

HUMANS AS A WEAPON: ASYMMETRY AND DEMOGRAPHY*

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Abstract: At the beginning of the paper, the author briefly considers the terms of war and asymmetry. As an example of the conception of asymmetric warfare, the author states the theses of a French theoretician, Guy Brossollet, on the so-called non-battle. Analyzing the particular elements of the tactics of the Islamist formations in Iraq and Syria, the author finds certain similarities between modular warfare in Brossollet's conception and the manner in which the offensive operations of the army of the Islamic State and other Jihadist militias are conducted. A special emphasis is placed on the conducting of attacks by means of car bombs operated by Islamist suicide fighters. The paper is based on the assertion that, given the fact that they are technically and resourcefully inferior to regular armies (especially those of the West), Islamist movements and military formations use car bombs in an attempt to asymmetrically respond to the supremacy of the adversary. In the author's opinion, the two essential elements – population and ideology – are necessary for such tactics of the Islamist armed formations. Given the fact that the population of the Islamic faith has constantly been increasing and that on average it is relatively young, an assumption can be made that in the decades to come, it will be a rich mobilization source for recruiting thousands of future suicide bombers. The Islamist narration will not disappear, either, given the fact that it is generated from certain radical interpretations of Islam. In other words, Islamism will exist as long as Islam exists. The basic thesis of the paper is based on an insight that the technologically and logistically weaker side in an asymmetric conflict resists with what it abounds in. In this case, Islamist formations in a conflict with secular Muslim and non-Muslim armies abundantly dissipate human resources – humans as a weapon (suicide bombers). Also, the basic thesis comprises the attitude that the tactics of using

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car bombs will become one of the dominant in the future due to the given positive demographic conditions (constant growth) within the world's Muslim population.

Keywords: asymmetry, demography, Islam, war, suicide attacks.

WAR AND ASYMMETRY

When multidimensional research in the phenomenon of war is concerned, the most prominent place probably belongs to a French author, Gaston Bouthoul. Not only did this French scientist lay the foundations for the scientific discipline that strictly addresses the phenomenon of war – polemology – but he also comprehensively studied it for several decades and published a plethora of scientific papers on it. Bouthoul singles out several important characteristics of war as a social phenomenon. First of all, war is a collective phenomenon and in that sense it should be differed from individual acts of violence. According to Bouthoul, in comparison with the “universal struggle” or different other forms of mutual conflicting, as well as in relation to individual crimes, war singles out with yet two quite important features – the subjective element (intention) and the political element (organization). Finally, war also has a certain legal character.¹³³ Relying on the determinations by other authors and his own insights into the nature of war, Bouthoul suggests that war should be defined as an armed and bloody fight between organized groups.¹³⁴

During the 20th century, states were most frequently those “organized groups” that were waging wars and signing peace treaties upon their termination. Apart from states (and alliances of states), wars were also being waged by different insurrectional formations, military-political movements and terrorist organizations. No matter what the participants in a war were like, in their mutual conflict, there was always a certain balance of forces between them, implying the parity of power or the supremacy of one of the sides in the conflict. Relying on Saida Bedar's conclusions, Barthélémy Courmont and Darko Ribnikar allege that symmetry is a fight between equal adversaries, dissymmetry is the striving of one of them to gain a qualitative and/or quantitative advantage, whereas asymmetry implies a reverse procedure – taking advantage of all the weaknesses of the adversary and inflicting as big a

¹³³ Gaston Bouthoul, *La guerra* [Barcelona: Oikos-tau, s.a. – ediciones, 1971], 31.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 35.

damage on him as possible.¹³⁵ According to their understanding, asymmetry implies rejecting the rules of the fight imposed by the adversary. That leads towards using less ordinary or completely unordinary forces, weapons, methods and locations (civilians, weapons of mass destruction, guerrilla, terrorism, narrower parts of a city/town, public places).¹³⁶ Essentially, when the weaker side in a conflict is concerned, waging an asymmetric war means that very limited resources and instruments are used to inflict immeasurable and frequently unacceptable human or material losses on the technically and organizationally superior adversary.

