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REVIEWING THE RELATIONSHIP OF WAR AND PEACE IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: CAN WE IMAGINE A WORLD WITHOUT WAR? ¹

Bogdan Stojanović – Predrag Terzić*

ABSTRACT

The history of human civilization is the history of wars. Peace was primarily perceived as a pause between those wars. From the concept of the absence of war, peace has transformed to a far more inclusive concept that includes the absence of various types of non-military threats to human well-being. Peace has not only changed its own theoretical foundations but also the practical understanding of international politics. The concept of peace was inextricably linked to war. Hence, the authors attached importance to the expansion and deepening of the concept of war in international relations, which could also be waged by non-military means in non-physical space. The evolution of war from state and military to forms involving non-state actors, non-military threats and new arenas of warfare, i.e., cyberspace, were presented as significant subject of analysis. Relationship between war and peace was investigated in the entire historical scope, looking at it through the prism of an eclectic theoretical-methodological approach. The results found lack of the possibilities for a world without wars and reach a pessimistic conclusion that war in new forms will continue to be a feature of international politics, while peace will primarily be perceived as a period of absence of war.

Key words: Peace, War, International Politics, Violence, State, Pacifism, Global Order, 21st Century

* Dr. Bogdan Stojanović is a Research Fellow at the Institute of International Politics and Economics, 25 Makedonska St., 11103 Belgrade, Serbia, e-mail: bogdan.stojanovic@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs.

* Dr. Predrag Terzić is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Political Studies, Faculty of Political Sciences, Belgrade University, 165 Jove Ilica, 11000 Belgrade, Serbia, e-mail: predragterzic@yahoo.com.

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Introductory considerations of war and peace in international politics

The emergence of human civilization and socio-political communities created conditions for the existence of conflict situations. Conflict has been immanent in human civilization since its very beginnings. The processes of conflict and cooperation, war and peace, can be found in the oldest sources of political thought (Dimitrijević and Stojanović, 1996, p. 7). The most extreme form of social conflict is war. There are numerous and difficult attempts to define the concept of war due to the fact that it belongs to the category of social science concepts that are of a changing and unstable character. Medieval war is quite different from modern war. However, it is still possible to induce common features of all wars ever fought. Although the nature of war has changed depending on technological progress and the overall evolution of human society, every war presupposes conflicting wills and the application of force. Theoretical debates in defining the concepts of war and peace push us into the analysis of historical trends and the practice of these social phenomena. The history of events has unequivocally confirmed the truth of the thesis that the way people create wealth and the way they wage war are inextricably linked (Tofler A. and Tofler H., 1998, p. 71). The agricultural revolution enabled the storage of economic surplus, which fuelled wars in premodern societies. The industrialization of economies reflected the industrialization of war, and mass production produced mass casualties in World War II, the bloodiest human conflict to date.

The Prussian strategist **Carl von Clausewitz** considered war "an act of violence aimed at forcing the opponent to submit to our will" (Raymon, 2001, p. 59). War presupposes wills in conflict, and victory in war is achieved after subjecting the enemy to our will. **Clausewitz** said that "war is not only a political act, but a real political tool, the continuation of political relations, their realization by other means." In the social sciences there is a tendency to intertwine and expand concepts, so it is difficult to say that **Clausewitz's** model is wrong. On the contrary, by expanding the concept of politics and consequently the concept of war, it can be said that the definition of war as a long arm of politics is just as accurate today as it was in the time when it was created. However, by understanding war as a political act, **Clausewitz** ruled out absolute war as a possibility. The emergence of nuclear weapons creates a disparity between military means and political goals, and absolute war until total destruction becomes possible. However, absolute war has found its place in theory, while in

reality and international relations, filled with even a minimum of rationality, a war of total destruction is hard to imagine (Stojanović, 2013). Nuclear weapons thus simultaneously confirm and refute **Clausewitz's** thesis. The reason why at the beginning of the analysis attention is directed towards the concept of war, and not peace, is found in the undeniable fact that throughout most of human history, peace was perceived as the absence of war, i.e., a pause between two wars (Dimitrijević and Stojanović, 1996, p. 22). In the existing literature, for every thousand pages that talk about the causes of war, there is less than one page that talks about the causes of peace (Geoffrey, 1973, p. 3). Throughout history, peace has played a subordinate role to war. The ancient Greeks and Romans understood peace as the absence of war (*absentia belli*) (Simić, 1993, p. 18). Apart from the fact that the ancient understanding of peace was "negative" (the absence of war), it was very difficult to draw a line between the concepts of war and peace. Namely, for the Greeks and Romans, the war against the barbarians was not a war in the true sense, but the spreading of peace through force. The basic maxim in the war against the barbarians was: "If you want peace, prepare for war." This concept of peace in the form of "peace through strength" has remained until modern times, albeit in a somewhat milder form. In the period between 1981 and 1989, President of the United States of America (USA) **Ronald Reagan** implemented the principle of "peace through strength", which ended the decades-long conflict with the Soviet Union (USSR) (Holmes, 1995). An even narrower and more exclusive definition of the term peace is found in the Hebrew tradition (Simić, 1993, p. 19). Peace comes from faithful service to God. War is permissible, even desirable, because peace is achieved by victory and represents the outcome of war. The militant concept of peace is also found in the Islamic tradition, which advocates spreading the Islam (peace) through the sword (war) (Simić, 1993, p. 23). In the early Christian tradition, peace is not established in the material world, but exists in the afterlife as the peace of God (Simić, 1993, p. 21).

