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## DOES TRUMP HAVE A GRAND STRATEGY?

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*Abstract:* In this paper, the author argues that Donald Trump so far failed to make expected radical changes in United States foreign policy, because he does not have a coherent grand strategy. This is an alternative argument to the one according to which he does have a grand strategy, but is too weak against the foreign-policy establishment to apply it. A definition of grand strategy as a “state’s theory how to produce security for itself” is taken from Barry Posen. According to Posen, there are four criteria for classifying grand strategies (objectives, premises, means and positions), while a grand strategy serves four functions (priorities, coordination, communication and accountability). Trump’s predecessors in the post-Cold War period favored a liberal hegemony grand strategy, to which Posen opposes an alternative strategy of restraint. A theoretical framework of the paper is a neoclassical realist foreign policy model which considers a sound grand strategy necessary to produce a change in foreign policy when other factors (distribution of power in the international system, the state’s identity) favor the inertia in foreign policy. Since this is not the case with Trump, the United States is still waiting for a president with a grand strategy of restraint.

*Key words:* Donald Trump, the United States, grand strategy, foreign policy, liberal hegemony, restraint, neoclassical realism.

## INTRODUCTION

The election of Donald Trump for president of the United States is surely an event which was hardly predicted by anyone who deals with American politics in a

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scientific manner. Until it came true, it was almost unimaginable that someone who is so much different from the post-Cold War “mainstream” could move into the White House. But, is he so different when it comes to foreign policy? In this paper, I argue that in spite of some of his foreign-policy views which are really radically different from those of his predecessors, these differences do not make a coherent worldview which could be applied to produce a radical change in US foreign policy. This opens the question of a grand strategy because having one is an essential condition for any US president to affect his country’s foreign policy in a significant way. Richard Nixon’s realism produced “triangular diplomacy” – opening to China, and later détente with the Soviet Union. Barack Obama’s tactically pragmatic liberal imperialism led the US to try to change the behavior of its global and regional rivals by engaging, instead of confronting them. Such personal stamp on US foreign policy (at least when it comes to its security component, which is a focus of this paper) can hardly be expected from Trump, given his lack of a grand strategic thinking. The paper unfolds as follows. First, I explain what a grand strategy is, and what the alternatives for the United States in this sense are. Second, I introduce a neoclassical realist foreign-policy model which determines the place of a grand strategy in a state’s actual foreign policy. Third, I look into Trump’s foreign-policy discourse to show that he never had a coherent grand strategy, so that it cannot be argued that he had one, but was too weak against the foreign policy establishment to apply it. I conclude that not having a grand strategy is nevertheless better than sticking to the liberal hegemony strategy of Trump’s predecessors.

### **WHAT IS A GRAND STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES?**

Barry Posen defines grand strategy as “a political-military, means-ends chain, a state’s theory of how it can best ‘cause’ security for itself”, (Posen, 1984, p. 13) or, more simply, as “a nation-state’s theory about how to produce security for itself”. (Posen, 2014, p. 1) A grand strategy aims to identify threats to national security, as well as political, military, economic and other means to counter these threats. Its essence is in establishing priorities because, in an anarchical international environment, threats are numerous and resources to counter them are limited. (Posen, 1984, p. 13) The focus (although not the only component) of a grand strategy is on military threats – because they are most dangerous – and military means – because they are most costly. (Posen, 2014, p. 1) A grand strategy is a broader concept than military doctrine, which deals exclusively with military means, (Posen, 1984, p. 13) yet it is narrower than overall foreign policy, which can have goals other than security. (Posen, 2014, p. 2) In short, according to Posen, a grand strategy is about national security, which means sovereignty, territorial integrity, power position and safety. (Posen, 2014, p. 3) A grand strategy could, but it does not have to be written in one place. (Posen, 2014, p. 1) It serves four functions. The

first is already mentioned – to establish priorities among ends and means. The second is to help complex state organizations which deal with national security coordinate their activities. The third is to communicate national interests to other states. The fourth and final is to assist accountability of internal actors and turn bad ideas aside. (Posen, 2014, pp. 4-5)