One of the conceptions of an asymmetric operation in the conditions of a large-scale conventional war was elaborated on by a French author, Guy Brossollet, in the mid-1970s. In the circumstances of the supremacy of the conventional forces of the former USSR and the Warsaw Treaty Organization against the French and NATO forces in Europe, Brossollet ideated a new concept of the defense of France. In that concept, the weaker side dissuades the stronger side from entering into a fight, i.e. it realizes its goal not by getting to grips with the enemy, but by persuading the enemy to withdraw from a conflict. The mentioned dissuasion is pillared by the capabilities of inflicting unacceptable losses on the enemy. Instead of a symmetric and conventional response to the Soviet threat, which would have been extremely risky due to the quantitative inferiority of the French (Western) forces, Brossollet advocated defiance founded on the deep battle array (in comparison with the speed of the invasion of the enemy), on the flexible and light forces (in comparison with the mass of the enemy) and on efficiency (in comparison with the number of the soldiers on the enemy's side).¹³⁷ In Brossollet's conception, the forces that offer resistance combine the operations of alarming and exhausting, and the battle in the classical sense is replaced with a plethora of decentralized, very simple but interrelated operations.¹³⁸ The skeleton of the performance of such operations consists of the modularly organized army. The ground module would consist of about 15 members divided into five groups. Each group would have a field vehicle and the armament that would comprise anti-tank systems, recoilless guns, mortars, lightweight automatic weapons and anti-personnel and anti-tank mines.¹³⁹ One module would be responsible for a zone covering the territory of about twenty square kilometers and its basic task

¹³⁵ Бартедеми Курмон и Дарко Рибникар, *Асиметрични ратови: Сукоби јуче и данас, тероризам и нове претње* [Београд: Новинско-издавачки центар „Војска“, 2003], 18.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 20.

¹³⁷ Gi Brossole, *Ogled o nebitki* [Београд: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 1978], 88.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 89.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 92.

would be to inflict minimal losses on the enemy (three fighting vehicles/ten infantry soldiers). In a fragmentary and rudimentary respect, in the last years, such a conception has been realized in practice by different Islamist formations in the Middle East in fighting against the security forces (the armies and the police) of the secular Arabic regimes and to a lesser extent against foreign expeditionary troops.

ISLAMIST MODULES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

In the Middle East, especially in Syria and Iraq, in the last years, an asymmetric conflict, in which there have been the technically, resourcefully and logistically superior forces of the legitimate regimes on the one side and on the other, in those very same aspects, the inferior different insurrectional Islamist militias, has been taking place. The Jihadist formations have only had distinct prevalence with respect to the level of combat morale. Since in a larger number of important dimensions they have been weaker than their secular adversaries, the Islamist militia, especially the forces of the Islamic State, they have tried to gain prevalence in the theater of operations by using unconventional methods and means and to maintain the initiative during the war. Humans have been the resource they have had a relative abundance of. Apart from the domestic population, in Syria and Iraq, several tens of thousands of volunteers have joined different Jihadist formations from abroad (from North Africa, the other countries of the Middle East, from the territories of the former USSR and from Western Europe). Ideologically indoctrinated, those volunteers have frequently been ready to also deliver suicide bombing attacks, which, apart from inflicting a loss on the enemy, would also imply their own certain death.

Becoming aware of that potential, the commanders of the Islamist militias, especially of the forces of the Islamic State, have begun to massively introduce motor vehicles overloaded with explosive into offensive operations. Suicide volunteers would, then, have operated those vehicles until the moment when the task— crashing against a particular target or activating the explosive in its proximity — had to be done. The targets of such attacks have been: 1) military or police checkpoints; 2) military bases or barracks; and 3) police stations. The data that can be obtained from the interactive database of suicide attacks on the website of the Chicago University testify to the proportions of the application of these tactics. The author of this paper has chosen the following parameters — the country: Iraq, the period: 2015; the armed groups: all; the campaign: the Iraqi rebels against the Iraqi Government and the Allies; the type of the target: security; the weapon: car bomb. The following results were obtained from the responses to the questionnaire with these parameters —

the total number of attacks: 151; the total number of the killed: 1095; the total number of the wounded: 1466. When Syria is concerned, together with the same remaining parameters except for the type of the campaign (the rebels against Syria and the Allies), the following results were obtained – the total number of attacks: 36; the total number of the killed: 364; the total number of the wounded: 310.¹⁴⁰ Otherwise, only those cases for which there is a confirmation from at least two independent sources are registered in this database.