The mentioned ancient and medieval traditions in the understanding of peace point to one common feature - the subordinate position of the concept of peace in relation to the concept of war. Peace was seen as a state between two wars or the other face of a war conflict, as an extraterrestrial (divine) state that has no points of contact with the material world, or as a relationship between man and God without its place in interpersonal relations. During the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, the "negative" definition of peace as the absence of war remained. Many political thinkers in this period emphasized the positive role of

war in social relations, while peace was in the background. **Thomas Hobbes** saw the "state of nature" as a state of constant war of all against all. This situation is overcome at the internal level through the conclusion of a social contract that forms certain rules of conduct, while at the international level such a contract is not possible, so constant war is a permanent feature of international relations. **Georg V. Hegel** believed that war maintains the ethical health of the people, while peace encourages stagnation and corruption (Dimitrijević and Stojanović, 1996, p. 354). For **Hegel**, war encourages the best in man, raises people's morale and influences the development of society. The English priest, economist and demographer, **Robert Malthus**, pointed out that war is necessary to reduce excessive population growth because the planet cannot provide everyone with the necessary means of living (Malthus, 1998). **Hegel's** militaristic and **Malthusian** concepts see war as a necessary and positive social fact. The opinion that war is an irrational and harmful action gained importance only in the 20th Century, after the bloody world wars. According to the latest data, 9 million people died in the First World War, while about 37 million people were killed in the Second World War, or about 1.7% of the total world population (Oreščanin, 1964, p. 349). However, despite the accepted fact that the war was not viewed with sympathy, throughout the entire period of confrontation between the USA and the USSR, peace was still understood as the absence of war, and such an attitude dominated, while revolutionary views on this issue remained in the background.

1. Positive peace and "cold" war

„So, we must fix our vision not merely on the negative expulsion of war, but upon the positive affirmation of peace. We must see that peace represents a sweeter music, a cosmic melody that is far superior to the discords of war. Somehow, we must transform the dynamics of the world power struggle from the negative nuclear arms race which no one can win to a positive contest to harness man's creative genius for the purpose of making peace and prosperity a reality for all of the nations of the world. In short, we must shift the arms race into a peace race" (King, 1964).

A new understanding and a detailed concept of positive peace, inspired by Hindu tradition and Marxist philosophy, was presented by the Norwegian sociologist **Johan Galtung** (Galtung, 1964, pp. 1-4). His understanding fundamentally changes the essence and meaning of the concept of peace. For

Galtung, peace is a basic, not a derived concept. Thus, it cannot be defined through the concept of war. According to this, he distinguishes two types of peace. Negative peace is the absence of war, and positive peace implies the integration of human society. Two different types of peace are possible, excluding one another. There is an analogy between peace in social science and health in medicine (Galtung, 2009, p. 45). Health is not only the absence of disease, but the ability of the body to stay healthy. The study of peace is actually an applied science, similar to medicine, which rests on the paradigm: diagnosis-prognosis-therapy (Galtung, 2009, p. 52). Therapy should not be conducted through the process of reducing violence (war), but through the process of improving life (Galtung, 2009, p. 53). Violence is present when human beings are under an influence that makes their actual somatic and mental realizations lower than their potential (Galtung, 1969, p. 168). Violence is not exclusively direct violence, but also includes indirect forms, i.e., structural violence. Positive peace includes the absence of structural violence, such as hunger, racism or some other form of social discrimination, and negative peace exclusively implies the absence of direct violence, of which war is the most severe form. **Galtung's** concept of positive peace is on a higher level of idealism because it requires the observation of peace and violence at all levels and across all time periods. Thus, violence between the sexes is no less important than interstate violence. In addition, positive peace implies prevention that requires looking into the future. Positive peace implies observing the totality of human society and understanding its deepest processes in order to ensure peace at all levels and prevent the outbreak of future violence. Positive peace cannot be achieved without general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament. This concept theoretically defined peace as general well-being, not the absence of war.

The historical era known as the Cold War in capital letters presents the state of affairs between superpowers who are at war with each other, not directly, but through intermediaries. Also, such a cold war involved ideological conflict and artificial creation of crises in various parts of the world. It is reasonable to ask whether a more appropriate term would be "cold peace", given that there was no direct war between the superpowers. According to the negative definition of peace as the absence of war, the era from 1945 until the collapse of the Soviet Union can be classified as peace. Positive peace as general well-being without structural violence has not been achieved.

