and economic development (Muller, 2006, p. 3). The tree structure of its subsidiary bodies, large numbers of staff and inefficient bureaucracy requires the reform of the world organization. Also, the number of UN member states had increased from 54 (in the moment of establishment) to 193. Failures of the United Nations in Rwanda, Somalia, Yugoslavia, invasion of Iraq, arbitrary use of humanitarian intervention and preventive attack led to loss of public confidence in the United Nations. Demands for reform of the United Nations are increasingly growing. The question of reform direction is complex because it reflects antagonisms between rich countries of the North and the poor and less powerful countries of the South (Meltzer, 1978).

When it comes to reform of the United Nations, the requirements for reform and enlargement of the Security Council are mainly emphasized. Of course these requirements are justified, having in mind that number of UN member states almost quadrupled since its inception, and current composition of this body does not match the situation on the world political scene. Besides this, one of the ways for United Nations improvement have to be reform of the relation between two main organs of this organization- The General Assembly and The Security Council.

POSITIONS OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER THE CHARTER

The UN Charter defines the General Assembly and Security Council as principal organs of the United Nations, along with the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat (UN Charter, Article 7).

The General Assembly is the main deliberative, policy-making and representative organ of the United Nations. From all 193 Member States of the UN, it provides a unique forum for multilateral discussion of international issues including peace and security. The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters. But, the possibility of keeping the discussion about a broad range of issues led to the impression that the General Assembly has grown into one dysfunctional body unable to focus on the most serious problems of today's world. Aforementioned impression contributed the adoption of numerous non-legally binding resolutions and declarations which have caused decline of the General Assembly's authority. In the previous period, the reputation of the General Assembly was seriously disrupted by overloaded agenda, long-lasting debates, adoption of "already seen" and "recycled" resolutions, without adequate mechanism for implementation (Dimitrijević, 2014, p. 28).

On the other side, the Security Council is consisted of eleven Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America are the permanent members of the Security Council. Article 24 of the Charter defines the Security Council as primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agrees that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf. All decisions of the Security Council are mandatory for member states. The permanent members of the Security Council have a veto power enabling them to prevent the adoption of any "substantive" resolution, as well as decide which issues fall under "substantive" title. Veto power of the permanent five is in a contradiction with Article 2 of the Charter which proclaims "sovereign equality of all its Members". Veto power and arbitrariness of the permanent Security Council members have caused numerous problems and abuses. Even one negative vote from one of the permanent member of the Security Council prevails over all other votes which were in favor of some issue (Andrassy, 1955). This solution causes imbalance in the functioning of the United Nations. Numerous discussions have taken place in recent years over the suitability of the Security Council veto power. Key arguments include that the five permanent members no longer represent the most stable and responsible United Nations members, and that their veto power slows down and even prevents important decisions being made on matters of international peace and security. Due to the global changes that have taken place politically and economically since the formation of the UN in 1945, widespread debate has been

apparent over whether the five permanent members of the UN Security Council remain the best member states to hold veto power (Dimitrijevic, 2008, p. 20-24).

By the Charter of the United Nations, the General Assembly and the Security Council are linked on many ways. As a part of its own functions, the General Assembly receives and considers annual and special reports from the Security Council. These reports include an account of the measures that the Security Council has decided upon or taken to maintain international peace and security (UN Charter, Article 15).

Also, the General Assembly and the Security Council shares some function, especially electoral. Together, these two organs elect judges of the International Court of Justice. The Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. These two organs are linked in the admission of new members and expulsion from the organization, as well as in maintenance of international peace and security.

RELATION BETWEEN GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND SECURITY COUNCIL IN MAINTAINANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

It is believed by many scholars that functions of the General Assembly and the Security Council are strictly separated in the field of international peace and security. Dumbarton Oaks proposals gave the General Assembly restricted competences in this field. But, San Francisco Conference decided to insert a new provision (Article 10 of the Charter) which caused a concurrence between two the most important UN organs.² Article 10 “enlarged the powers of General Assembly in such a way to make a scope of the Assembly’s functions almost universal, subject only to certain restrictions” (Andrassy, 1955, p. 564). Therefore, the delimitation of functions between the General Assembly and the Security Council depends on the first place on the interpretation of these restrictions (Andrassy, 1955, p. 564).