The May 2015 battle for the Iraqi city of Ramadi, when the forces of the Islamic State conquered that place after fighting for several days, can be referred to as a pattern of using motor vehicles with explosive. After the American invasion on Iraq in 2003, during the process of the reconstruction of Iraq's security forces, the United States gave them, among other things, about 3500 Humvee field vehicles. After the great offensive of the Islamic State's forces during the summer of 2014 and the conquering of Mosul, the Jihadists laid their hands on about 2300 of these vehicles.¹⁴¹ Apart from using them for cargo transportation, the members of the Islamic State's formations began to also use them for delivering suicide attacks. During the conquest of Ramadi in 2015, as many as thirty or so motor vehicles (including the Humvees) were transformed into the moving bombs that served as a shock weapon for penetrating the defense of the Iraqi forces that had been forced to withdraw and surrender the city to the Jihadist groups. In that year, apart from Ramadi, the Humvee field vehicles were also used in other locations in the Province of Anbar, in fighting for the oil refinery near the city of Baiji, as well as in Iraqi Kurdistan and in Syria.¹⁴²

The Humvee's advantage over an ordinary passenger vehicle lies in its protection (the armor), which makes it impossible for defenders to eliminate the suicide driver with an ordinary shooting weapon before he comes sufficiently close to the target and activates the explosive. In that sense, the use of armored vehicles such as the Humvee is the last stage in the development of the use of vehicle bombs by the Islamic State and its predecessor Al-Qaeda.¹⁴³ Cars and trucks were used for that purpose in the past.

¹⁴⁰ The data were retrieved from: Suicide Attack Database, http://cpostdata.uchicago.edu/search_new.php, Search carried out on April 7, 2017.

¹⁴¹ Sean D. Naylor, "The Islamic State's Best Weapon Was Born in the USA", *Foreign Policy*, June 4, 2015, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/04/hell-on-wheels/> [Retrieved on April 8, 2017]

¹⁴² *Ibid.*

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

Although the Humvees had been captured in Iraq, the Islamic State was also abundantly using them in Syria, where they were being used in order to take control of the checkpoints and military bases that relatively quickly surrendered as soon as a vehicle bomb had made an opening in the line of defense.¹⁴⁴

Bearing these facts in mind, a conclusion can be drawn that the mass use of car bombs with suicide drivers is a specific asymmetric tactical procedure practiced by the weaker side in a conflict that only has available in a sufficient extent fanaticized humans at its disposal. By comparing the described procedures carried out by the Islamist militias (first of all the forces of the Islamic State) and Guy Brossollet's conception, certain similarities, as well as major differences, are noticed. When the similarities are concerned, it may be established that the groups of the Humvee field vehicles in a capacity as car bombs attacking the exactly allocated targets also represent modules of their own kind, although they are rudimentary and primitive. These modules, as well as those in Brossollet's conception, should sufficiently harm the opponent and ultimately force the opponent to withdraw, while surprise (unexpectedness) factor simultaneously plays an important role. The psychological effect of their use is in both cases equal to the fighting effect and perhaps even more impressive.

On the other hand, significant differences are also noticeable. According to Brossollet's idea, it is implied that a field vehicle and its crew should survive at least one combat task. In the tactics of the Islamist militias, first of all of the forces of the Islamic State, car bombs and their drivers are disposable. According to Brossollet, the operation of the module is, before all, directed towards the destruction of moving targets (fighting vehicles and the infantry), whereas the Jihadist modules operate against stationary targets (checkpoints/bases/police stations). In Brossollet's conception, the modules operate from a certain distance which is, among other things, contingent upon the firing range of the used armaments, whereas in the tactics of the Islamic State and other Jihadist movements a direct contact of a vehicle loaded with explosive and the target is necessary for the realization of the combat task.