Although it has its roots in the Hindu tradition, the concept of positive peace was constituted by **Johan Galtung** during the 1960s, in a period when the

confrontation between the USA and the USSR largely existed. Positive peace is too idealistic a concept, and a few decades after the bloodiest conflict in human history, it was hard to expect a radical change in thinking about international relations and interpersonal relations in general. In addition, the realization of positive peace in practice requires complete disarmament, which was not a realistic option in the golden era of the security dilemma. A security dilemma is a situation where the increase in power of each party coincides with the increase in power of others, and everything ends with a decrease in security, including the costs of maintaining that power (Kegley and Witkoff, 2006, p. 711). The need to distinguish and analyse conceptual structures in the understanding of peace stems from the Cold War reality, which, viewed from different perspectives, can lead to different conclusions. Through **Galtung's** prism, the period of the Cold War was anything but a period of peace. However, if we understand peace in a "negative" definition, as the absence of war and the reign of stability in the international system, it can be said that the era of the Cold War was actually an era of "cold peace", i.e., negative peace. Cold peace implies a situation in which the most powerful states do not go to war with each other. In this case, it meant the absence of war in the relations between the two largest world powers, the USA and the USSR. International relations during the Cold War were absolutely subordinated to two superpowers in the political, economic, ideological and military sense. Realist views on international relations ruled, not tolerating ideas like positive peace, considering it too idealistic for a world dominated by relations of power and force.

Peace is understood in the simplest form, as the absence of armed conflict between two poles of power. The question arises whether it is justified to talk about positive peace when there is an undeniable fact that the world is still not even close to disarmament and purification from wars. Perhaps it would be more useful to focus intellectual energy on removing war as the first obstacle to peace. War, as a social phenomenon reflected in direct armed conflict, did not experience embodiment in the era of extremely hostile relations between the two largest world powers. It is necessary to perform an analysis and discover which factor contributed to such a war not breaking out, and if possible, direct that factor to the prevention of some future wars.

This analysis is aimed at finding and arguing the answers to these and similar questions, through the prism of the relationship between the two largest nuclear powers in history. The main question concerning this specific relationship is whether the war between the superpowers did not break out due to the existence

of a nuclear balance of power? Peace in the absolute sense, as the complete absence of war from international relations, was not achieved during the Cold War period, but there was peace between the two most important poles of power on the international stage. War was a present feature of international relations even in the period of the Cold War, but peace was preserved between the most important actors of international relations. Did nuclear weapons, or rather the balance of nuclear power, play a significant role as a factor in the peace and stability of the international system during the Cold War? Perhaps the fact that the war between the USA and the USSR would probably be the last that the two countries would fight, ensured peace between extremely hostile countries. The paradox and balance of nuclear power prevented perhaps the last war humanity would ever wage. One of the world's greatest physicists and the man whose ideas created the basis for the development of nuclear weapons, **Albert Einstein**, prophetically stated: "I do not know with what weapons the Third World War will be fought, but the Fourth World War will be fought with sticks and stones" (Calaprice, 2005, p. 173). Perhaps the potential destruction of civilization as we know it is the reason why World War III did not break out.

2. The evolution of war as a permanent characteristic of international relations

War belongs to the category of social science terms that are not easily defined. Against the difficulties of defining the concept of war stands its immanence in human civilization. The nature of war changed depending on technological progress, but also on the overall evolution of human society. The tendency of the increase in the number of war victims is connected with the historical increase of murderous and destructive capacities. The presence of war in international relations shows that **Hobbes'** man-wolf did not disappear, but changed his methods and means in realizing his own goals. **Carl von Clausewitz**, a Prussian strategist, says that war is an act of violence aimed at compelling our enemy to do our will (Aron, 2001, p. 59). Therefore, war presupposes wills in conflict and is won after the submission of the opponent to our will. Furthermore, **Clausewitz** says that war is not merely a political act but a real political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, a carrying out of the same by other means (Aron, 2001, p. 59). In the social sciences there is a tendency to intertwine and expand concepts, so it is difficult to say that **Clausewitz's** model is wrong. In contrast, by expanding the concept of politics

and consequently the concept of war, it can be said that presented definition of war as the long arm of politics is more accurate today than ever before.

The practice of war has changed its form throughout history. War as a social phenomenon evolved by changing war conditions, causes, methods, means, actors and goals, but it never disappeared from international relations. The recommendation of the former US president, **John Kennedy**, that "mankind must put an end to war or war will put an end to mankind", remained unrealized (Kegley and Witkoff, 2006, p. 578). Consequently, this would mean that humanity must become an oasis of peace in order to survive. As we analysed here, peace is understood as the absence of war, i.e., direct violence. Although the UN Charter prohibits offensive war in international relations, from 1945 until today not a single day has passed without a war being waged somewhere on the planet (UN Charter, Art. II). The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union create fertile ground for ethnic and secessionist wars, which do not correspond to the classic type of interstate armed conflict. Asymmetric wars and wars against an invisible adversary occupy the main place in international relations in the post-Cold War era. Therefore, war is still a very important characteristic of international relations and it does not seem that it will be different in the future.