The Security Council is the only UN organ empowered to take actions (peaceful and coercive) in regard of maintenance of international peace and security. The fact is that Article 24 of the Charter authorizes the Security Council to take all kinds of actions in this field, but also states that its responsibility in this area is “primary.” Based on this, it could be concluded that there is a “secondary” responsibility, which belongs to the General Assembly.

² UN Charter, Article 10. The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.

Based on the broad range of powers set out in Article 10 of the Charter, the General Assembly may consider the issues that fall within the “specific” jurisdiction of the Security Council. Paragraph 1 of Article 11 regulate the activities of the General Assembly and states that “the General Assembly may consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.” This article doesn’t specify any limitations for the General Assembly, which leads to competitiveness with the Security Council in regard of regulation of armaments, since as one of the functions of the Security Council is “establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments” (UN Charter, Article 26).

Also, Paragraph 2 of Article 11 deals with the concrete questions concerning threats to the peace. Such questions can be brought before the General Assembly by any Member States or non-member of the UN, which again leads to competitiveness conflict with the Security Council. By this Article jurisdiction of the General Assembly is confined to a recommendation. Also, the General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to situations which might endanger international peace and security. Bearing in mind that recommendations of the General Assembly are not obligatory, it will depend on the Security Council whether it will consider the particular situation.

In terms of the discussion, in practice there are no significant limitations for the General Assembly. It may discuss any question even if the Security Council, meanwhile, deals with that question.

But, when it comes to recommendations, situation is different. If the General Assembly and the Security Council discuss a question at the same time, it is possible to adopt contradictory decisions. To avoid such kind of situations, Paragraph 1 of Article 12 of the Charter states: „while the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.”

Interpretation of Paragraph 1 of Article 12 was the subject of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in the case “Consequences of the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories”. The opinion was requested by the General Assembly resolution ES-10/14. The Court has confirmed the primary, “but not necessarily exclusive” competence of the Security Council in maintaining international peace and security. The General Assembly does have the power, *inter alia*, under Article 14 of the Charter, to “recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment” of various situations. According to the Court, “the only limitation which Article 14 imposes on the General Assembly is the restriction found in Article 12, namely, that the Assembly should not recommend measures

while the Security Council is dealing with the same matter unless the Council requests it to do so” (IJC, *Advisory Opinions And Orders Legal Consequences Of The Construction Of A Wall In The Occupied Palestinian Territory*, Advisory Opinion Of 9 July 2004, p. 16-17).

UNITING FOR PEACE

The role and influence of the General assembly in the fields of international peace and security was changed and improved by the Resolution Uniting for peace adopted on 3 November 1950. The adoption of this resolution came as a response of the USA and ideologically similar states to the strategy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) to block any determination by the Security Council on measures to be taken in order to protect the Republic of Korea against the aggression launched against it by military forces from North Korea (Tomuchat, 2008). States of Soviet bloc were against the adoption of the Resolution United for peace, calling it “illegal” (Peterson, 2008, p, 66).

The most important part of the resolution 377 A (V) is section A which states that “Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security”(United Nations General Assembly Resolution 377 (V) (‘Uniting for Peace’ UNGA Res 377 [V] [3 November 1950] UN Doc A/1775).

Procedural and substantive steps are suggested. First of all, if the Assembly is not in session this resolution created the mechanism of the “emergency special session” which can be called upon the basis of either a procedural vote in the Security Council, or within twenty-four hours of a request by a majority of UN Members being received by the Secretary-General. Such a session will be convened with a view to make appropriate recommendations for “collective measures (...) including the use of armed force when necessary“. As also the language of the resolution clearly reveals, the General Assembly can never be a full substitute for the Security Council in this area. Accordingly, only “recommendations” are mentioned. In procedural votes, the permanent members of the Security Council do not have the ability to block the adoption of draft resolutions, so unlike substantive matters, such resolutions can be adopted without their consent.

Furthermore, the General Assembly established fourteen membered Peace Observation Commission which reports on potential threats for peace and security

thereby entering into the competition of the Security Council under the Article 39. Uniting for peace procedure “constituted a precedent case in the application of the UN Charter provisions.” (Krasno, 2004, p. 318). This resolution also, at least theoretically, strengthened the role of the General Assembly in maintenance of international peace and security.