The grand strategy issue was raised in the United States during the nineties of the last century, under the international systemic condition of unipolarity. As a unipol – by far most powerful state in the world, unconstrained by the presence of other poles – the US could make a choice of its foreign policy direction. In the middle of the decade, Posen published an article co-authored by Andrew Ross, in which they dealt with US grand strategy choice for the post-Cold War period. (Posen and Ross, 1996-1997) They identified four possible grand strategies among which Washington could choose: neo-isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative security and primacy. (Posen and Ross, 1996-1997, p. 5) They based this classification on the following criteria: what are the main US objectives in international politics envisioned by each strategy?; what are their basic premises about international politics?; what are preferred political and military means of each strategy?; what are their positions on several basic international issues, such as nuclear proliferation, NATO enlargement and regional conflicts? (Posen and Ross, 1996-1997, pp. 7-9)

Neo-isolationism rests on the premise that self-defense is the only vital interest of the US. The collapse of the Soviet Union left a balance of power in Eurasia, which does not need to be supported by the US. The nuclear weapons additionally secure US security. The US should stay out of regional conflicts, disband NATO, keep minimum nuclear second-strike capability, and reduce military expenditures to 2 percent of GDP. (Posen and Ross, 1996-1997, pp. 9-16) Selective engagement aims to ensure peace among the great powers. Because the balancing, even nuclear, is not reliable, the US should stay engaged abroad. However, it should do this selectively, given the scarcity of resources. It should prevent nuclear proliferation if potential nuclear powers have a conflict of interests with the US. It should get involved in regional conflicts only in some regions – Europe, East Asia and the Middle East – and only if these conflicts bear the risk of turning into great power wars. NATO should not be abolished, but it should not be expanded either. The US should retain the capability of waging two regional wars simultaneously. (Posen and Ross, 1996-1997, pp. 17-23) Cooperative security advocates consider peace and security indivisible, which means that the US has an interest in preserving world peace, by working collectively with others within international institutions and regimes as much as possible. Cooperative security views the spread of democracy good for security cooperation between great powers. Nuclear proliferation is dangerous and should be stopped. The US should react at every regional conflict, especially engaging in humanitarian interventions. (Posen and Ross, 1996-1997, pp. 23-32) A grand strategy of primacy assumes that only US dominance ensures the

world peace – the balance of power politics and selective engagement are not sufficient. Any of the existing or potential great powers should be prevented from challenging the preeminent position of the US. As the most powerful state in the system, the US has enough resources to support this kind of policy. Russia and China should be contained. NATO should be expanded, not only because of Russia, but to keep US involvement in European security matters. The US should not abandon international institutions if they can be useful. Nuclear proliferation should be stopped because it undermines US freedom of action. Regional conflicts matter if they could produce a competing power, while some humanitarian interventions should also be pursued to demonstrate US power and leadership. This kind of grand strategy requires “nearly Cold War-size” military forces. (Posen and Ross, 1996-1997, pp. 32-43)

Posen and Ross saw the Clinton administration grand strategy as a mix of primacy, cooperative security and selective engagement. (Posen and Ross, 1996-1997, pp. 44-51) However, in his newest book Posen unambiguously stated that since the end of the Cold War the US has been favoring a grand strategy of liberal hegemony, which is the fusion of primacy and cooperative security, fully completed after September 11 terrorist attacks, and of which now there is a consensus among most of US political elites. (Posen, 2014, pp. 5-7) This strategy is called liberal because it sees the spread of liberal values abroad as important for US security. It is called hegemonic because its proponents aim to keep the power advantage of the US relative to other powers, in order to sustain what they call the “liberal world order”. (Posen, 2014, pp. 5-6) From the viewpoint of this strategy, US national security is threatened by three main sources: failed states, rogue states, and peer competitors. (Posen, 2014, p. 6) As a critic of this kind of grand strategy, Posen favors the alternative, a mix between selective engagement and isolationism, which he calls strategic restraint. (Posen, 2014, p. 7) His critique of liberal hegemony is based on the review of the strategic position of the United States. He agrees that the current world order is still unipolar. (Posen, 2014, p. 16) However, from this, as well as the fact that there is no candidate for hegemony in Europe or Asia (although China’s economic growth could challenge this in the future), he concludes that the US does not have to be a hegemon to be safe. (Posen, 2014, pp. 16-19) On the contrary, Posen thinks that the liberal hegemony strategy compromises US security not only because it proved to be too costly, but also because it provokes other actors’ actions that in the long run diminish US security. He identifies three kinds of such actions: balancing by those countries that oppose US hegemony, which does not have to be “hard” (strengthening military and forming alliances) to be successful – there are many forms of “soft” balancing, too; cheap riding by its allies, which means relying on the US for their own defense, while not contributing sufficient resources for this; and reckless driving by some other allies, who engage in wrong policies knowing they have US backing. (Posen, 2014, pp. 24-50) Moreover, the