However, war has evolved in practice to include more and more non-military and non-state elements, so there is more and more talk about the so-called "new" wars. In the globalized age, a new type of organized violence appears, described as the "new" war (Kaldor, 2005, p. 13). The characteristic of the "new" wars lies in the internal character of the conflict, but the external influence remains dominant due to the weakening of state sovereignty. It is for this reason that **Martin Shaw** introduced the term degenerate warfare (Kaldor, 2005, pp. 14-15). "New" wars arise due to the erosion of state sovereignty and the loss of the state's monopoly on organized violence. State sovereignty is threatened from above, by international institutional arrangements, and from below, by civil society. The right to war (*ius ad bellum*) was previously reserved exclusively for states and was derived from the thesis of state interest as the only legitimate justification for war. Non-state elements could not invoke the state interest, and were therefore excluded from the right to achieve their goals through war. The goals of the "old" wars were of a geopolitical and ideological nature, while the goals of the "new" wars are related to identity politics (Kaldor, 2005, p. 19). The struggle for the identity of a nation, clan, religious or linguistic group is at the root of the "new" wars. The conflict of identities also existed in earlier wars, but then identity was

closely connected with state interest and did not exist independently. The non-state direction of the "new" wars results in a far greater number of civilian victims. The ratio of civilian to military casualties during the wars of the nineties was 8:1 (Kaldor, 2005, p. 22). The most diverse groups of people take part in the "new" wars, such as criminal clans, mercenaries, paramilitary or parapolice forces, which mostly act in a decentralized manner. A key feature of "new" wars is the presence of asymmetric relations. "New" wars are not entirely new, but it is justified to use the term to show the difference from classic interstate wars.

War has evolved from a phenomenon based on state action, which is centralized and hierarchically organized, into a phenomenon based on privatization, decentralization and deterritorialization. The degenerate war, however, continued to exist as such in international relations. The entire 20th Century is a century of wars. With the end of the Cold War, optimism reigned when it comes to wars because it was thought that their number would decrease. However, the collapse of the Eastern Bloc only thawed new conflicts. In 1992, the number of wars per year reached a record number, 51 wars, which was three times more than in the 1960s, when the average number of wars per year was 19 (Kegley and Witkoff, 2006, p. 591). Throughout the 20th Century, there was a tendency for the number of wars to be increased. Thus, in the 1950s, an average of 13 wars were fought in the world per year, in the 1960s, 19 wars, in the 1970s, 31 wars, while during the 1980s and 1990s, more than 40 wars broke out per year (Kegley and Witkoff, 2006, p. 591).

Are we making progress as a society when it comes to violence? The history of warfare and various types of human violence is covered in **Steven Pinker's** book from antiquity to the present (Pinker, 2011). He shows that we may be living in the most peaceable era in history. The murder rate in medieval Europe was more than thirty times what it is today. Wars between developed countries have vanished. **Pinker** looks for reasons why violence has declined in modern civilizations. According to him, several of the causes of the decline, including wealth, resource rivalry, and religion, have not had a substantial impact. The powerful state (Leviathan) that exploits its power to defend its inhabitants and reaches down to subjugate subordinate entities is one element that has had a substantial impact. The term "civilizing process" which **Pinker** adopts from sociologist **Norbert Elias** has been primarily a product of the state's growing power, which has given it a monopoly-like grip on force in the most developed nations. A second element is "gentle commerce," which benefits both business partners and lowers the fear element. Another significant factor in a more

peaceful society is feminization, because from the earliest ages, males behave more violently than girls (Pinker, 2011). But **Pinker** dismisses the role of nuclear weapons on the field of prevention total war between superpowers and overemphasizes “civilizing process”. Also, nominally deaths of non-combatants have been steadily rising. War has evolved, but it has not lessened in its destructiveness. It is now more frequently a multifaceted war between fragmented or collapsed nations that no one has the capacity to terminate, as opposed to a fight between well-organized governments that can eventually negotiate peace. In some circumstances, it could be true that the contemporary state’s monopoly on force has resulted in a decline in the number of violent deaths. However, it’s also true that the power of the contemporary state has been utilized for purposes of mass murder, so one should not disregard victims of state terror too easily.

A comprehensive and complete theory of war throughout history was given by **Azar Gat**. By studying war in numerous cultures and civilizations, he tries to come up with a unique explanation, which will include all social sciences (Gat, 2006). Gat advocates an evolutionary theory in which war is a “natural” activity, and mutual competition for scarce resources is the ultimate cause of socially organized violence. He points out that aggression can be innate, but the existence of social conditions is necessary for it to manifest itself. That is why many societies have managed to live without conflict for generations.