It is interesting that United for Peace was accepted by the vast majority of the member states (52: 5: 2), but its provisions on the use of armed forces enforcement action weren't successfully implemented in practice, even by countries who have been most active on its adoption. Condemnation of the General Assembly addressed to the People's Republic of China for its military intervention in Korea proved that the majority of UN member states were not ready to support action against a great power and a permanent member of the Security Council and thereby endangers world peace. Also, member states have largely proved unwillingness to make available military contingents for the operations provided for above resolutions. Some of the successful examples of Uniting for peace practice were during the Suez crisis in 1956 when the General Assembly adopted a resolution to send peacekeeping forces to supervise cessation of hostilities. Such agreement was possible only because the interest of two superpowers were converged, despite the veto of two permanent members France and Britain, who were directly involved in the conflict.

So far, ten emergency special sessions have been held by the procedure of Uniting for peace. But, nowadays maintaining international peace security is in hands of the Security Council and regional organizations. „General Assembly remained in the background, but it is still a reserve if Security Council is not able to perform its function” (Jazić, 1995, p. 73). Its role in this respect is concentrated on the “less” activities e.g. early warning crisis systems or decisions to send the observers for the elections. Notwithstanding their sheer numerical superiority, many members of the United Nations are much too weak to attempt to challenge the decisions made at the Security Council. Any application of Uniting for Peace with a view to taking enforcement action would at least need the support of one of the permanent members (Tomuchat, 2008, p. 4).

UNITED NATIONS MEMBERSHIP PROBLEMS

Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations (UN Charter, article 4, para. 1). The admission of any such state in the UN membership will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

This solution had caused serious problems in past, especially during the Cold war. Permanent members of the Security Council had used their veto power in order to prevent reception and nomination of new members. For example, the Soviet Union had used the veto power 47 times against membership requirements of the states that belonged to Western block. On the other hand, the US had persistently obstructed the achievement of the required majority for Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania membership in the UN. During the period of 1946-1955, only 9 countries had become members of the UN. The question of admitting new members had evolved into a kind of “battle for prestige” between East and West (Smouts, 2000, p. 28).

This tendency had launched numerous of legal and political issues and the General Assembly asked an opinion from the International Court of Justice in November 1949. The question was framed in the following terms: “Can the admission of a State to membership in the United Nations, pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Charter, be effected by a decision of the General Assembly, when the Security Council has made no recommendation for admission by reason of the candidate failing to obtain the requisite majority or of the negative vote of a permanent Member upon a resolution so to recommend?”. In its Advisory Opinion on 3 March 1950, the Court stated: “Two things were required to effect admission: a recommendation by the Council and a decision by the Assembly. The use in the article of the words “recommendation” and “upon” implied the idea that the recommendation was the foundation of the decision. Both these acts were indispensable to form the “judgment” of the Organization (paragraph 1 of Article 4), the recommendation being the condition precedent to the decision by which the admission was effected (ICJ, Advisory Opinion of 3 March 1950).”

The Court had clearly confirmed that recommendation of the Security Council must be preceded by a decision of the General Assembly. This opinion stressed the primacy of the Security Council over the General Assembly in making decisions important for the UN.

ANNUAL REPORTS FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The General Assembly receives and considers annual and special reports from the Security Council. These reports include an account of measures that Security Council has decided upon or taken to maintain international peace and security (UN Charter, Article 15).

Members of the General Assembly are displeased with the quality of the Security Council’s reports and consider that reports should be much more detailed, in order to strengthen the role of the General Assembly and achieve a balance between two organs. Reports of the Security Council contain review of taken

measures, but without deeper analysis and specifying why some of the Council's decisions are made.

The General Assembly Resolution 58/126 invites the Security Council “to continue with initiatives to improve the quality of its annual report to the General Assembly, mandated by Article 24, paragraph 3, of the Charter, in order to provide the Assembly with a substantive, analytical and material account of its work, in accordance with resolution 51/193”. “Convening of informal consultations” with the Security Council might be one of solutions (General Assembly Resolution 58/126, Article 4).

Also, in addition to improve the quality of the annual report, Resolution 58/126 urges the Security Council to submit periodically, special subject-oriented reports on issues of current international concern. So far no periodical reports were submitted to the General Assembly.

APPOINTMENT OF THE SECRETERY GENERAL

The Secretary-General is one of the most important organs of the UN. Article 97 of the Charter determines it as a chief administrative officer of the Organization. In this capacity, the Secretary General attends all meetings of the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council, and performs such other functions as are entrusted to him by these organs. By the functions, as are entrusted to him by other UN organs, its role has not only an administrative, but a political character. Due to Article 99 of the Charter, the Secretary-General can act independently and “may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.” This authorization makes the Secretary General a “spokesperson of international interest” (Alexandrowicz, 1962, p. 1112).

The Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council (UN Charter, Article 97). Also, in this case the UN Charter included both most important organs of the UN in the process of appointment. This case shows again the superiority of the Security Council in relation to the General Assembly.

Any permanent member of the Security Council can use veto for any of candidates. The Secretary-General appointment was controversial issue in San Francisco Conference, but great powers were able to defend their positions claiming that the Secretary-General must enjoy the confidence of all the Security Council permanent members (Skjelsbæk, 1991).

Process of appointment of all eight Secretary-Generals was the result of compromising between permanent members of the Security Council. In the situation when the Security Council cannot agree on one candidate, it remains a

dilemma and a legal void how should the General Assembly decides. In current practice, the appointment of the Secretary-General was mainly a matter of agreement between the two great powers – the USA and the USSR.

The process of Secretary-General appointment has been criticized by the General Assembly members, mainly due to the exclusivity of the Security Council and the lack of transparency of this process.

In the work of the ad hoc groups dedicated to the reform of the General Assembly this issue is considered as one of the most important. General Assembly Resolutions A / 51/241 and A/60/286 suggest recommendations to the Security Council in terms of increasing the transparency of the Secretary General appointment and more active involvement of the General Assembly and the President of the General Assembly in that process. E.g. General Assembly Resolution A / 60/286 states that bearing in mind the provisions of Article 97 of the Charter, the need for the process of selection of the Secretary-General to be more inclusive and invites the Security Council to regularly update the General Assembly on the steps it has taken in this regard.” The same resolution encourages the President of the General Assembly to consult the Member States to identify potential candidates endorsed by a Member State and, upon informing all Member States of the results, may forward those results to the Security Council and supports “formal presentation of candidatures for the position of Secretary-General in a manner that allows sufficient time for interaction with Member States, and requests candidates to present their views to all States members of the General Assembly.”

Numerous General Assembly members consider that the General Assembly should appoint the Secretary General by secret or open ballot. India has made an interesting proposal by which the Security Council should appoint three candidates and the General Assembly elects one of them as a Secretary General (Security Council Report, Special Research Report No. 2: Appointment of the UN Secretary General). This proposal was disapproved by permanent members of the Security Council. In practice, during the appointment of the Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, and his re-election in 2011, the Security Council did not consider any of recommendations set out in GA resolutions.

ENCROACHMENT ISSUES

Recent attempts of the Security Council to take on other issues besides those dealing with international peace and security e.g. HIV or climate change, have met with strong opposition in the General Assembly (UNRIC, Security Council: HIV/AIDS a Security issue). Adding such critical matters to the agenda of the Security Council is considered unacceptable encroachment by the most General Assembly members (Swart, 2008, p. 23).

On behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, the representative of Cuba stressed that the Security Council must fully comply with all provisions of the Charter and the General Assembly resolutions which clarify its relationship with other organs. Also, on behalf of the Group 77, the representative of Argentina expressed concern considering that the main responsibility of the Security Council is maintenance of peace and security, and other issues, including economic and social development and climate changes, are the competence of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (*Sievers & Dams, 2014, p. 583*).

General Assembly Resolution 59/313 devoted to strength and revitalization of the General Assembly states that “Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with Article 24 of the Charter.” Therefore, the Security Council should primarily focus on its functions established by the Charter.

IMPORTANCE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RENEWING

Proposals for General Assembly’s revitalization are the subject of discussion since the early 50s of XX century. One of the first attempts for better balance and relation between UN General Assembly and the Security Council was the establishment of so-called the Little Assembly. Due to disagreements of the permanent members of the Security Council, some part of its political powers was transmitted to the General Assembly. This loaded already overloaded agenda of the Assembly and “it become essential, therefore, that the members be represented in some forum for longer periods if they were to assume there wider responsibilities.” (Bowett, 1957, p. 7) The Little Assembly has meetings between regular sessions of the General Assembly and was consisted of one representative of each member state of the UN to ensure continuity in the work of the General Assembly.