liberal hegemony strategy leads the US to interventions abroad, confronting it with nationalisms of local people, which results in the spread of anti-Americanism and involvement in identity politics it cannot cope with. (Posen, 2014, pp. 50-60) Posen concludes that liberal hegemony is “a costly, wasteful, and self-defeating grand strategy”. (Posen, 2014, p. 65) It “tends toward political expansion, high defense spending, and war. It is not a status quo policy”. (Posen, 2014, p. 68)

Unlike the liberal hegemony, strategic restraint strategy identifies and focuses on vital US security interests. (Posen, 2014, p. 69) One of these interests is to maintain the balance of power in Eurasia, while others are to manage nuclear proliferation and suppress global terrorist organizations. (Posen, 2014, p. 69) Given that there is a rough balance of power in both Europe and Asia, the US should reduce its commitments and military deployments there. (Posen, 2014, pp. 69-71) Although nuclear weapons are a threat to the US, this should not be exaggerated, and the first priority should be to deter nuclear-capable states, not to seek confrontation with them. (Posen, 2014, pp. 71-83) In combating terrorism, the US should first admit its own mistakes from the past, one of them being its omnipresence, which made it “too easy for others to blame the United States for their problems” and engage in terrorist activities against it. (Posen, 2014, pp. 83-87) For strategic restraint, maintaining the “command of the commons” by the US military – which means its control over common spaces such as the sea, air, and the outer space – is essential. (Posen, 2014, pp. 135-144) Posen identifies three possible paths to change in grand strategy: the first and the least likely is that “politicians will read arguments offered by advocates of Restraint”; the second is that some crisis will lead to it; and third and most likely in a modern pluralist democracy is that this change will be incremental, slow but sure. (Posen, 2014, pp. 174-175)

Posen’s strategic restraint resembles what some other authors call “offshore balancing” and favor this kind of strategy for the United States. (Layne, 1997; Mearsheimer, 2011) In short, offshore balancing means that the United States should focus on preventing any other power become a Eurasian hegemon, or a hegemon in some of the three most important Eurasian regions: Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East. (Layne, 1997, p. 112; Mearsheimer, 2011, p. 18) This is to be done by reducing US commitments in these regions, relying on local powers to check potential hegemons, and keeping its own forces offshore, ready to cross the ocean only if these powers fail. (Layne, 1997, pp. 112-123; Mearsheimer, 2011, pp. 18, 30-34) The United States indeed pursued offshore balancing for most of the 20th century, including the policy of containment during the Cold War, but excluding periods of isolationism and hegemonic behavior in the last decade of the century. A classical realist Hans Morgenthau could be considered a theoretical father of this strategy, given that he explicitly defined enduring national interests

of the US as: hegemony in the Western Hemisphere; the balance of power in Europe; the balance of power in Asia. (Morgenthau, 1952)

