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CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE CSCE/OSCE AFTER THE COLD WAR AND THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS¹

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Abstract: After the end of the Cold War, the CSCE began re-examining its goals of existence and redefine them in line with the newly emerging environment. The initial intentions of the CSCE to become a pan-European cooperative security institution were replaced under the influence of the Yugoslav crisis by developing the necessary capacity to prevent and resolve conflicts in its region. Accordingly, under the influence of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia have been developed many structures and institutions, instruments, mechanisms and procedures to reduce risks, for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation in Europe. The paper describes the development of capacities for cooperation in the area of conflict prevention and resolution of the

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Conference on European Security and Co-operation, and later of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe under the influence of the Yugoslav crisis in the period from 1990 to 1999.

Key words: conflict prevention and resolution, Yugoslav crisis, CSCE and OSCE.

INTRODUCTION

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is a regional organization which encompasses a geographical area from Vancouver to Vladivostok through its 57 participating countries. Participating countries from the region of North America, Europe and Asia provide the OSCE with a transatlantic and Asian-South Caucasus dimension. In accordance with the regional agreements of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, the OSCE aims among other things to provide early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation in Europe. In a broader sense, the OSCE is committed to preserving stability, peace and democracy for more than a billion people through a political dialogue on common values and practical work that brings about permanent changes. (What is the OSCE?, 2017, p. 2) Due to the comprehensive approach to security composed of a political-military, economic-ecological and human dimension, as well as with its broad membership, the OSCE gives significant impetus to the development of the security community in its region (Glišić, 2011). The OSCE participating States account for about 30 percent of membership in the United Nations, of which four are members of the Security Council. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe provides a comprehensive action by means of intensive activities in many different areas like the conflict prevention and resolution analyzed in this paper.⁵

During its existence, the OSCE adapted its role and goals to the current changes in international relations and thus established and developed the necessary structures and institutions, instruments, mechanisms and procedures, including various field activities. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe was formed from the Conference on European Security and Co-operation (CSCE) which aimed

⁵ Under the auspices of the political, military, economic, ecological and human dimension of security, the OSCE deals with the following: (1) arms control, (2) conflicts prevention and resolution, (3) reform and cooperation in the security sector, and (4) transnational threats, borders control, countering terrorism and policing - the political-military dimension; (1) economic activities, (2) environmental activities, and (3) good governance - economic-ecological dimension; (1) human rights, (2) elections, (3) media freedoms and media development, (4) national minorities issues, (5) Roma and Sinti, (6) rule of law, and (7) tolerance and non-discrimination - human dimension. On a broader scale, the OSCE also deals with some of the issues related to all three dimensions of security: (1) combating human trafficking, (2) cyber security, (3) democratization, (4) education, (5) gender equality; (6) migration and (7) youth issues. Retrieved from <https://www.osce.org/what-we-do>. Accessed on March 4, 2018.

at expanding, deepening and continuing the process of the detente, and thus creating conditions for the peaceful overcoming of the division between the East and the West during the Cold War (CSCE, 1994: Budapest Decisions, Strengthening the CSCE). The proposal made by the Soviet Union in the early fifties of the previous century to establish a pan-European security conference is considered the beginning of the idea of creating a Conference on European Security and Co-operation.⁶ The development of the CSCE/OSCE began with the Helsinki Counseling (from November 22, 1972, to August 1, 1975, - the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act), after which was established the practice of the multilateral diplomatic process (from August 1, 1975, until November 21, 1990, - the CSCE Summit in Paris). Then, through the multilateral process of intergovernmental political cooperation (from November 21, 1990, to July 10, 1992, - the CSCE Summit in Helsinki) it developed to an international political institution with the role of "regional agreement" (from July 10, 1992, to December 6, 1994, - CSCE Summit in Budapest) and an international organization within the meaning of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations (dated December 6, 1994).⁷

The social, state and international changes in its geopolitical field had an important impact on the development path of the OSCE/OSCE. The most important of them were undoubtedly: (1) the unification of Germany; (2) disarmament of opposing military blocks; (3) democratization of the societies in the countries of Eastern Europe; (4) the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty; (5) the collapse of the Soviet Union and (6) the Yugoslav crisis. The paper describes the impact of the Yugoslav crisis on the establishment and development of the CSCE/OSCE capacities for the conflict prevention and resolution in the period from 1990 to 1999, as well as the way, intensity and effectiveness of their engagement in order to calm this crisis.⁸ After the Cold War, the CSCE began with

⁶ More details on the beginning of the development of the Conference on European Security and Co-operation in: (International Politics, 1994).

⁷ Key issues related to the development process of the CSCE/OSCE, in most cases, were adopted at the Summits of Heads of State or Governments of the participating States. In view of the above-stated, the main sources of the analysis of the impact of the Yugoslav crisis on the development of the CSCE/OSCE capacities for conflict resolution were the documents adopted during the following summits of this organization: (1) the CSCE Summit in Paris, 19-21. November 1990; (2) the CSCE Summit in Helsinki, 9-10. July 1992; (3) the CSCE Summit in Budapest, 5-6. December 1994; (4) the OSCE Summit in Lisbon, 2-3. December 1996 and (5) the OSCE Summit in Istanbul, 18-19. November 1999.

⁸ Under the term Yugoslav crisis, we mean the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the processes that preceded it and the consequences that followed, including armed conflicts on its territory. Reference according to: (Kovačević and Dajić, 1994). The specified period of research from 1990 to 1999 was determined in view of the beginning and the course of the Yugoslav crisis, as well as on the fact that the CSCE/OSCE at that time experienced the most significant changes in its development.

the process of redefining its goals in the early 1990s, precisely when the Yugoslav crisis escalated. The crisis in the territory of the former SFRY showed that the conflict-prevention and conflict-resolution capacities available to the CSCE immediately after the Cold War were not adequate. The above-mentioned resulted in the OSCE/OSCE to develop under the significant or crucial influence of the Yugoslav crisis, primarily in the area of conflict prevention and resolution, which mainly included risk reduction, early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation in Europe.