In explaining the cause of the war, **Gat** analyses two theories. “Here the two classical and conflicting answers were formulated by **Thomas Hobbes** in the seventeenth century and by **Jean-Jacques Rousseau** in the eighteenth.” (Gat, 2006, p. 93) Hobbes’ school of anthropological pessimism is the following. **Thomas Hobbes** sees man as an egoistic being, which is why in the state of nature there is a “war of all against all” (*bellum omnium contra omnes*). In order to abolish such a situation and protect the rights and freedoms of people, a social contract is signed, which creates the state. Against the anthropological pessimism of **Thomas Hobbes**, **Jean-Jacques Rousseau** advocates the thesis of anthropological optimism. According to his opinion, man is good by nature, and his corruption is the result of the action of culture and civilization. In different periods, one of these two theories has an advantage.

Gat presents a long historical analysis of the war, which he concludes with the experience of liberal democracy and the optimistic thesis that most of the world is entering a period of “democratic peace”. „For, indeed, liberal and democratic societies have proven most attuned to modernity’s pacifying aspects.”

(Gat, 2006, p. 104) However, he believes that the liberal democracies are not absolutely inclined towards peace, because there have been wars between democratic states and even more colonial and civil wars. In the 20th Century, the benefits of peace have grown exponentially, changing the former pursuit of material benefits in war to a state in which neither side has a concrete interest in attacking another state. Democracy, wealth and comfort, the increase in urban population and metropolitan lifestyles, the sexual revolution that reduced the enthusiasm for war, the decrease in the number of male relatives, the increase in the participation of women in public life make relations between most countries similar to those between the United States and Canada. Nuclear deterrence also plays a positive role. However, stability is threatened by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism.

After the end of the Cold War and accelerated globalization, war remained a significant feature of international relations, perhaps even more significant than before. **Fukuyama's** thesis about the end of history turned out to be partly correct. The concept of liberal democracy won a great victory in the ideological confrontation between the West and the East, so prominent authors announced the great "end of history" (Fukuyama, 1989). Regardless of the self-confidence and optimism of the scientific and professional public in the West, liberal democracy still failed to spread throughout the world. The Western countries of liberal democracy may have entered the "post-historical era", but a large number of countries are still mired in a historical age, which is full of wars. It seems that these countries will not be able to get out of the historical mud for a long time.

It is justified to ask the question whether war would still be a significant feature of international relations if all countries of the world accepted the liberal-democratic concept? The liberal theory of democratic peace says that the main causes of wars are found in the way states are organized. The main formula of this theory is found in the position that democratic states do not go to war with each other. Wars can therefore be eradicated by the spread of liberal democracy in the world. The facts show that examples of wars between stable democratic states are really rare. If we accept the utopia that the idea of liberal democracy is universalized and covers the whole world, war between states would probably be eradicated, or at least less represented. However, it was noted that the nature of war has changed and interstate wars are becoming less frequent, but it is unlikely that the "new" war would disappear even with the introduction of democracy on a planetary level. The "new" wars are predominantly intrastate. The end of the Cold War resulted in an explosion of intrastate wars. In the period between 1989 and

2001, 118 intrastate wars broke out, as opposed to 8 interstate wars in the same period (Kegley and Vitkoff, 2006, p. 611). The most common causes of intrastate wars are ethnic and religious factors, but also economic disputes and struggles of different groups to obtain state control. Although these wars are of a local character, there is a huge external influence or even direct involvement of foreign factors in them (Kaldor, 2005, p. 14). In times of multidimensional globalization, the distinction between local and global is sometimes lost.

It seems that intrastate wars will take on even greater momentum in the future, given that there are less than 200 states in the world, and thousands of different ethnic groups that already aspire or will aspire to an independent nation state in the future. New war arenas such as cyberspace and outer space are emerging (Stojanović, 2021). War will thus, changing its form, continue to be a permanent feature of international relations.

3. The curse of the alienation of violence

In accordance with what has been said, it is justified to ask the question whether a pacifist global order is even possible? Can peace win the final victory over war, which would place the **Galtung's** attempts to reconceptualize peace on the pedestal of theoretical determination. If there were no more wars, we would not define peace as the absence of war, but a proactive course of defining peace as the absence of structural violence such as hunger and poverty would prevail. In addition to the analysis of the phenomenon of war and peace at the level of the international system, it is necessary to descend to the level of the building unit of the system, i.e., man as an individual. The theoretical conception of pacifism stems from two key positions of **Cheyney Ryan**. While the first refers to the determination of the "pacifist impulse", which is understood as the refusal to kill out of conviction, rather than rational consideration, the second is based on the analysis of the attitudes of Western authors towards war and fighting methods (Cawston, 2019, p. 42). Such alienated violence enables violent behaviour, ignoring emotions and attitudes that could represent resistance to such action. Understanding the alienated nature of modern violence requires an answer to the question of how to react to alienated and institutional forms of violence, i.e., how to reject it. The limitations of the ahistorical approach to pacifism lead to the emergence of an alternative approach that connects attitudes about pacifism with an awareness of the material and institutional requirements for its success. Therefore, an alternative form of pacifism should be formed as a response to

modern forms of alienated violence.