This is a good place in the paper to introduce its theoretical framework. Barry Posen is also a realist, and a neoclassical one. Neoclassical realism is a theoretical approach which aims to explain the actual foreign policy of the state by factors situated both on systemic level – which means factors that come from international system – and unit level of analysis – factors that come from within the state. (Rose, 1998; Lobell et al, 2009) For example, current US hegemonic behavior could be explained by a systemic factor of distribution of power in the international system, which is unipolar, and in which the United States is the only pole, thus encouraged by the system to seek global hegemony. However, the international system does not influence the foreign policy of a state directly – this influence has to be translated through the decision-making process, where many factors from a unit level of analysis also decide what would be the course of the state's foreign policy. The US president is thus free from systemic factors to choose a grand strategy, but whether his choice will produce an appropriate foreign policy also depends on systemic factors, as well as the other factors at the unit level.

I also apply the neoclassical realist model to explain US foreign policy, identifying an extraordinary identity of US state and society as a unit level factor which makes its foreign policy prone to liberal interventionism. In this, I rely on David Campbell's concept of US identity. In his major work, Campbell showed that since the inception of American society, US identity has been constituted and reproduced by a very rigid and exclusionary approach against various illiberal internal and external actors. (Campbell, 1992) A combination of this identity with US unipolar position since the end of the Cold War logically resulted in a foreign policy whose aim is to establish a liberal hegemonic world order, which means the extermination of all alternatives. However, I also share Campbell's assumption that identity is not fixed – given that it was constituted by foreign policy, it could also be changed by it. (Campbell, 1992, pp. 8, 33) This means that a powerful president, convinced in a grand strategy of restraint or offshore balancing, could resist pressures from the foreign-policy establishment to continue down the liberal hegemonic path, and make small, but significant steps in foreign policy, which in the long run would result in a change of US identity and stabilize a new foreign policy. Is Donald Trump the man?

## **DONALD TRUMP'S NON-EXISTENT GRAND STRATEGY**

When Trump was elected in November 2016, characterizations of him as a man who would try to change US foreign policy were widely shared, both by those who feared changes because they favored current hegemonic strategy, and those who hoped Trump would succeed in redirecting Washington's foreign policy

towards strategic restraint. A good example for the latter is John Mearsheimer, who soon after the elections published an article in which he advised Trump to abandon the policy of liberal hegemony and adopt a “realist foreign policy”, which is one of many names for the strategy of restraint or offshore balancing. Mearsheimer based his hopes on Trump’s strong campaign against the foreign policy community (e.g. “deep state”) which favors liberal hegemony, but was cautious in giving predictions who would prevail in this battle. (Mearsheimer, 2016) An example for the former is Robert Kagan’s apocalyptic article published two weeks into Trump’s presidency, in which he warns of “increasing ambition and activism of two revisionist powers, Russia and China”, and “declining confidence, capacity, and will of the democratic world, and especially of the United States, to maintain the dominant position it has held in the international system since 1945”, two trends which would lead the existing world order to collapse into a “brutal anarchy”. To Kagan, early signs of Trump’s presidency “suggest that the new administration is more likely to hasten us toward crisis than slow or reverse these trends”. (Kagan, 2017)

Worries and hopes about Trump were also widespread among world political leaders, depending on their views how US foreign policy should look like. On one side were the likes of the president of the European Council, Donald Tusk, who said that – alongside with Brexit – Trump’s election “should be treated as a warning sign for all who believe in liberal democracy”, or French President Francois Hollande, for whom “some of Donald Trump’s campaign positions must be put to the test of the values and the interests that we share with the United States”. On the other, leaders of European right-wing European parties, such as Geert Wilders and Marine Le Pen, cheered Trump’s victory, while Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban’s comment on it was that “democracy is still alive”, and Russia’s President Vladimir Putin sent Trump a long telegram to congratulate him, in which he greeted Trump’s campaign slogans about restoring good US-Russian relations and expressed Russia’s readiness for this. (The New York Times, 2016; The Guardian, 2016)