The awakening of the national question was one of the main disintegration factors of the Yugoslav community, and therefore the cause of the Yugoslav crisis (Stojanović, 1990, pp. 257-274). The national issue was for the first time officially discussed at the session of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia on March 16, 1962. However, the key date for the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis was June 30, 1971, when the amendment on the constituent principles of the Yugoslav state was carried out through the adoption of an amendment to the 1963 Constitution of the SFRY and a framework for its confederation and decommissioning was created. After that followed a twenty-year period marked by an economic and political crisis, which culminated in inter-republican and inter-ethnic disagreements when the dissolution of the Yugoslav republics began to be openly advocated (Kovačević, Dajić, 1994, p. 10).

The Yugoslav crisis escalated in the late 1980s and early 1990s within substantially altered international relations, arising from the unification of Germany, the democratization of the societies of Eastern Europe, the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty and the collapse of the Soviet Union. All these conditioned the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of the international community, primarily the United Nations, the CSCE, NATO and the European Community, in the prevention and resolution of the newly emerging conflict. Therefore, the Yugoslav crisis presented an immense challenge for the international community, and thus for the then Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Through its more important stages - secessionism of the former Yugoslav republics, large-scale conflicts and NATO intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina, terrorism and separatism in Kosovo and Metohija, and NATO aggression on the FRY - the crisis in the former SFRY territory has shown the international community is not ready to respond to these types of challenge and thus has become the subject of many research to ensure an optimal way of resolving future conflicts of a similar nature.

The CSCE/OSCE has been engaged on several occasions in the Yugoslav crisis, initially independently, and later as the carrier of tasks assigned by the "wider" international community (Aćimović, 1996, pp. 426-427). For the first time, the CSCE was involved independently in resolving the Yugoslav crisis in the period from 1991 to 1992, as one of the subjects of international relations, and like other

international organizations, it was unsuccessful.⁹ The failure of the engagement of the CSCE in the early period of the Yugoslav crisis, marked by the secessionist ambitions of the former republics of the SFRY, pointed to the crucial importance of the existence of the capabilities for early warning and timely conflict prevention.

“It is precisely the action of the CSCE in the Yugoslav crisis that is the central point of the evaluation of the CSCE’s role as unsuccessful in the activities of this type (i.e. “early warning” and “early action,” *author’s comment*). However, the same situation unambiguously illustrated the key importance of preventive and early action: the moment a crisis has turned into an open conflict the possibilities for “corrections” of such a situation would qualitatively change and options narrow down, not only for the CSCE, but for any other international multilateral activity.” (Cagić-Ranisavljević, 1995, pp. 13).

Moreover, the weak capacities for the presence of the CSCE on the territory of the SFRY during 1991-1992 conditioned a need for the normative definition of practical activities related to crisis management. Thus, on the CSCE Summit in Helsinki in 1992, all this contributed to the CSCE’s objectives to be roughly defined in relation to achieving readiness for engagement in early warning, conflict prevention, and crisis management. (CSCE, 1992b: Helsinki Summit Declaration, paragraphs 18-20).

For the second time, the OSCE was engaged in November 1995 to implement the Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina within the mandate given to it by the “wider” international community. On this occasion, the OSCE was engaged in three important fields (The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995): (1) the stabilization of the region - the preparation and realization of negotiations on confidence-building and security measures and arms control measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Yugoslavia; (2) organization of elections and (3) human rights protection. At the Lisbon Summit, the Helsinki goals (early warning, conflict prevention, and crisis management) were

⁹ During the engagement in the Yugoslav crisis in the period 1991-1992, the CSCE has adopted a number of documents within its bodies, the most important of which are: the Declaration on the Situation in Yugoslavia, Berlin, 19-20. June 1991; An Urgent Appeal for Cease-fire, Prague, 3-4. July 1991; Mission for Yugoslavia, Prague, 3-4. July 1991; Emergency Appeal for Cease-fire, Prague, 8-9. August 1991; Help to Negotiations on the Future of Yugoslavia, Prague, 8-9. August 1991; Statement on the cease-fire in Yugoslavia, Prague, 3 September 1991; Negotiations on the Future of Yugoslavia, Prague, 4 September 1991; The situation in Yugoslavia, Prague, 10 October, 1991; Support to the UN action on Yugoslavia, Prague, November 29, 1991; The situation in Yugoslavia, Prague, October 22 1991; Mission of the CSCE Rapporteur on Human Rights, Prague, 22 October 1991; Declaration on Yugoslavia, Prague, 8 January 1992; Declaration within the continuation meeting of the CSCE, Helsinki, 15 April 1992; Declaration on BiH, Helsinki, 12 May 1992; Declaration of the Committee of Senior Officials of the CSCE, Helsinki, 20 May 1992, Decisions of the Committee of Senior Officials of the CSCE, Helsinki, 10 June 1992; Decision of the Committee of Senior Officials of the CSCE, Prague, 8 July 1992; Decisions of the Committee of Senior Officials, Prague, 14 August 1992 and the Decision of the Committee of Senior Officials, 18 September 1992.

