Coordinating responses to state-led arbitrary detention: Law and coercion in Russia’s hostage diplomacy

Jović-Lazić, Ana (2026) Coordinating responses to state-led arbitrary detention: Law and coercion in Russia’s hostage diplomacy. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 21 (1). pp. 1-20. ISSN 2159-5364

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Abstract

Some governments detain foreign citizens to gain a political advantage. This practice, now known as hostage diplomacy, persists despite clear legal prohibitions. Existing rules under the1979 Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and consular treaties define the norm but do not ensure its enforcement. This study examines how law and coordinated state action can begin to close that gap, using Russia’s use of political detention from 2018 to 2025 as a critical case. The analysis compares Russia’s use of hostage diplomacy with that of Iran, China, and North Korea. It uses public records, official statements, United Nations’ findings, and parliamentary reports to show how law and coercion work together. The analysis integrates concepts from coercion theory and norm enforcement to illustrate why unity among states is more significant than diplomatic responses by individual states. Recent case evidence indicates that synchronised legal measures, common sanctions, and ongoing diplomatic pressure alter incentives more efficiently than singular actions. The results add to an increasing move to link international law to practical application and to outline collective actions that render coercive detention less feasible.

Item Type: Journal Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Hostage diplomacy, arbitrary detention, international law, coercive diplomacy, sanctions, collective action, norm enforcement
Depositing User: Ana Vukićević
Date Deposited: 30 Mar 2026 08:59
Last Modified: 30 Mar 2026 08:59
URI: http://repozitorijum.diplomacy.bg.ac.rs/id/eprint/1707

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