There is no doubt that the Little Assembly was established in order to reduce the inefficiency of the Security Council in resolving political issues and therefore significantly strengthened the role of the General Assembly in respect of their solution (Sharma, 1978, p. 83). Although it did not last long (only 3 years, up to 1950), the Little Assembly dealt with a number of important issues including the issue of voting precede in the Security Council, international political cooperation, important issues of political independence and territorial integrity of China. For the reform of the United Nations establishment of a body such as the Little Assembly might be a good solution. This could contribute in improvement of the General Assembly’s reputation and made a balance with the Security Council on important political issues.

Some documents emphasize the reaffirmation of the General Assembly as central point of UN reform. E.g. Millennium Declaration states the reaffirmation

of the “central position of the General Assembly as the chief deliberative, policy-making and representative organ of the United Nations, and to enable it to play that role effectively.” Also, Report of ex- Secretary General Kofi Annan “In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for all” lists a series of recommendations devoted to strengthening the role of the General Assembly, notably rationalization of its work, accelerating the decision-making process, simplifying the agenda, and strengthening the role of the President of the General Assembly. It is also recommended greater focus of the General Assembly on international terrorism, migration and actual issues. Although the Report wasn’t entirely devoted to the General Assembly, its importance cannot be denied, as “an important step towards in the reaffirmation of role and place of General Assembly in the UN system” (Dimitrijević, 2014, p. 29).

Reports of ad hoc working groups on renewing the General Assembly denounced continued encroachment by the Security Council on issues which clearly fell under the powers and prerogatives of the General Assembly, including the areas of norm-setting, legislation, administrative and budgetary matters, and establishing definitions. Working groups were specifically concerned that the Security Council’s gradual but constant encroachment on the Assembly and the Economic and Social Council was most acute in the area of norm-setting and that it was most essential to counter and correct its activities in that regard first and foremost. Working groups also cited the work of the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization, which could contribute to the process of revitalization, in particular with respect to the functional relationship of the principal organs (General Assembly, Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Revitalization of the Work of the General Assembly, 17 July 2013).

CONCLUSION

The United Nations Charter is the most important legal document of the modern world. Although based on the sovereign equality of states, veto powers of the permanent members of the Security Council violate this principle in practice. The Charter determinates the General Assembly and the Security Council as the bearers of the most important functions of the United Nations. These two bodies are conceived as an organ of action (Security Council) and an organ for discussion (General Assembly). These two organs share together numerous authorities. However, there is an impression of disharmony in their relationship. On one side, the body composed of all member states in many respects is limited by the body composed of limited number of members. The veto power of only one of the permanent members of the Security Council may cause anon-adoption of some decision. Practice showed many examples of that.

Despite growing demands on the Reform of the Security Council and expansion of the number of its permanent membership members, the reform of the UN should not go only in that direction. Also, functions of the General Assembly should be expanded and less dependent of the Security Council, especially on making important decisions or appointment functions. Seventy year old practice showed that veto power and almost exclusively role of Security Council on the area of international peace and security did not work well.

Balance between two most important bodies of the UN systems could contribute in restoring reputation of the UN and achieving the objectives envisaged by the Charter. Establishment of the body such was the Little Assembly in the fifties could be one of the options. Ad hoc working groups for Renewing of the General Assembly demand more power for this body and suggest limitation of the Security Council authorities in some aspects of the UN system. Of course, all these demands depend on political wills of the UN members.

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**ODNOS IZMEĐU GENERALNE SKUPŠTINE
I SAVETA BEZBEDNOSTI KAO ASPEKT REFORME
UJEDINJENIH NACIJA**

Apstrakt: Sedamdeset godina nakon osnivanja, organizacija Ujedinjenih nacija je u velikoj krizi, a zahtevi za reformu su sve brojniji. Sama Povelja UN ima veliki nedostatak- pravo veta stalnih članica Saveta bezbednosti krši načelo suverene jednakosti država. S obzirom na ovlašćenja Saveta bezbednosti, u najvećem broju slučajeva se za reformu Ujedinjenih nacija, kao prva asocijacija javlja reforma Saveta bezbednosti. Ali, imajući u vidu veze i zajedničke funkcije Generalne skupštine i Saveta bezbednosti, jedan od pravaca u kojim može teći reforma Ujedinjenih nacija jeste uspostavljanje ravnoteže u pogledu ovlašćenja ova dva organa, i davanje suštinski značajnih i konkretnijih ovlašćenja Generalnoj skupštini.

Ključne reči: Ujedinjene nacije, reforma, Savet bezbednosti, Generalna skupština, pravo veta, Povelja UN.

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