Through his campaign, then during the two-month period of being president-elect, and finally by some of his first moves into his presidency, Trump indeed stimulated expectations that US foreign policy would be radically different from the one during the entire post-Cold War period. One of his basic political slogans was “America First”, which implied he was not interested in ruling some liberal world order, but rather in pursuing more narrowly defined US national interest. (Grevi, 2016) Some of his campaign promises in line with this basic premise were the following: to reconsider US commitments to NATO if European allies do not meet the condition of 2 percent of GDP defense expenditure; to improve relations with Russia and base them on “the principles of equality, mutual respect and non-interference in the internal affairs of each other”; to cooperate with Russia and Syrian President Assad in combating ISIS and ending Syrian civil war. (Durando, 2016) Trump rhetorically strongly opposed some of the main pillars of liberal

hegemony, such as military interventionism and regime change policy – first during his post-election tour, when he said that the US “will stop racing to topple foreign regimes that we know nothing about, that we shouldn’t be involved with”, (Holland, 2016) and also in his inaugural speech, when he confirmed that the US does not seek to “impose our way on anyone, but rather to let it shine as an example for everyone to follow”. (The White House, 2017d) And as if he was a good student of Mearsheimer, by accepting congratulations from “a democratically elected leader of Taiwan” in December, he hinted that he considered China the greatest US geopolitical rival, instead of Russia. (Borger, 2016)

Since only a few weeks into the presidency, it seemed that Trump has been renegeing on most of his promises which qualified him as a proponent of a grand strategy of restraint. His Vice-President Mike Pence expressed US “strong support” and “unwavering commitment” to NATO in his Munich speech in February, (The White House, 2017c) shortly preceded by a new deployment of US troops to Eastern Europe – to Bulgaria. (Reuters, 2017) So far a bilateral meeting between Trump and Russian President Putin has not been scheduled – two leaders will meet for the first time on the margins of a multilateral event, a G20 summit in Germany. Trump’s national security advisor Michael Flynn, who was considered close to Russians, had to resign only a few weeks after taking his post. A major twist happened in Syria, where the US-Russian cooperation was expected to be the least difficult. After an alleged chemical attack by Syrian forces near Homs in April, Trump was quick to deliver a few emotional speeches and strike Syrian military base with cruise missiles, abandoning in a blink of an eye his previous positions on issues of regime change, non-intervention, and cooperation with Assad and Russia in combating ISIS. (Powell, 2017) And this happened during the Chinese President Xi-Jinping’s visit to the United States, which clearly demonstrated softening of Trump’s approach to this East Asian great power. (Bandow, 2017)

It would be too easy to draw a conclusion from all this that Trump, once in the White House, failed to deliver his earlier foreign policy promises because he was too weak vis-à-vis the “deep state” to apply his grand strategy. Here I challenge this hypothesis by formulating an alternative one – that Trump failed to change US foreign policy not because he could not impose a grand strategy of restraint, but because he did not have a grand strategy at all. Analysis of Trump’s foreign-policy discourse during the campaign, the period between his election and inauguration, and since he moved into the White House will show that it offers contradictory answers, or no clear answers at all, to four questions Posen and Ross identified as criteria for classifying grand strategies: the questions of objectives, premises, means and positions. As a result, four Posen’s functions which grand strategy should serve are also missing: priorities, coordination, communication and accountability.

The question of US objectives is very simple: does Washington aim to establish global hegemony, or just prevent some other power from doing this? The first



objective is the essence of liberal hegemony (primacy) strategy, while the second is the cornerstone of strategic restraint (offshore balancing). While it is true that Trump, unlike his predecessors, rarely or ever mentions the importance of US leadership,<sup>2</sup> it is also true he does not offer a sound alternative. Identification of threats logically follows objectives: if US ambition is to rule the world, it will feel threatened by all actors who wish to remain independent, especially if they are great or regional powers; if its ambition is to prevent some other's hegemony, it will focus on power(s) which have such capabilities and/or intentions. Trump's stance on threats is confusing. He repeatedly expressed willingness to remove Russia – which certainly lacks both capabilities and intentions to compete for global/regional hegemony – from the top of the list of US geopolitical threats and improve relations with it, while pressing harder against China – which could pose a hegemonic threat in the future – is an indicator of an offshore balancing strategy. The same is true for his vow to eliminate ISIS – whose intention to create a global caliphate is clearly revisionist – from the face of the Earth. (The White House, 2017d) However, Trump's hawkish attitude towards some “rogue states”, whose only sin is independence from the United States, indicates the liberal hegemonic philosophy. Trump even threatens to walk away from the results of Obama's diplomatic engagement with some of these states, such as the nuclear agreement with Iran and opening with Cuba.<sup>3</sup> He proved ready to reconsider tough approach to China, in order to get its help against much less capable North Korea. And only one alleged excess by Syrian President Assad was sufficient for Trump to put him back on the US list of rogue leaders, explaining this move with clear-cut liberal hegemonic rhetoric.<sup>4</sup>