enhanced with a new projected goal called post-conflict rehabilitation, which was influenced by the OSCE's engagement in the post-conflict rehabilitation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (OSCE, 1996: Lisbon Summit Declaration, paragraph 5). In addition, when identifying security challenges to determine the security model for Europe in the twenty-first century among others were listed ethnic tensions, aggressive nationalism and violations of the rights of national minorities. (OSCE, 1996: Lisbon Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the twenty-first century, paragraph 2). It is quite certain the source of the mentioned security challenges was precisely the Yugoslav crisis. For the third time, the OSCE was engaged in the period October 1998 - March 1999, in order to find a peaceful solution to the problem of the Kosovo crisis through the verification of the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution no. 1199 of September 23, 1998. The fourth engagement of the OSCE in the observed period was after the NATO aggression against the FRY when in accordance with the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution no. 1244 of June 10, 1999, and within UNMIK, it took a leading role in the activities of institution building and human rights protection in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija. Therefore, at the Istanbul Summit these engagements in resolving the Kosovo crisis influenced the confirmation of the goals of the OSCE's existence once again, which were defined three years before in Lisbon, as well as the stance that the OSCE was a regional arrangement in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations (OSCE, 1999c: Charter for European Security, Summit OSCE, paragraph 7). In addition, it is important to point out that based on negative experiences regarding the overlapping of the mandates of various international organizations engaged in the Yugoslav crisis, at the Sixth meeting of the Ministerial Council in Copenhagen in 1997, was passed the decision on the Common Concept for the Development of Co-operation among Mutually-Reinforcing Institutions (OSCE, 1997: Annex: Common Concept for the Development of Co-operation between Mutually-Reinforcing Institutions). This cooperation was later elaborated at the Istanbul Summit through the Operational Document - Platform for Co-operative Security (OSCE, 1999c: Operational Document - the Platform for Co-operative Security).

Whether it was engaged alone or within the wider international community, the CSCE/OSCE dedicated a lot of time to the Yugoslav crisis, which, as the immediate environment, influenced its development. However, despite the significant representation of the CSCE/OSCE in resolving the Yugoslav crisis, it is a fact that the force was used in the prevention of conflict several times before its existing instruments and mechanisms for resolving disputes and preventing crises were exhausted or used, or there was just a selective use and in some cases abuse.¹⁰

¹⁰ The biggest misuse of the OSCE is certainly the case in the village of Racak in November 1999, when William Walker, head of the OSCE Verification Mission for Kosovo, told at a news conference that the villagers of Racak had taken him to the hill where he saw the bodies of twenty killed civilians.

An important point in considering the engagement of the CSCE/OSCE in the Yugoslav crisis is certainly the suspension of the then FRY, which was implemented on the basis of the decision of the Committee of Senior Officials on July 8, 1992, referring to its declarations of 12 and 20 May of that year.

“The removal of the representatives of the FRY from the work of the OSCE is the only case of a suspension in its previous history. It is even more significant because the possibility of a suspension is unforeseen by any OSCE document.” (Milinković, 1997, p. 13)

The suspension was valid until November 10, 2000, when the FRY became a participant in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. The period of the “empty chair of the FRY” definitely made it difficult for the CSCE/OSCE to engage in the Yugoslav crisis.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS TO ENGAGEMENT OF THE CSCE/OSCE IN CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION AFTER THE COLD WAR

The OSCE traces its origins to the early 1970s when the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) was created. As already mentioned, the CSCE represented a multilateral forum for dialogue and negotiations between the East and the West in which it was necessary to expand, deepen and make continuing and lasting process of detente and thereby create the conditions for the peaceful overcoming of divisions. The practice of a multilateral diplomatic process under the auspices of the CSCE began with the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. The above-mentioned document was signed by 35 participating States and it was the basis for the further development of the CSCE. Currently, it is still ongoing and directs the work of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. The Final Act is divided into three basic categories (in practice often referred to as “baskets”) relating to (1) security issues in Europe; (2) cooperation in the field of economics; and (3) cooperation in humanitarian and other fields.¹¹ Throughout the entire period of the Cold War, the only established CSCE structure was the negotiating structure, which consisted of summits, follow-up meetings, and thematic meetings.

¹¹ The Final Act established ten basic principles of the CSCE (the so-called “Decalogue”) that regulate the mutual relationship of states, as well as the attitude of the states themselves towards their citizens: (1) the principle of sovereign equality; (2) abstaining from the use of force or threat of force; (3) inviolability of the boundaries; (4) the territorial integrity of States; (5) peaceful resolution of disputes; (6) non-interference with internal disputes; (7) respect for human rights and basic freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief, (8) equality and the right of peoples to self-determination; (9) cooperation between countries and (10) conscientious fulfillment of obligations under international law. (CSCE, 1975: Questions relating to Security in Europe).

Already in early 1990, the CSCE presented major plans for the creation of a new security and co-operation constellation in Europe based on the concept of cooperative security. This concept is based on the assumption that security is fundamentally indivisible and that any violation of the basic safety standards must be followed by the collective response of the entire community of states in order to ensure compliance with those standards. The institutionalization of the CSCE began based on the decisions of the Paris Summit from 19 to 21 November 1990, adopted by the document entitled the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. On that occasion, the CSCE was invited to take on a new role in managing historic changes and to provide an adequate response to the challenges that arose after the end of the Cold War.

At the Paris Summit, the CSCE set the following goals (Aćimović, 1991, p. 2): (1) democracy based on human rights and fundamental freedoms; (2) welfare achieved through economic cooperation and social justice; (3) peace and unity of Europe; and (4) equal security for all nations. Implementation of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe was followed by further development of the negotiating and decision-making structures – establishment of the Committee of Senior Officials, as well as the first elements of the CSCE operational structure and institutions, including the Secretariat, the Conflict Prevention Center, and the Office for Free Elections.

However, after the end of the Cold War, in the CSCE region, the conflicts regarding the interpretation of the fourth and eighth principles of the Final Act became frequent. Establishment of the right to “self-determination” provided the principle according which many secessionist movements in the CSCE region were terminated at the expense of and contrary to the principle of “territorial integrity of the states.” According to the above-mentioned, a large number of violent conflicts occurred in the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. It is important here to emphasize the Charter of Paris for a New Europe also indirectly acknowledges the potential tensions between the aforementioned principles of the Final Act, but also introduces the seeds of yet another conflict – “respect and realization of human rights” in order to “strengthen peace and security among the participating States.” This again confirmed the “right to self-determination,” putting the said right in the context of “relevant norms of international law, including those relating to the territorial integrity of States.”