The use of car bombs with suicide drivers, along with a series of other procedures, not only at the military, but also at the political, psychological and propaganda levels, categorizes the warfare of the Islamic State as the so-called Fourth-Generation War, according to the classification done by Colonel

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

Thomas X. Hammes.¹⁴⁵ Apart from Iraq and Syria, the usage of motor vehicles with explosives in offensive operations has also been recorded in Afghanistan, Libya, Somalia and Nigeria.

Although the use of car bombs in the wars waged in Iraq and Syria has brought undeniable successes to the Islamic State, the development of the events in the theater of war in the Middle East during the last two years (losses, the loss of the territory) has been testifying in favour of the fact that the tactics of offensive operations with the vehicles overloaded with explosives with suicidal drivers is not omnipotent. Yet, the basic thesis of this paper states that in potential wars in the decades to come also, this tactical procedure – a fight through the use of car bombs driven by suicide drivers – will be dominant when Islamist militias and movements are concerned.

DEMOGRAPHY AND IDEOLOGY FACTORS

In their study of asymmetric warfare, Courmont and Ribnikar state that asymmetry can be identified as and equalized with the “weapon of the poor”. In other words, as they conclude, those who are inferior “develop various strategies, more or less efficient, whose intention is to achieve satisfactory goals with ‘available means’”.¹⁴⁶ Jihadist movements, like the Islamic State, have numerous enemies, who can be classified into two categories. The secular regimes in Muslim countries, such as the Syrian, the Iraqi or the Egyptian, belong to the first category, and the non-Muslim states that are actively supportive of the mentioned regimes, such as the Russian Federation, belong to the second category. Islamist militias are multiply inferior in comparison with the armed forces of the secular regimes, and in particular in comparison with the armed forces of the non-Muslim countries – the American, the Russian and those similar ones. They do not have an air force, radars or other sophisticated devices. They have to capture other means or purchase them on the “black market”. They have no regular and legal sources of income – they are forced to pillage and carry out criminal activities. They frequently depend on individuals, groups and institutions from the rich countries of the Arabian Peninsula. Their chain of command consists of former or deserter officers, as well as civilians without any military professional qualifications at all.

¹⁴⁵ About the characteristics of the Fourth-Generation War, see in: Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and The Stone: On The War in the 21st Century* [Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2004], 207-223.

¹⁴⁶ Бартелеми Курмон и Дарко Рибникар, *Асиметрични ратови: Сукоби јуче и данас, тероризам и нове претње*, op. cit., 21.

Of the “available means”, fanaticized humans and the ideological charge is what Jihadist movements have to a sufficient extent. Given the current demographic trends, it can be said with determination that the Islamist formations will have at their disposal a far larger mobilization reservoir in decades to come than it is the case today. As early as in his own time, Bouthoul established a fact that no large-scale war could be waged without an appropriate demographic infrastructure.¹⁴⁷ He thought that large-scale wars followed the periods of demographic expansion. He put a special emphasis on the so-called explosive structure – an abundant surplus (excess) of young people which exceeds the number of the jobs offered by an economy.¹⁴⁸ The governing structures in the states, as well as extreme political movements, can frequently resort to the channeling of the frustration of a large number of young people towards their military engagement or forcing migration towards other parts of the world. Youth who lack economic resources (jobs or money) or political resources (representation or other freedoms) are likely to engage themselves in political violence, join a rebel or terrorist group.¹⁴⁹

Which fact can be established when the demographic trends in the Islamic world are concerned? According to the findings of the Pew Research Center, of all religious groups the Muslim population in the world will be growing fastest by 2050. According to the forecasts of this Institute, from 1.6 billion in 2010, the population of the Islamic faith will reach as many as 2.76 billion people in 2050.¹⁵⁰ So, during the four decades, the Muslim population in the world will have increased by over one billion! For the purpose of comparison, the Christian population will have quite a moderate growth – from 2.17 billion (in 2010) to 2.92 billion (in 2050).¹⁵¹ Expressed in percentage, in both 2010 and 2050, the Christian population will account for about 31.4% of the world population. On the other hand, the Muslim population will leap from 23.2% (in 2010) to 29.7% (in 2050).¹⁵²

When the age structure of the world’s population as per religions is looked at, it can be noticed that the Muslim population is the youngest. So, the individuals of up to 15 years of age have had 34% share in the global Muslim

¹⁴⁷ Gaston Bouthoul, *La guerra*, op. cit., 55.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.* 53.