The pacifist impulse is based on the moral foundations of not killing the enemy, because it sees in him/her not only an enemy soldier, but primarily a human being. The enemy soldier does not exclusively bear the epithet of fascist, Nazi, communist or any other designation that should produce the urge to kill, but represents a being similar to you. The pacifist impulse, in **Ryan's** model, is not a set of moral principles or arguments against killing, but primarily represents a sensitivity to the status of others as related creatures, coupled with a refusal to create a distance that obscures this feeling and thus makes killing possible (Cawston, 2019, p. 42). Such a feeling precludes certain actions towards another person, including murder. The second claim stems from **Ryan's** explanation of the Chickenhawk Syndrome, which is based on a changed Western way of understanding war. Such an understanding is influenced by institutional arrangements that do not burden citizens with war costs, as well as the understanding that war does not require a specific sacrifice from the average citizen. That is why citizens in the West do not understand the reasons for the war, nor do they understand who the war is being waged against, and they are often unable to determine the country where the war is being fought. Thus, responsibility disappears and it becomes easier to go to war. While pacifist conditions affect the reduction of distance and the understanding of the enemy as neighbour, the institutional arrangements and phenomenological aspects of modern warfare create conditions for alienated war.

Nonviolence theorists **Tolstoy**, **Gandhi** and **Martin Luther King** found the basis of nonviolence in people's relationship to themselves and others. Pacifist thinking and actions in this sense are associated with concern for the feelings of a fellow being. In debates about the ethics of war, pacifism is defined as unrealistic, idealistic and naive, and when opposing opinions regarding the pacifist impulse, the basis of moral obligation is undermined by the discussion of the permits and limitations of justified killing. One way for a moral community to prohibit an act is to make it such that it never occurs to people (Cawston, 2019, p. 45). However, **Ryan** states that there are mechanisms that interfere with the ability to see another person as a related creature. Thus, by defining the other as a fascist or a Nazi, distance is created and that person is no longer thought of as a neighbour. Thus, it dehumanizes the related being, and makes murder possible.

The present age is a period of alienated war. Alienation is understood as the feeling that the war is a distant event and that supporting the war does not involve sacrifice for the average citizen (Cawston, 2019, p. 46). This analysis implies the

emergence of a professional (mercenary) army, and raises questions of responsibility, civic duty and moral consistency. However, in the period of alienated war, a stronger form of alienation emerges. Thus, the analysis is extended to modern violence, which takes the form of alienation. That is why, instead of the age of alienated war, one can rather speak of the period of alienated violence. Alienated violence, in addition to war, also includes the violent actions of the police, the judiciary, detentions, deportations, sexual violence, domestic violence, as well as structural violence related to poverty and racism. Expanding the analysis to other forms of violence is necessary and convergent to **Galtung's** expansion of peace as the absence of structural violence, not just the absence of war. Bureaucratic, technological and ideological developments reduce our ability to recognize and respond to violence. In the **Marxist-Hegelian** understanding, alienation occurs when the connection between the one who possesses power and the power itself is interrupted or blurred. "The object I have created, or the act I have performed, appears separate and distinct and is experienced as not belonging to me, nor it is an expression of myself" (Cawston, 2019, p. 47). In **Marx's** perception of wage labour, workers are alienated from the objects they produce, because they do not own or control them. Contemporary violence is also alienated from citizens, both in terms of the possibility of its use and the way of using and controlling security structures.

The alienation of violence also contributes to the separation of violence from its effects. Thus, decisions on action are reduced to a whole series of decisions made by various bodies and individuals. Additionally, alienation is influenced by physical distance from the process of violence, but also by the type of actions that seem detached from the nature of the results. Thus, apparently non-violent actions, such as the push of a button, can cause thousands of people to suffer. In a similar way, the invention of firearms enabled the creation of greater alienation compared to earlier ways of applying violence. Just as the relations between the bourgeoisie can be defined as exploitative and conflictual, the relations between civilians and members of the security services can be defined in a similar way. While civilians renounce the possibility of using violence, fighters in certain situations, such as protests, become the target of people's anger and frustration. The separation between civilians and soldiers, police and the public means that security forces do not engage in direct physical violence as part of everyday life. Civilians do not face the violence that sustains their way of life and thus form the belief that our daily interactions are naturally social and immediate, when in fact they depend on essential violence. By means of the **Marxist-**

Hegelian theory, the broader historical development of violence, as well as its manifestation in various aspects of contemporary life, can be investigated.