After the Paris Summit, further decisions were passed regarding the redefinition of the objectives and tasks, structures and institutions, instruments and mechanisms of the CSCE/OSCE. The next major milestone in the development of the CSCE after the Cold War was the Follow-up Meeting from March 24 to July 8, 1992, and the Helsinki Summit from 9 to 10 July 1992. The Follow-up Meeting and the Helsinki Summit were preoccupied with the wave of violence in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Given this, the participating states tried to create conditions for the

most active engagement of the CSCE, which would prevent the outbreak of such conflicts in the future, as well as a more efficient resolution of the existing ones. The concept of preventive diplomacy is being introduced for the first time at the Helsinki Summit. The necessity to promote the concept of preventive diplomacy in Europe after the end of the Cold War became apparent. Conflicts broke out in the European area immediately after the Cold War, including the territory of the SFRY, where the breakup of the federal state brought about great violence and civil war. Regarding this, the Helsinki Summit has initiated further institutionalization of the CSCE in the area of conflict prevention and resolution, primarily through the establishment of the Security Cooperation Forum, the High Commissioner on National Minorities and the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration.

It is evident the CSCE between the Summits in Paris and Helsinki has become a rather institutionalized organization for cooperative security. The CSCE has adopted a wide range of normative principles that support the concept of cooperative security in its region. It has also established a comprehensive and multiple sets of concrete institutions for applying these principles, with appropriate resources and political support. However, over time, it turned out that due to the outbreak of numerous conflicts in the territory of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, the CSCE began to focus more on preventing and resolving conflicts in its region, rather than building a pan-European cooperative security institution. However, this temporary immaturity, which was inevitable in the circumstances of the initial period of establishing the competence of the new operational structures and the CSCE institutions and their development, has contributed to remarkably modest results in preventing and resolving conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Therefore, the engagement of the CSCE at the beginning of the escalation of the Yugoslav crisis has demonstrated its inability to operate effectively in the areas of preventive diplomacy, such as early warning, preventive action and conflict prevention (Cagić-Ranisavljević, 1995, pp. 11-14). This has influenced the development of certain instruments and mechanisms that enable the OSCE to act autonomously and more efficiently if there is a political will of all participating States in the area of conflict prevention and resolution.

During the Summit in Budapest, at the end of 1994, the CSCE affirmed its role as the primary instrument in the area of conflict prevention and resolution, applying a flexible and dynamic approach. The potential of the CSCE mechanisms in the subject area was not fully exploited for the following reasons: (1) the lack of political will of the member states to make difficult decisions, primarily those relating to the wars in the former Yugoslavia; (2) visible competition between the CSCE and other international organizations, and hence the existence of mutually blocking, instead of mutually supportive relations between them, and (3) rigidity of conflicts, which implied various attempts to prevent the implementation of resolutions, given the effects of cohesion of the history and influence of the current

brutality of the parties on their willingness to continue resolving conflicts in the battlefield (Sandole, 2007, p. 73).

Drawing from the experience from the Yugoslav crisis, in order to create as much synergy as possible with other international organizations and the necessary conflict resolution measures, the Heads of State and Governments of participating States of the CSCE decided at the Budapest Summit to initiate a discussion on a common and comprehensive security model for Europe for the 21st century and to adopt conclusions in the form of a document at the next meeting in Lisbon (CSCE, 1994: *A Common and Comprehensive Security Model for the twenty-first Century*, p. 26) Regarding this, during the Lisbon Summit from 2 to 3 December, 1996, a Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Model of Security for Europe for the 21st Century was adopted, which represented an in-depth expression of the OSCE's efforts to strengthen security and stability in its region, with the mutual reinforcement of the efforts of other European and transatlantic institutions and organizations (OSCE, 1996: *Lisbon Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the twenty-first century*, pp. 10-13.).

In the following years, the adoption of the Charter for European Security and the Platform for Cooperative Security at the Istanbul Summit in December 1999, created the conditions for the OSCE to act more effectively in the area of conflict prevention (OSCE, 1999c: *Charter for European Security*, pp. 1-45). Some of the contents of the document were also affected by events in the area of the southern Serbian province of Kosovo and Metohija, which will be shown in more detail in the following section.

Based on the displayed development of the CSCE/OSCE, it can be noted that special attention is paid to the development of its capacity to provide early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation in Europe. These contents represent the basis of current OSCE in the area of conflict prevention and resolution. Otherwise, in the current practice, in order to prevent and resolve conflicts under the auspices of the OSCE are engaged the Security and Cooperation Forum, the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, the various field missions and the Secretariat.

The impact of the Yugoslav crisis on the conflict prevention and resolution as one of the main areas of engagement of the CSCE/OSCE also imposed the need to develop its structures, institutions, instruments, mechanisms and procedures in the subject area (Stefanović, 1996, p. 324-678; Đorđević, Glišić, 2004, pp. 9-31).

THE INFLUENCE OF THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS ON DEVELOPMENT OF STRUCTURES AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE CSCE/OSCE IN THE FIELD OF CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION

The Yugoslav crisis had an impact on the establishment and development of negotiating and decision-making bodies - primarily the Ministerial Council, the High Council, the Standing Council and the Security Cooperation Forum, as well as on the establishment and development of an operational structure and institutions - like the Center for Preventing Conflict, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the High Commissioner on National Minorities.