¹⁴⁹ Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba, *The Future Faces of War: Population and National Security* [Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2011], 32.

¹⁵⁰ Pew Research Center, *The Future of World Religions: Population, Growth Projections 2010-2050: Why Muslims Are Rising Fastest and the Unaffiliated Are Shrinking as a Share of the World’s Population*, April 2, 2015, http://www.pewforum.org/files/2015/03/PF_15.04.02_ProjectionsFullReport.pdf [Retrieved on: April 10, 2017], 6.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.* 6.

¹⁵² *Ibid.* 6.

population in 2010, whereas the world average was 27%.¹⁵³ Currently, many Muslim countries that are politically or from the aspect of engaging in armed conflicts faced with Islamist movements or those in which Islamist ideas enjoy a broad support have on average very young populations.

In Egypt, for example, (data refer to the last year) 31% of the population is under 15 years of age. In the neighboring Sudan, that percentage reaches up to 43%. In Niger, even 50% of the population is under 15 years of age.¹⁵⁴ When Asia is concerned, 30% of the population of Saudi Arabia is younger than 15, 44% in Afghanistan, 36% in Pakistan, and 28% in Indonesia.¹⁵⁵ For the purpose of comparison, the population of those under 15 years of age accounts for 14% in Serbia and even less – 13% in Germany (the European total being 16%).¹⁵⁶

The different age structures in the mentioned countries can be understood with the help of the demographic transition theory. To put it very briefly, demographic transition is the process of moving from the high birth and death rates to the low birth and death rates, from high growth potential to incipient decline.¹⁵⁷ A great majority of states with a Muslim population has just stepped into this process although certain countries have almost reached the end of that tendency, such as Turkey. On the other hand, European countries had already gone through that transformation a long time ago. In any case, in decades to come the Jihadist movements can count on a significant mobilization base – a large number of young people who may be recruited for combat tasks, including the operation of car bombs.

It would certainly be wrong if all Muslims were identified with Islamists and Jihadists. It would be of precious value for this paper if the percentage of the total world's Muslim population that Islamist movements can count on in the sense of a mobilization base could be at least approximately determined. A few years ago, the Pew Research Center conducted an examination with respect to the attitudes of the Muslim population in the world towards certain religious, social and political phenomena.

Although this research cannot be treated as quite a representative one since a larger number of bigger Muslim countries were left out, at least it can

¹⁵³ Ibid. 10.

¹⁵⁴ Population Reference Bureau, 2016 World Population Data Sheet, <http://www.prb.org/pdf16/prb-wpds2016-web-2016.pdf> [Retrieved on: April 14, 2017], 10.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid. 12-13.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid. 13-14.

¹⁵⁷ John R. Weeks, *Population: An Introduction to Concepts and Issues* [Belmont: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002], 100.

offer indications of the manner in which Muslims in the world perceive certain contemporary problems and phenomena and in which percentage. The introduction of Sharia as the official legislation is advocated by 99% of the interviewed in Afghanistan, 84% in Pakistan and 82% in Bangladesh. Except in South Asia, a very high level of support to the introduction of Sharia is recorded in Iraq (91%), in the Palestinian territories (89%), in Egypt (74%) and in Jordan (71%). Malaysia and Indonesia have similar percentages – 86% and 72%, respectively.¹⁵⁸ In contrast with the foregoing high percentages, the percentage of support to suicide bomber attacks is much lower. The attitude that such attacks are “often or sometimes justified” is only supported by 1% of the interviewed in Azerbaijan, 2% in Kazakhstan, 3% in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 7% in Indonesia and Iraq. On the other hand, the percentage is not insignificant in the following countries: 13% in Pakistan, 15% in Turkey, 18% in Malaysia, 26% in Bangladesh, 29% in Egypt, 39% in Afghanistan and even 40% in the Palestinian territories.¹⁵⁹