Trump's premises about how the world works are ambiguous. He and his predecessors tend to treat the world as an arena where states and other actors compete for power, rather as some liberal international community. (Zakaria, 2017) However, the former approach, which is a realist one, does not necessarily have to speak in favor of strategic restraint option. US hegemony could also be justified by pure realist arguments, as the only way to ensure security in what is now an anarchic, but should be transformed into a hierarchic international environment. With no

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<sup>2</sup> “Leadership” was a keyword in Obama's foreign-policy discourse. He spoke of “renewing American leadership” even before he became a presidential candidate, choosing this phrase later as a motto of his first national security strategy, while “strengthening and sustaining American leadership” was a cornerstone of the second one. (Obama, 2007; The White House, 2010; The White House, 2015)

<sup>3</sup> Trump's words on twitter about Cuban leader Fidel Castro's death are clear example of hatred speech, more characteristic for liberal crusaders, than calculated realists. (Wootson, 2016).

<sup>4</sup> Trump's speech in which he justified military attack against Syria was full of emotional phrases, including laments over deaths of “beautiful babies”, while later he called Assad an animal, which is a kind of rhetoric Obama never used. (The White House, 2017b; Kazin, 2017)

<sup>5</sup> A phrase “peace through strength” from the “America First Foreign Policy” document, could be interpreted in either of two mentioned ways. (The White House, 2017e)

clear objectives, there is also uncertainty whether Trump's realist premises about international relations lead to a hegemonic, or a defensive policy.<sup>5</sup>

The question of means adds to this ambiguity. Trump is a strong supporter of strengthening US military.<sup>6</sup> But for which goals? Posen was clear that one of the vices of liberal hegemony strategy was its price, and it is mostly reflected in increased military expenses throughout the past decades. Obama managed to reverse this trend while not abandoning the liberal hegemony strategy, so why would Trump make further costs? The United States could contain China and battle ISIS with the present level of military expenses. In this light, even more confusing is Trump's demand from allies to spend more on military. If the purpose of this demand was to save money of US taxpayers which now goes to overseas hegemonic commitments, then why would Trump increase military spending anyway?

The message to NATO allies is a message against cheap riding, which is consistent with strategic restraint, but a repeated commitment to NATO itself – a military alliance which has no other purpose than a hegemonic one – is not.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, in order to be consistent, a strategy of restraint should include discouraging of reckless drivers, which is certainly not Trump's case, whose uncritical support of Israel, the greatest of all reckless drivers according to Posen, proves there is no clear strategy when it comes to the US president's position on allies. Regarding another important issue for identifying a grand strategy – nuclear proliferation – Trump seems to be as much hegemonic as his predecessor Obama, who favored a world without nuclear weapons (where the US would be able to dominate conventionally) and fiercely battled proliferation. However, Trump's undermining of the nuclear accord with Iran, which ensures that this country will never acquire nuclear weapons, as well as a saber-rattling against already nuclear North Korea, puts in question whether Trump knows enough about nuclear weapons in order to have a well-thought position on this issue. (Gaouette, 2017)

Having said all this, it is not clear what Trump's foreign-policy priorities are, although his main domestic-policy goal – to avoid impeachment and if possible secure another term – is clear.<sup>8</sup> To achieve this goal, Trump proved to be ready to make foreign-policy moves which are opportunistic at a given time, which creates an illusion that he wanted to do something different, but the “deep state” does not