The Ministerial Council (until the Summit in Budapest, the Council of the CSCE) and the High Council (until the Summit in Budapest, the Committee of Senior Officials) were established at the Paris Summit (CSCE, 1990b: New Structures and Institutions of the CSCE Process & Supplementary document to give effect to certain provisions contained in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe). The Ministerial Council was established with the aim to (1) consider matters of importance to the CSCE and to make appropriate decisions; (2) prepare meetings of Heads of State or Governments of the participating States; and (3) implement the established tasks and adopted decisions (CSCE, 1990b: New Structures and Institutions of the CSCE Process & Supplementary document to give effect to certain provisions contained in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, paragraph 2). However, the engagement of the CSCE in the Yugoslav crisis led to the strengthening of its role in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management at the next Summit in Helsinki (OSCE, 2000, p. 25). As for the High Council, by the provisions defined in the Paris Charter it was in charge of: (1) preparing the meetings of the Ministerial Council; (2) implementing its decisions; (3) considering the current issues and future work of the CSCE, including its relations with other international bodies, and (4) making appropriate decisions in the form of recommendations to the Ministerial Council (CSCE, 1990b: New Structures and Institutions of the CSCE Process and Supplementary document to give effect to certain provisions contained in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Chapter I-B). At the Helsinki Summit, the events in the former SFRY influenced the extension of its obligations in enabling the CSCE to engage in early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and peacekeeping operations (CSCE, 1992b: Helsinki Decisions, Early Warning, Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management).

Furthermore, the engagement of the CSCE in the Yugoslav crisis created a need for a permanent body that would be able to provide continuous political advisement and decision-making regarding the latest developments in the area of responsibility of the organization's activities, as well as to prepare and coordinate the work of newly established instruments and mechanisms, and primarily those in the field of conflict

prevention and resolution. The Permanent Political Advisory Council was established at the CSCE Council in Rome in 1993, called the Standing Committee, which is the current Permanent Council (CSCE, 1993: CSCE Structures and Operations, paragraph 3& paragraph 7.1). The Yugoslav crisis contributed significantly to the establishment of the current position and role of the Standing Committee/Council within the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

The Yugoslav crisis caused much more attention to be paid to the negotiating structure regarding the security issues discussed within the CSCE, especially when it came to preventing and resolving conflicts. Given the decisions adopted at the Helsinki Summit, it was decided to establish a new negotiating and decision-making body called the Forum for Security Cooperation. On that occasion, the Forum was designed as a framework for negotiating issues related to: (1) launching new negotiations on the control of arms, disarmament and confidence-building; (2) improving regular counseling and strengthening cooperation; and (3) improving the process of reducing the risk of conflict (CSCE, 1992b: Helsinki Decisions, CSCE Forum for Security Co-operation, paragraph 8). It can be said that the engagement of the OSCE in the Yugoslav crisis through ensuring the implementation of confidence-building and security measures and regional arms control measures in accordance with the provisions of the aforementioned Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina conditioned the importance of the Forum for Security Cooperation in the overall institutionalization of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Through its engagement in the implementation of the Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the OSCE introduced into its practice a novelty, which was to solve specific regional security problems through the implementation of confidence and security-building measures. Regarding this matter, the Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina envisaged confidence and security-building measures on two levels: (1) confidence and security-building measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and (2) confidence and security-building measures in the region. Also, for the first time, the OSCE was the bearer of regional arms control measures. In order to carry out these activities, the OSCE has developed two in many ways unique agreements in the current practice: (1) the Agreement on Strengthening Confidence and Security-Building Measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina, concluded in Vienna in 1996; and (2) the Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control, concluded in Florence in 1997. On the Lisbon Summit, this affected the OSCE to direct towards the maintaining of security in its region and consolidation of the situation in Southeast Europe through the implementation of the Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina (OSCE, 1996: Lisbon Summit Declaration, paragraph 18).

The Conflict Prevention Center was established on the basis of the decisions of the CSCE Summit in Paris on 18 March 1991. Among other things, at the beginning of its mandate, the Center was in charge of collecting reports on the

implementation of the economic embargo against Yugoslavia designated by the United Nations in September 1991. However, its resources and staff at that time were not fully developed, which jeopardized its purpose, particularly after the intensification of the Yugoslav crisis in the second half of 1991. However, the establishment of the Forum for Cooperation in the Area of Security jeopardized the continuation of the Center's existence. Namely, his further destiny depended on the progress of negotiations, exchange of opinions, counseling and cooperation within the Forum, from which the possible new immediate tasks of the Center should arise and the strengthening of its action in terms of reducing the risk of conflict. The extent and intensity of conflicts on the territory of the former SFRY were the main factors of the survival and further development of the Center for the Prevention of Conflicts. As a result, the Center has currently developed capacities to provide support to the Official Chair and other OSCE structures in activities such as (1) identifying potential crises and planning future missions and tasks; (2) providing support when implementing confidence and security-building measures; and (3) archiving all documentation related to the annual exchange of military information. In addition, the failure of the OSCE Mission for Verification in Kosovo and Metohija, primarily referring to the failed deployment of the planned number of persons for verification, led to the decision to establish an Operational Center for the preparation and implementation of OSCE field operations within the Center for Conflict Prevention at the Istanbul Summit (OSCE, 1999c: Charter for European Security, paragraph 43). Its basic role was to plan and develop field operations.

The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights has its roots in the Bureau for Free Elections, set up at the Paris Summit, which played a role in facilitating the cooperation of participating states in meetings and exchanging information on free elections (CSCE, 1990b: New Structures and Institutions of the OSCE process, paragraph 13). However, with the development of events on the territory of the former SFRY, the Bureau for Free Elections became an obsolete institution. This led to the establishment of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (CSCE, 1992a: Human dimension, paragraph 9) at the CSCE Council meeting in Prague in 1992. It was the largest institution in the OSCE and responsible for: (1) promoting democratic elections, in particular through overseeing the electoral process; (2) providing practical support in the establishment of democratic institutions and human rights, and the strengthening of civil society and the role of law; (3) contribution to early warning and conflict prevention, in particular through the monitoring and implementation of obligations from the human dimension and (4) the contact point for Roma and Sinti issues.

The High Commissioner on National Minorities was established by decisions adopted at the Helsinki Summit as a response, as early as possible, to ethnic tensions that have the potential to become a conflict within the OSCE region. The High Commissioner on National Minorities acts as an instrument of preventive

diplomacy and aims to identify and timely assist in resolving ethnic tensions that could jeopardize peace, stability, and relations between the participating States of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. The need for the establishment of this institution originated primarily because of the Yugoslav crisis, and it recorded significant engagement in the territory of Macedonia (Ackerman, 2010, pp. 115-128).