As can be observed, a very high percentage of the respondents are supportive of the introduction of Sharia as the official legislation, which is otherwise one of the most important goals of Islamist movements. Contrary to that, a significantly lower percentage of the population approves of suicide attacks, which ensure one of the most impressive media impacts of action of those very same movements. So, broad Muslim masses are to a great extent supportive of the political goal of the Islamists (the establishment of Sharia), whereas they are to a much lesser extent supportive of the part of their practice (suicide attacks). This conclusion testifies to the fact that it is very difficult to precisely determine in percentage the share that radically enthused Muslims have in the total population of the Islamic creed. What is certain, however, is the fact that the number is by no means insignificant even if we accept that it has a single-digit percentage in comparison with the global Muslim population (given the fact that about 1.8 billion Muslims currently live in the world, this means to say 5% implies a number of about 90 million people).

Apart from demographic trends, certain facts that concern Islam itself as a religion also work in favor of the radical Muslim movements. It is frequently possible to learn from the media that certain Muslim theologians think that certain interpretations of Islam adhered to by Jihadists are wrong or harmful.

¹⁵⁸ Pew Research Center, *The World's Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society*, April 30 2013, <http://www.pewforum.org/files/2013/04/worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-full-report.pdf> [Retrieved on: April 14, 2017], 15.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.* 29.

Yet, in Islam, there is no clearly defined reference authority (individual or collective) whose opinion of a problem or phenomenon all or at least the majority of believers would unconditionally show inclination for, as is the case within the Catholic Church (the Pope) or say orthodox churches (patriarchs/synods). As Bernard Lewis notices, there is neither church nor priesthood in Islam.¹⁶⁰ It means that there is no true clerical hierarchy, either, for which reason and in the broadest meaning of the word, the so-called moderate and radical interpretations of Mohammed's teachings can also have an equal theological legitimacy.

The second important fact that stimulates the creation and expansion of the Jihadist militias and Islamist movements concerns certain teachings/messages from the Islamic tradition, including the Quran itself. Say, as Lewis alleges, according to the Muslim teachings, a jihad is one of the basic commandments of faith, an obligation imposed on all the Muslims by God through revelation.¹⁶¹ However, a question is posed regarding what jihad actually is. In the media, that word is frequently translated as a holy war, which irritates certain Islamic theologians. Although this Arabic word literally means – an effort, an aspiration, a striving or a fight, and although certain Muslim reformers suggest that this term has a moral and spiritual character in the first place – Lewis clearly determines that the obligation of the jihad has been understood in the military sense by the overwhelming majority of classical Islamic theologians, jurists and traditionists.¹⁶² Apart from that, Lewis emphasizes the fact that the basis of the obligation of a jihad lies in the universality of Muslim revelation and that everyone who has accepted that revelation has a duty to convert or at least subordinate those who have not done that yet. This obligation is not limited by space and time and it must last as long as the whole world has accepted the Islamic faith or has submitted itself to the power of the Islamic State.¹⁶³

Such conclusions suggest that in the decades to come, apart from the mobilization (human) potential, the Islamist movements can, in the same degree, also count on the theological (ideological) inspiration (a radical narration) while recruiting future suicide bombers. To put it more briefly, as long as there is Islam (in such an organizational and dogmatic respect) there will also be Islamist movements, as well as the extreme interpretations of the Quran. In any case, in decades to come, the powerful combination of the

¹⁶⁰ Bernard Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam* [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988], 30.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.* 73.

¹⁶² *Ibid.* 72.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.* 73.

demographic growth of the global Muslim population and the different Islamist discourses from Morocco to Indonesia will make a reliable “infrastructure” for the tactics of suicide attacks that have previously been described.