One of the key characteristics of alienated violence is the division of labour, from which it follows that most people are not directly involved in violence. That distance allows us to become sensitive to direct, physical violence. The covert nature of violence creates sensitivity and aversion to violence, whereby people see themselves as non-violent. Since we cannot value ourselves as violent beings, we use technologies and ideologies that allow us to think of ourselves as non-violent beings. The combination of our aversion to violence and our tendency to think of ourselves as nonviolent leads us to perceive alienated violence as an end in itself. Alienation introduces the dimensions of distance, and distance can be physical, emotional, moral, agency and phenomenological. Alienated violence diminishes or dominates the feeling towards one's neighbour. Our estranged state thus facilitates participation in structures and action, while there is little or no awareness. Control, engagement, re-appropriation of violence and recognition of one's own violence represent the four dimensions of alienation. Acknowledging our own violence combined with feeling for our fellow creatures motivates us to reduce the manifestations of our own violence. The probability of such a thing happening in practice is not high, but it is theoretically possible.

Pacifism implies the existence of a pacifist impulse created through a process of alienation, but it denies the distance associated with alienated violence that rendered that impulse impotent. Thus, pacifism is seen not as an idealistic moral orientation, but as a materialistic position that implies the emergence of changes in the relations of violence in practice.

4. World war in the global order of the 21st Century

In order to be able to understand the present, it is necessary to know the past. The new phase of world history, which began in the middle of the last century, is completely different from the history that lasted for the previous 10,000 years, from the transition to sedentary agriculture. Nevertheless, **Francis Fukuyama's** thesis about the end of history, which was popular in the first decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall, experienced a practical negation. The changes that took place during the "short twentieth century", as **Eric Hobsbawm** calls it, include a communication revolution that practically abolished time and distance, but also four social aspects of sudden changes: 1. reduction of the peasantry, which until the 19th Century was the largest part of the world's population, 2. the

growth of the population of urban areas and the emergence of hyper-cities, 3. the replacement of the world of oral communication with the world of universal reading and handwriting or typing and 4. the change in the position of women (Hobsbawm, 2008, p. 16).

The role of the state, however, changes in the period of dominance of the free market ideology, so that the state transfers its traditional responsibilities, postal services, electricity supply, as well as police forces and prisons, to private companies focused on making a profit. Hobsbawm points out that, at the time of his writing, there were about 30,000 such armed "private contractors" in Iraq (Hobsbawm, 2008, p. 18). Thus, states no longer have a monopoly over the armed forces, and conscripts are no longer ready to fight and die for their country. In terms of economic relations, the process of globalization has also contributed to the growth of the wave of labour migration from poorer to richer regions within the same countries, but also across international borders. The arrival of workers from abroad in Western countries produces a whole series of cultural, religious and civilizational tensions. Economic globalization also influenced the deindustrialization of countries that were "behind the Iron Curtain" during the Cold War, but also the shift of mass industrial production to Asian countries. China thus became the "workshop of the world".

In the situation of the economic strengthening of Asian countries, primarily China, as well as Russia's aspiration to regain the status of a superpower, and especially taking into account the actuality of the Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict, the question arises whether today the fear of the outbreak of a new world war is greater than ever. Today, there are dozens of smaller or larger war hotspots in the world, as well as a large number of refugees and internally displaced persons who were victims of forced mass population relocations. Although small wars, viewed through the standards of the 20th Century, can produce great disasters, the consequences of starting a world war are unfathomable. The chances of a new world war are increasing due to the growing inequality created by the ideology of the free market and the uncontrolled globalization associated with it. The lack of balance in international relations, which was caused by the victory of the United States in the competition with the Soviet Union, also increases the possibility of a global conflict. The balance of fear that guarantees nuclear weapons between possessor states increases the role of world war and brings a dose of stability to the relationship between the nuclear superpowers (Petrović and Stojanović, 2012). However, nuclear parity between the strongest cannot prevent the outbreak of a new world war that would be fought through

intermediaries, and not directly between nuclear powers. Such a war is taking place in Ukraine, still of a regional nature, but with the potential to draw many other countries into the conflict.