THE INFLUENCE OF THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS ON DEVELOPMENT OF THE CSCE/OSCE INSTRUMENTS IN THE FIELD OF CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION

In order to be successful in the area of conflict prevention and resolution, the CSCE/OSCE had to develop certain instruments for operational actions in the field, such as reporting and fact-finding missions, long-term missions, personal representative of the chairman, REACT teams and peacekeeping operations. Most of these instruments were created under the influence of the engagement of the CSCE/OSCE during the Yugoslav crisis.

The inability of the physical presence of the CSCE to manage the crisis on the territory of the former SFRY has caused more than modest effects. This led to the establishment of a Fact-Finding Mission and Rapporteur Mission at the Helsinki Summit as instruments for conflict prevention and political crisis management (CSCE, 1992b: Helsinki Decisions, Early Warning, Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management, paragraphs 12-16).

Also, the need for a long-term and continuous presence in the crisis area for the collection of information regarding human rights, military developments and mediation in a possible approximation of the opposing interests of the parties to the conflict appeared during the engagement of the CSCE in the Yugoslav crisis. This need was institutionalized through the establishment of a Mission of Long Duration to Kosovo, Sandzak and Vojvodina by the Committee of Senior Officials in August 1992 (International Politics, 1992, pp. 26). This was the first mission of this type within the CSCE. It had the task to improve the dialogue between authorities and minority representatives, collect information on relative human rights violations, serve as a contact point for representatives of various ethnic groups and provides information on legal solutions to minority, media and election issues. The mission was activated in the period from December 8, 1992, to June 28, 1993, when due to a suspension from the CSCE the Government of the FRY canceled its hospitality.

Beside the Mission of Long Duration to Kosovo, Sandzak and Vojvodina, during its engagement in the Yugoslav crisis until the end of 1999, the OSCE/OSCE used this instrument on several occasions, thus gaining experience for the subsequent dimensioning of such missions and the need to develop new

elements in the function of their support. Among other things, long-term missions were also deployed twice in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija. The FRY accepted the First Permanent Mission, called the OSCE Verification Mission for Kosovo, which had the task to verify the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199 (International Politics, 1998, pp. 2-4). However, before the NATO aggression, the Mission halted its work and the verifiers were withdrawn from Kosovo and Metohija. The Second Mission in Kosovo was established in accordance with the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244. This mission was part of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and responsible for building institutions and democracy, the rule of law and human rights in the region. Its work focused on the following interdependent areas: (1) media affairs; (2) democratization; (3) elections; (4) police training and the rule of law and human rights.

In addition to the long-term missions in Kosovo and Metohija, there was a very noticeable and intense engagement of the Personal Representative of the Chair in 1998, which significantly contributed to the profiling of the position and role of this instrument in the field of conflict prevention and resolution under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

From three depicted missions, the OSCE Verification Mission for Kosovo had special significance in the development of REACT teams. According to the Agreement on the OSCE Verification Mission for Kosovo, it was planned to deploy 2,000 people for its implementation. However, due to the lack of the sufficient number of experts, only about 1,400 persons were deployed and considerably slower than planned. On that occasion, it became apparent that the participating states could not provide civilian experts at any given time, even for missions of great importance for international security. Based on this experience at the Istanbul Summit, REACT teams have been established (OSCE 1999c: Chapter for European Security, paragraph 42).

Due to the experience of engaging long-term missions during the Yugoslav crisis, the OSCE is now distinguished for the implementation of this instrument in order to prevent and resolve conflicts. Currently, with its capacities, it is engaged in 15 countries in the areas of Southeast Europe, Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia. (Galbreath, 2007, pp. 65-91 and OSCE, 2018, pp. 56-90). Long-term missions are the basic instrument for conflict prevention, crisis management, conflict resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation of the region. The mandate, size and activities of these missions are very diverse, which affects the flexibility of their implementation and provides unique opportunities for engagement in conflicts and crisis situations throughout the OSCE region. Their mandates typically include the following tasks: (1) assistance, advice and formulation of recommendations in the areas that the OSCE and the host country have agreed to; (2) monitoring the commitments undertaken within the OSCE and providing advice or

recommendations to improve their implementation; (3) assistance in organizing and monitoring elections; (4) providing support in strengthening the rule of law and democratic institutions and in preserving and restoring order; (5) creating conditions for negotiation and other measures that can facilitate peaceful resolution of conflict; (6) verifying and/or assisting in the implementation of an agreement on the peaceful resolution of conflict; and (7) supporting rehabilitation and reconstruction of various aspects of society.

Peacekeeping operations have been established by the Helsinki Decisions (CSCE, 1992b: Helsinki Decisions, Early Warning, Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management, paragraphs 17-56). Hence, precisely at the same time when the UN took part in resolving the Yugoslav crisis by establishing peacekeeping forces in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. The establishment of peacekeeping operations was a reflection of the CSCE's efforts to strengthen its effectiveness in the field of practical activities aimed at managing the Yugoslav crisis and preventing conflicts in the former SFRY, as well as to ensure the necessary effectiveness as a regional agreement within the meaning of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations. As it is well known, so far, the OSCE has established only one peacekeeping operation in the Nagorno-Karabakh area.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS ON DEVELOPMENT OF MECHANISMS AND PROCEDURES OF THE OSCE/OSCE IN THE FIELD OF CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION

Most of the instruments and procedures available within the OSCE are related to the prevention and conflict resolution, primarily in the matters of human dimension, risk reduction, early warning and preventive action, and peaceful resolution of disputes based on conciliation and arbitration. Their establishment and intensive implementation were certainly facilitated by the establishment of the Security Cooperation Forum and the Standing Committee/Standing Council (OSCE, 2011, p. 9).

