The Stratgic Communication of China’s Global Security Initiative

Mitić, Aleksandar (2023) The Stratgic Communication of China’s Global Security Initiative. In: Conference Proceedings / The 3rd “Dialogues on China” International Academic Conference: New Chinese Initiatives for a Changing Global Security November 9-10, 2023, Belgrade. Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, pp. 263-279. ISBN 978-86-7067-321-2

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Abstract

China unveiled its Global Security Initiative (GSI) in a sensitive international context, only two months after the February 2022 start of Russia’s military operation in Ukraine. Beijing garnered early international support for its initiative by promoting the concept bilaterally and at the leading multilateral fora. Yet, its main strategic communication effort occurred in February–March 2023. Beijing first reinvigorated the GSI with its Concept Paper on February 21 and then paired it, three days later, on the occasion of the first anniversary of Russia’s operation, with its 12-point position paper on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis. Although the position paper received little support in the West, it boosted the prominence of the GSI, particularly among non-Western countries. Two weeks later, Beijing struck a remarkable strategic communication success for the GSI when it brokered a surprising deal between regional foes Iran and Saudi Arabia on the restoration of their diplomatic relations. Through this performance, Beijing succeeded in presenting the story not only about the existence of the GSI but also about its concrete potential as well as the important role it could play in the resolution of other conflicts. While support for the GSI has grown in the Global South, Western reactions have ranged from lukewarm to negative, accusing the initiative of spreading anti-NATO and anti- US aims and vying to become an ‘alternative to the Western-led security order’. Nevertheless, an early assessment of China’s strategic communication on the GSI shows timeliness, robustness, flexibility, attractiveness, communicative value of action, and coherence between words and deeds.

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