CONCLUSION

Jihadist militias in the wars and armed conflicts throughout Asia and Africa (from Niger, via Somalia, Syria and Iraq to Afghanistan) are most frequently incapable of conducting regular large-scale military operations against the legal security forces in those states and the foreign troops that support these forces. Therefore, they resort to asymmetric warfare, relying on probably the only one relatively abundant resource they have at their disposal – humans. As is noticed in a paper dedicated to asymmetric warfare, the true asymmetry does not only lie in the differences in the power and the military organization of the warring sides, but also in their tactics, values and goals.¹⁶⁴ The tactical procedure of Jihadist groups in which humans are transformed from weapon operators into a weapon itself (the use of car bombs operated by suicide drivers) undoubtedly belongs to asymmetric warfare.

Bearing in mind the current, as well as future, demographic trends in the Muslim world, it is possible to almost certainly anticipate that in the decades to come this procedure will be dominant in the Jihadist tactics of war waging. Especially in its “civilian” variation (terrorist attacks with motor vehicles loaded with explosive on the buildings where a large number of citizens gather – stadiums, halls, squares – say, in Western Europe), this procedure can produce innumerable victims and immeasurable psychological and political consequences.

The use of car bombs with suicide drivers demonstrates the connectedness between asymmetry and demography. The technologically developed societies of the Northern Hemisphere with pronouncedly negative demographic indicators, such as Japan, have increasingly been considering and operationalizing the introduction of robotics into the armed forces. On the other hand, the technologically undeveloped, but demographically dynamic Muslim world can first of all offer Jihadist militias the “human resources” that these militias have mercilessly been spending. Most probably, the world is entering a period of numerous and long-lasting asymmetric wars in which humans (the population) will be one of the dominant factors.

¹⁶⁴Joaquín Mariano Pellicer Balsalobre, “El recurso humano en la doctrina para los escenarios de guerra asimétrica”, *Documento Marco*, 06/2017, http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_marco/2017/DIEEEM06-2017_Guerra_Asimetrica_JoaquinPellicer.pdf [Retrieved on April 30, 2017], 6.

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LJUDI KAO ORUŽJE: ASIMETRIJA I DEMOGRAFIJA *

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Apstrakt: Na početku rada, autor ukratko razmatra pojmove rata i asimetrije. Kao primer koncepcije asimetričnog ratovanja, autor navodi teze francuskog teoretičara Gi Brosolea o tzv. nebitki. Analizirajući pojedine elemente taktike islamističkih formacija u Iraku i Siriji, autor nalazi određene sličnosti između modularnog ratovanja u Brosoleovoj koncepciji i načina izvođenja napadnih operacija vojske Islamske države i drugih džihadističkih milicija. Poseban naglasak je stavljen na izvođenje napada pomoću auto-bombi kojima upravljaju islamistički borci – samoubice. Rad se zasniva na tvrdnji, da islamistički pokreti i vojne formacije, budući da su tehnički i resursno inferiorni u odnosu na regularne armije (posebno na one sa Zapada), upotrebom auto-bombi pokušavaju da asimetrično odgovore na nadmoć protivnika. Prema mišljenju autora, za ovakvu taktiku islamističkih oružanih formacija, neophodna su dva suštinska elementa – populacioni i ideološki. S obzirom da se stanovništvo islamske vere u svetu neprekidno uvećava, i da je u proseku relativno mlado, može da se pretpostavi, da će ono u decenijama koje slede predstavljati bogat mobilizacijski izvor za regrutovanje hiljada budućih bombaša-samoubica. Takođe, islamistička naracija neće nestati s obzirom da se generiše iz određenih radikalnih interpretacija islama. Drugim rečima, dokle god bude islama biće i islamizma. Osnovna teza rada se zasniva na uvidu da se tehnološki i logistički slabija strana u asimetričnom konfliktu odupire sa onim čega ima u izborju. U ovom slučaju, islamističke formacije u sukobu sa sekularnim muslimanskim i nemuslimanskim armijama obilato troše humane resurse – ljude kao oružje (bombaše-samoubice). Takođe, osnovnu tezu čini stav da će taktika upotrebe auto-bombi postati jedna od dominantnih u budućnosti, usled pozitivnih demografskih datosti (konstatnog rasta) u okviru svetske muslimanske populacije.

Ključne reči: asimetrija, demografija, islam, rat, samoubilački napadi.

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