The Yugoslav crisis had an impact on the development of the Human Dimension Mechanism, primarily through the establishment of the Mission of Experts and the Mission of Rapporteurs. The Yugoslav crisis has contributed to the fact that particular attention has been paid to the relationship between security and human rights within the CSCE/OSCE (Begiraj, 2011). The Human Dimension Mechanism (Vienna and Moscow Mechanism) is one of the most complex mechanisms of the OSCE. It is upgraded and modified at the meetings of the Human Dimension Conference. In its original form, the mechanism was established at the Follow-up Meeting in Vienna in 1989 (CSCE, 1989, Human Dimension of the CSCE). It was upgraded on the second meeting of the Conference on the

Human Dimension in Copenhagen in 1990 (CSCE, 1990a: paragraphs 41-43). It was extensively extended at the third meeting of the Human Dimension Conference in Moscow in 1991 (OSCE, 1991: paragraphs 1-16). Certain modifications were also experienced at the CSCE Council Meeting in Prague in 1992 (OSCE, 1992a: Human Dimension, paragraph 14). The mechanism was designed to contribute to the more efficient implementation of the commitments undertaken by the participating States with the documents created under the auspices of the OSCE, as well as establishing their close cooperation in that area. The purpose of the mechanism was to resolve specific problems that a participating state was facing in its territory or in relations with other participants. Drawing from the direct field engagement of the Council of Europe and the European Economic Community in February and March 1991 during the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis, the CSCE established the Expert Missions and the Rapporteurs' Mission (OSCE, 1991: paragraph 13) at the Third Meeting of the Conference on Human Dimension, held on 4 October 1991 in Moscow. On October 10, 1991, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe assumed the role in the protection of the rights of national minorities in accordance with its standards and definitions. At the session of the Committee of Senior Officials, it was emphasized that the unresolved issue of national minorities on the territory of the former SFRY prolonged tension and instability, and that the conflict should not be used for the violent change of the ethnic composition of various areas (International Politics, 1991b, pp 17). Starting from such commitments, the Committee of Senior Officials at the meeting in Prague on 22 October 1991 decided to send the Mission of Human Rights Rapporteurs to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia (International politics, 1991a, pp. 18). The Mission's task was to become familiar with the human rights situation, including the rights of minorities, and to inform the Committee of Senior Officials. Based on the report submitted by the said mission, the Committee of Senior Officials decided to continuously monitor the state of human rights in Yugoslavia in the future, including the position of national minorities.

After that, the Human Security Mechanism until the end of 1999 was activated five more times, from which three times in connection with the Yugoslav crisis. On 23 July 1992, the Mission of Human Rights Rapporteurs was sent upon the UK request and with the support of another 12 participating States to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia to report on the attacks on civilians. During the 22nd meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials on June 30, 1993, the Moscow Mechanism on Human Dimension was launched based on the decision to send the Rapporteurs Mission to the FRY to investigate the state of human rights. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FRY refused to issue visas to the members of the Rapporteurs' Mission, so the Mission was not realized. During the NATO

aggression on the FRY, the Human Dimension Mechanism was initiated by the Russian Federation on April 23, 1999 (OSCE, 2011, p. 14).

Regarding the mechanisms for risk prevention, from the existing seven in the period from 1990 to 1999, two mechanisms have been activated referring to the Yugoslav crisis - the Mechanism for Consultation and Cooperation as regards Unusual Military Activities and the Mechanism for Cooperation as regards Hazardous Incidents of a Military Nature. The Mechanism for Consultation and Cooperation as regards Unusual Military Activities is foreseen by the Vienna Document, and it represents a framework for consultations and cooperation between states as regards any unusual and unplanned military activities of a participating state (OSCE, 1999a: Risk Reduction, paragraphs 16 to 16.3. 1.2). In the period from 1990 to 1999, this mechanism was activated four times, each of which was related to the territory of the former Yugoslavia (OSCE, 2011, pp. 17-18).

The Mechanism for Cooperation as regards Hazardous Incidents of a Military Nature, also envisaged by the Vienna Document, is a framework for cooperation among the participating States through the reporting and clarification of hazardous incidents of a military nature in order to avoid possible misunderstandings and mitigate the consequences. So far, it was activated only once by Portugal in January 1992, when that country requested explanations on behalf of the European Commission regarding the shooting down of a helicopter with observers above the territory of the former Yugoslavia (OSCE, 2004, p. 5).

In connection with early warning and preventive action, the Mechanism for Consultation and Co-operation as regards Emergency Situations (Berlin Mechanism) was established at the meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials in Berlin from 19 to 21 June 1991, as a result of consideration of the possibilities for the most efficient operation of the CSCE in crisis situations. Negotiations for the establishment of the said mechanism were a line of separation among the participating States and represented a subject of a great dispute during the preparation of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. The establishment of this mechanism was opposed by three countries - the USA, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The opposition of Yugoslavia stemmed from the awareness that the process of disintegration, which had already begun within its borders, could become the subject of the said mechanism. On the other hand, the USA and the Soviet Union intended to avoid securing a significant role of the CSCE on security issues.