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<sup>6</sup> This is one of the main goals from the mentioned document on America First foreign policy, but there is also a separate document on rebuilding US military. (The White House, 2017f)

<sup>7</sup> In one of the strongest expressions of support to NATO, voiced at NATO summit in Brussels in May, Trump among else said NATO should still be there because of “threats from Russia”. (The White House, 2017a)

<sup>8</sup> Since Richard Nixon, there was no US president whose possible impeachment was so present as a topic in media. Since Trump's associate and Trump himself are above everything else being accused for different kind of ties with Russia, this process has recently been dubbed “Russiagate”. (McKissen, 2017)

let him do it. Coordination between Trump's associates that should perform foreign policy is missing – that they often contradict each other and the president in statements became a commonplace.<sup>9</sup> Under these circumstances, other international actors have no certainty of what national interests Trump's administration pursues, which prevents them from formulating their own strategies how to respond to US behavior in the future. They often engage in experimental moves to tap into the pulse of US administration, which could trigger unwanted international outcomes.<sup>10</sup> And could the accountability of an overall US foreign policy be secured if the president writes irresponsible tweets on the internet, which is also an indicator of his lack of strategic vision?

### CONCLUSION

Donald Trump is the first US president in the post-Cold War period who does not have a grand strategy. According to the neoclassical realist foreign policy model applied in this paper, this results in certain inertia in US foreign policy, given that the international systemic factor – a relative decline in US power – is not sufficient to produce such change in its foreign policy that would affect US identity – a unit level factor which strongly favors the liberal hegemonic behavior. In this sense, nevertheless, not having a grand strategy is a step forward compared to the liberal hegemony strategy of Trump's predecessors. The very fact that someone who is not a proponent of this strategy, albeit sticking to some of its elements, is elected for US president, makes a good precedent for the future. Thus I would agree with Posen that a change in US grand strategy towards restraint could only come over time, incrementally, slowly, but surely.

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<sup>9</sup> The most pressing example was when Trump tweeted that he had “absolute right” to share classified information on ISIS with Russia, while his national security adviser McMaster denied media allegations that such sharing occurred. (Baker and Davis, 2017)

<sup>10</sup> Such behavior could be seen from political leaders in the Balkans during last few months.

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## IMA LI TRAMP VELIKU STRATEGIJU?

Apstrakt: U ovom radu, autor tvrdi da je Donald Tramp do sada propustio da izvede očekivane radikalne promene spoljne politike Sjedinjenih Država, zbog toga što ne poseduje koherentnu veliku strategiju. Ovo je alternativni argument u odnosu na onaj prema kome on ima veliku strategiju, ali je isuviše slab u odnosu na spoljnopolitički establišment da bi je primenio. Definicija velike strategije kao „teorije države o tome kako da proizvede bezbednost za sebe“ je preuzeta od Berija Pozena. Prema Pozenu, ima četiri kriterijuma za klasifikovanje velikih strategija (ciljevi, pretpostavke, sredstva i stavovi), pri čemu velika strategija obavlja četiri funkcije (prioriteti, koordinacija, komunikacija i odgovornost). Trampovi prethodnici u posthladnoratovskom periodu favorizovali su veliku strategiju liberalne hegemonije, kojoj Pozen suprotstavlja alternativnu strategiju uzdržavanja. Teorijski okvir rada je neoklasični realistički model spoljne politike koji smatra pristojnu veliku strategiju neophodnom da proizvede promene u spoljnoj politici onda kada drugi činioци (raspodela moći u međunarodnom sistemu, identitet države) favorizuju spoljnopolitičku inerciju. Kako ovo nije slučaj sa Trampom,

Sjedinjene Države i dalje čekaju na predsednika sa velikom strategijom održavanja.

*Ključne reči:* Donald Tramp, Sjedinjene Države, velika strategija, spoljna politika, liberalna hegemonija, održavanje, neoklasični realizam

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