Libiseller and **Milevski** in their seminal article challenge the border between concepts of war and peace, directing it to the so-called “grey-zone” conflict and “hybrid warfare” (Libiseller and Milevski, 2021). The concept of “grey-zone” conflict establishes an area between war and peace that is primarily defined by what it is not. Additionally, these ideas propagate imperfect understandings of war and peace, exacerbating our perception that we are unable to tell the difference between these two. Most of the contemporary armed conflicts can be classified in this zone, which blurs the distinction between wartime and peacetime relations. Although **Libiseller** and **Milevski** refer to space between war and peace where competition exists below the threshold of armed conflict, we would rather include contemporary armed conflict in this blurred zone. Hard concepts of war and peace are arbitrary with impossibility to reflect the reality of today’s armed conflicts. The authors correctly conclude the tendency towards sub-conventional conflict with the simultaneous existence of war and peace (Libiseller and Milevski, 2021). However, the “grey-zone” is not only a competition, but also a low-intensity armed conflict that does not correspond to the classical concept of war, while at the same time it cannot be considered as a peace. This competition also includes activities such as cyber warfare, economic and political pressures, sharp rhetoric on the brink of declaration of war. A good example of this type of “grey-zone” is the relationship between NATO and Russia during the war in Ukraine. Although without direct war, these two entities are not in peaceful relations. This is evidenced by the statements of high-ranking officials of Western countries, such as the statement of the German foreign minister **Annalena Baerbock** that „we are fighting a war against Russia, and not against each other” (Reuters, 2023) Therefore, the absence of war does not automatically mean that there is a peace between the parties. The curvature of the border between these two terms does not allow them to be viewed separately.

According to the rules of the Red Cross (International Committee of the Red Cross - ICRC), which represents a kind of guardian of the norms of international humanitarian law, published and summarized in a study in 2005, every war must respect the proportionality of attacks, the prohibition of indiscriminate killing, the prohibition of all means that cause unnecessary suffering and rules to protect the natural environment (ICRS, 2005). Indiscriminate attacks are defined as those that are not directed at a specific military objective, that can hardly be limited and

controlled by international humanitarian law due to their devastating effects and most importantly, that are not capable of distinguishing civilian from military objectives (ICRS, 2005, p. 40). Proportionality in attacks prohibits such attacks that cause incidental injury and death to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination of both elements (ICRS, 2005, p. 46). Means and methods of warfare that cause unnecessary suffering are also prohibited. Preservation of the environment imposes the obligation that attacks must not be such as to cause unnecessary damage to the environment.

Means of warfare that can intentionally or accidentally cause widespread and long-term damage to the environment are prohibited (ICRS, 2005, p. 151). The study is based on a set of rules from multilateral treaties, including the additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions (Protocol I) and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, as well as the practices and legal opinions of states regarding armed conflicts. Modern war in the era of the kind of development of international institutions, legal norms and the system of international sanctions must respect the "rules of the game". After the Second World War, as the bloodiest event in human history, the states tried to prevent some new uncontrolled violence by establishing the UN mechanism. In addition to the mentioned nuclear parity, international law and institutions play a significant role in preventing the outbreak of the Third World War, but at the same time they do not guarantee the prevention of the outbreak of many other wars. Norms of international humanitarian law foresee the obligation to distinguish the civilian population from active combatants. Therefore, weapons that indiscriminately kill civilians are banned, but civilians still die in wars. War will thus continue to exist as an inseparable element of international relations, and peace as its antipode will predominantly be viewed through the lens of the absence of war.

Conclusion

The relationship between war and peace builds the dual reality of international relations and human civilization from the earliest beginnings. Peace was understood as the absence of war or a pause between two war conflicts, which means that without war, peace would be a permanent state. The connection of this relationship is so great that the big question is whether there is peace without war, i.e., would there be a perception of such a state if its opposite did not exist. The evolution of the term peace and its reconceptualization by probably the greatest theoretician of peace, **Johan Galtung**, breaks the strong

connection with war as its opposite. Positive peace is much more than the absence of war and includes human well-being, a state without hunger and poverty, with a healthy environment. Undoubtedly, the great idea of reconceptualizing the concept of peace has not been confirmed in practice because peace is still seen as a state of absence of war, albeit not in the traditional sense. War is no longer strictly reserved for state actors and is often asymmetric, waged in invisible space often with non-military means of warfare. Increasingly frequent events of information war, cyber war or war against terrorism have broadened the understanding of the term, but while maintaining its essence. Every war involves violence, but at the same time it is justified to ask whether it is a human necessity. The author's conclusion is that a pacifist order cleansed of war, at least the classical one, is not possible due to the immanent alienation of violence. A world without war is only achievable if the pacifist impulse overcomes the fact of the alienation of violence, which creates distance in relation to other people. While war will undoubtedly continue to be a permanent feature of international politics, a new world war is unlikely to occur. A third world war in which the world's most powerful countries would directly participate is not a realistic scenario, primarily because of the enormous nuclear potential, capable of putting an end to human existence. The functioning of norms and the strength of international institutions play a role in preventing the outbreak of a world war. Regional wars are being fought all over the world today, with the potential to have a global effect. Incentives for new conflicts are created by accelerated globalization and the strengthening of inequality, and the weakening of state sovereignty leads to the loss of control over conflicts. Non-state actors play an increasingly important role in warfare, but states will continue to be the bearers of "war games". Nuclear weapons prevent the outbreak of direct war between nuclear powers, but they do not prevent proxy crises and wars. The entire research offers the answer that classic, as well as "new", wars will continue to follow humanity on its way. Peace, understood as the opposite of war, will remain an inseparable factor in that relationship.

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