This mechanism was first used during the Yugoslav crisis since that was the reason for its creation. The Committee of Senior Officials had seven extraordinary meetings on the basis of the Berlin Mechanism during the Yugoslav crisis in the period from 1991 to 1994. The First Extraordinary Meeting at Luxembourg's request from 28 June 1991, was held in Prague on 3 and 4 July of the same year, that is, only thirteen days after the establishment of the Berlin Mechanism. On this

occasion, the OSCE first considered the emerging crisis in Europe after the Cold War through issues related to the ceasefire and hostilities, preventing the spread of conflicts and providing common assistance in resolving it. Decisions from that meeting were adopted in the documents called the Emergency Appeal for a Ceasefire and the Mission to Yugoslavia. The Second Extraordinary Meeting was scheduled in Prague on 8 and 9 August 1991. At that meeting, the Committee adopted a new Declaration for the ceasefire and agreed on the decision to continue the operation in connection with the Yugoslav crisis given in the documents: Assistance to Negotiations on the Future of Yugoslavia and the Observer Mission in Yugoslavia. At the Third Extraordinary Meeting, held in Prague on 3 and 4 September 1991, the Declaration on the ceasefire was adopted and, through a document entitled Negotiations on the Future of Yugoslavia, the positions on the negotiated settlement of the crisis in Yugoslavia were agreed. The Fourth Extraordinary Meeting was held in Prague on October 10, 1991. At that meeting, the representatives of the CSCE participating countries reviewed developments in Yugoslavia and adopted a document entitled The Situation in Yugoslavia. At the Fifth Extraordinary Meeting, on 29 November 1991 in Prague, a document entitled Support to the UN Action on Yugoslavia was adopted. The Sixth Extraordinary Meeting was held in Helsinki from 6 to 12 May 1992, at the request of Austria from 4 May 1992. This meeting was dedicated to armed conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹² At the end of the consultation, the Declaration on the BiH was adopted. In addition to the above-mentioned, during the Follow-up Meeting in Budapest on November 25, 1994, Bosnia and Herzegovina issued a request for an extraordinary meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials regarding the situation in the Bihać region. The meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials on this matter was held in parallel with the Budapest Review Conference. The last time the mechanism was launched in connection with the Yugoslav crisis was by the Russian Federation on April 23, 1999, in line with the NATO aggression against the FRY.

During the development of the Berlin Mechanism, the general consensus rule was abandoned. In fact, an exception called “Consensus Minus One” has been introduced, which provides that in the event of emergencies decisions can be prepared and implemented without the consent of a participating country for which the mechanism has been initiated. Three exceptions to the introduction of the consensus - two on the procedural plan during the convening of extraordinary meetings in connection with the Mechanism for Consultation and Cooperation as regards Unusual Military Activities and the Berlin Mechanism, and one on the decision-making plan within the framework of the Human Security Mechanism have significantly altered the nature of the OSCE. According to the opinion of the

¹² These documents were published in: *International Politics*, Belgrade, No. 995-7, 1991, pp. 15-18; No. 998-1000, 1991, p. 28. and No. 1005-6, 1992, p. 20.

eminent authors in this field, the main incentive for introducing changes into the decision-making system by general consent was, unfortunately, the Yugoslav crisis and the mentioned exemptions from the consensus rule were mostly applied so far in connection with it (Aćimović, 1996b, pp. 122).

CONCLUDING CONSIDERATIONS

During the Cold War, the CSCE represented a multilateral forum for dialogue and negotiations between the East and the West, within which was necessary to expand, deepen and make continuing and lasting process of detente and thereby create the conditions for the peaceful overcoming of divisions. Presently, the OSCE is a pan-European security organization that in accordance with the regional agreements of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations aims to ensure the prevention and conflict resolution on its territory, i.e. early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation in Europe.

The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe started redefining its place and role in the security architecture of Europe after the Cold War by implementing the decisions adopted at the CSCE Summit in Paris in 1990. Since then, in order to ensure a self-sufficient role in European security, the CSCE/OSCE has set unique objectives and tasks and has continuously developed its structures, institutions, instruments, and mechanisms in accordance with them.

It can be said that the escalation of the Yugoslav crisis was one of the reasons for the CSCE to redefine its goals of existence and design a new role in the post-Cold War reality. This has led to the definition of new tasks and the institutionalization of the CSCE OSCE, primarily in the field of conflict prevention and resolution. Therefore, the Yugoslav crisis had a significant or even decisive influence on the establishment of new structures, institutions, tools, and mechanisms of the CSCE/OSCE or the development of existing ones.

The transition at the end of the Cold War was a turbulent time in world history. The simultaneous collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia created conditions for the outbreak of numerous conflicts. At the same time, these events occurred when the CSCE was still in the process of building its structures and institutions, instruments and mechanisms, and the inability to react immediately to such a wide spectrum of violent conflicts has caused doubts as to its effectiveness as a conflict management tool.

Identifying the cause-and-effect relationship between the Yugoslav crisis and the development of the OSCE/OSCE from 1990 to 1999 through the consideration of a multitude of scientific documentation and relevant documents, it can be concluded that the Yugoslav crisis, after the Cold War, had influenced the CSCE to define the area of prevention and conflict resolution as a matter of gravity,

and consequently to establish and develop adequate structures and institutions, instruments and mechanisms within it. Regarding the negotiating and decision-making bodies, the Yugoslav crisis had a distinct impact on the development of the Council of Ministers and the High Council (established at the Paris Summit in 1990, but under the influence of the Yugoslav crisis their mandates were extended at the Helsinki Summit in 1992), as well on the establishment and further development of the Permanent Council (established at the meeting of the CSCE Council in Rome in 1993) and the Forum for Security Cooperation (established at the Helsinki Summit in 1992). Additionally, the Yugoslav crisis had a significant impact on the development of the Conflict Prevention Center (established on the basis of the decisions adopted at the Paris Summit in 1990) and the establishment and further development of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the High Commissioner on National Minorities (established at the Helsinki Summit in 1992). Most of the OSCE instruments were created under the influence of the Yugoslav crisis, such as reporting and fact-finding missions, long-term missions, personal representative of the Chair, REACT teams and peacekeeping operations. Likewise, the crisis in the former SFRY had an impact on the establishment of the Human Dimension Mechanism and the Berlin Mechanism (Early Warning and Preventive Action) as well as on the development of two mechanisms in the area of risk reduction - Mechanism for Consultation and Cooperation as regards Unusual Military Activities and Mechanism for Cooperation as regards Hazardous Incidents of a Military Nature. When analyzing the existing OSCE procedures, it is apparent that under the influence of the Yugoslav crisis a general consensus rule was rejected, regarding the application of the Berlin Mechanism and the Human Dimension Mechanism.

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